Articles

This article argues that the courts should have invoked Alaska’s public trust doctrine, which prevents the granting of preferences over state natural resources. The courts should have also rigorously examined the BOG’s wolf killing policies and protected the wolf as a valuable public trust resource. The BOG’s wolf killing policies have not been supported by the public, leading to ballot initiatives to protect the wolf. Congress is currently considering the Protect America’s Wildlife Act, which will prevent the same day airborne hunting of Alaska’s wolves.

Folks come to law smithies with tort troubles. Those troubles follow this general scenario: Allegedly, someone has breached a duty owed that damaged another’s right, thus calling for a duty of smithies to fix it. In this nation’s separation of government powers, that scenario initiates a job for the judicial branch, where courts are the shop smithies. Within their job description and among its many work orders lies the issue of pet loss remedy. That remedy will be the focus of this Essay; but first, all remedy of any kind must be put in context.

In this Introduction to Volume 13, Part 2 of Animal Law, the author considers the "Animal Question" - the shorthand term "for all of those difficult questions about our views of, and relations with,nonhuman animals."

This Article uses the theory of deliberative democracy, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and others, to suggest that public discourse is essential to encouraging democratic change in animal welfare law. The author examines the legal regimes of Canada and New Zealand to determine which country better facilitates a public dialogue about the treatment of animals. The Article concludes that, while Canada has a number of laws that ostensibly protect animals, New Zealand’s regime is much better at creating the public discourse required to meaningfully advance animal protection. The author does not suggest that New Zealand’s regime is perfect; rather, New Zealand’s model is preferable to Canada’s because it allows the public to meaningfully engage in laws affecting animals at regular intervals. In Canada, generating discussion in government about animal welfare is too often left to the whim of legislators. Due to New Zealand’s model of encouraging and requiring public discourse, its protection laws have begun to surpass those of Canada, and there is reason to believe this will continue. Encouraging public discourse about our assumptions about animals fosters hope for meaningful progress in their lives.

The Animal Welfare Act is a federal statute that directs the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture to "promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors." This article summarizes the original 1966 act, all its amendments, and bills to amend it that are pending in the 109th Congress.

A comprehensive consideration of the role of animals in the cultural development of China,

A comprehensive consideration of the role of animals in the cultural development of China.

This paper considers several sources of international law as potential candidates to protect harp seals from cruelty and over-exploitation. Part I of this paper discusses the Canadian Marine Mammal Regulations, which are the legal-regulatory structure under which the hunt takes place. Part II describes the range and status of the main species targeted in the commercial seal hunt, namely, the harp seals. Part III reviews several several sources of international law as potential candidates to protect and conserve the targeted harp seals. This paper concludes that the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora(CITES) is the most likely candidate to protect harp seals from unsustainable trade, and that they should be listed as a protected species under Appendix II.

Part I of this article gives an overview of the problem: dog breed discrimination by insurers, as well as a related problem of breed-specific legislation by some states. Part II analyzes the major scientific studies on dog bites, showing that no one has adequately proven that some breeds are more inherently dangerous than others. Part III shows that breed discrimination and breed-specific legislation are opposed by most veterinary and animal groups. Part IV demonstrates that insurers have been ignoring the unique and special role that pets play in millions of American homes. Part V shows how the insurance industry is a highly regulated industry which subjects itself to legislative control where, as here, the public is being harmed by underwriting decisions not driven by actuarial justification.

The Delhi Sands Flower Loving Fly obtained endangered species status on the day a county planned to construct a hospital on the fly's dwindling habitat. Since the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the taking of any endangered species and courts have interpreted "taking" to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures” a member of the species, the county made concessions to comply with the ESA. However, when the county learned that the fly stood in the way of its plans to redesign an intersection, the county filed suit challenging the application of the ESA to the fly's habitat; many others who also wished to build on the fly's habitat joined in the suit as well. Using United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), these groups hoped the district court would find that the ESA, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, could not constitutionally protect the fly's habitat. The district court, however, upheld the act's application. In the appeal of the district case, known as the National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, but offered three different explanations why the ESA could or could not constitutionally require protection of the fly. In this article, John Copeland Nagle investigates these three strikingly diverse explanations. In doing so, Nagle also investigates whether Congress has the power to protect something that is very rare, very valuable, and seemingly entirely uninvolved with commerce between the states.

This paper analyzes the conflicting management goals for the double-crested cormorant in Canada and the United States. In doing so, the paper answers the question whether one can predict how the migratory, double-crested cormorant population will be managed through international law, when the United States perceives the rise of the cormorant population an economic and biological threat, but where Canada views the cormorant’s comeback a biodiversity success story.

This article discusses the fact that the International Whaling Commission has not expressly recognized the Makah tribe's aboriginal subsistence need, and instead has intentionally left the issue ambiguous. The only viable reason for the IWC to deny the Norwegians a quota under the same exemption is the "aboriginal" requirement. The IWC should clarify the legal ambiguities regarding the right to harvest whales, and it should grant subsistence right to Norwegian coastal fishermen.

This article examines the main arguments used for denying moral rights to nonhuman animals, the rights to life and bodily integrity in particular. Because these arguments are deficient, animals should not be denied legal rights on the basis of their presumed moral inferiority to humans.

Article explains how the laws which deal with protection of animals from inappropriate human acts developed during the 1800's. The key focus is on Henry Bergh's efforts in the adoption of the 1867 New York Act.

Mr. Duckler delves into valuation issues that arise in the context of recovery of non-economic damages for death and injury to companion animals. He argues that the special nature of companion animals in society necessitates an assigned monetary worth to such animals that is distinct from and exceeds mere market value. As support for this contention, Mr. Duckler provides relevant legal, sociological, and anthropological analyses.

Historically, in prosecutions under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to prove the element “knowingly” the government only had to prove that a defendant intentionally killed an animal that turned out to be endangered or threatened, not that the defendant knew the identity of the species or the endangered or threatened status of the animal when it was killed. Jury instructions to this effect were repeatedly upheld. Then, in a brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court for McKittrick v. U.S., the federal government, unprompted, unnecessarily, and without explanation, said that it would not use this jury instruction in the future because the instruction did not properly explain “knowingly.” The U.S. Department of Justice subsequently issued a directive to its attorneys to that same effect. Now, there is a self-imposed rule in ESA prosecutions requiring prosecutors to prove that a defendant knew the animal was endangered or threatened at the time it was “taken” or killed. This Article discusses ways in which this change conflicts with the established law and its impact on ESA prosecutions.

In recent years, several member states in the European Union enacted legislation to regulate or prohibit fur farming. This article calls for further action to ban the practice throughout the European Union. The Author notes animals’ inabilities to protect their own interests and the role of law to protect these vulnerable interests. The Author concludes by responding to the objections of fur farming proponents, ultimately finding no legitimate justification for the documented suffering of animals raised on fur farms.