Articles

This article examines the public policy debate over control of stray animal populations, in particular, feral cat colonies. The author, director of a feral cat advocacy group, explains that many of the individuals who act as caretakers for feral cat colonies are caught in a conundrum as to whether they should come "out" as caretakers or remain in secrecy. Much of the current legal policy for animals stems from antiquated animal control laws that do not accurately reflect the attitude of the country toward companion animals.

Drawing upon various schools of legal thought, this Essay explores how ideological and non-legal factors influence the adjudication process in animal law cases. The Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements highlighted the indeterminacy present in legal doctrine and undermined trust in judges’ ability to arrive at “correct” answers to legal questions. In the midst of such indeterminacy, where legal texts do not predetermine legal outcomes, judges tend to render decisions that are consistent with pervasive societal norms and existing distributions of political power. Starting from these premises, the Author questions whether innovative and creative impact litigation by the animal law movement can succeed in fundamentally challenging speciesism through a legal system that is pervasively hostile to the interests of animals. Although incremental and meaningful gains are possible through litigation, we must recognize the limits of legal reform in the short-term. Although such limitations are typically seen as cause for despair, the Author argues that recognizing our powerlessness can be a source of compassion and an opportunity to experience our shared existential vulnerability with animals.

The Article begins with a brief history of service animals. It continues with an analysis of the proposed changes to the ADA rules and selected case law that illustrates the need for clarification in this area of the law. The Article then evaluates the way service animals are handled under the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) because of recent regulatory activity interpreting that law. The Article concludes by arguing that there are rational reasons to have an expansive definition of service animal under the ADA and, in the alternative, if there is a restrictive definition under the ADA, the broader protections under the FHA and ACAA should remain in place.

Part I provides a brief recount of the history of Anglo-American statutes prohibiting harm to animals. In Part II, the notions of victimhood, consent and harm are explored in order to lay the groundwork for the claims that will be put forth in the remainder of the article. Part III examines five different theories advanced to explain the interest society seeks to promote by punishing acts that are harmful to animals. Part IV explains why it is not necessarily the case, as some animal law scholars have argued, that because animal cruelty statutes allow for the infliction of harm to animals as a result of hunting, scientific activities and farming, the interest primarily sought to be protected by these laws is something other than the protection of animals.

The role of humans in mass extinctions necessitates an assessment of the collective human psychology responsible for the degradation of Earth’s life support systems. In this paper, the Author will cite instruments and discourse relevant to international environmental law to illustrate how an antiquated conception of biological hierarchies is condoned whenever other species are mentioned.

This article offers an extended analogy for the purpose of posing basic questions about proposals for granting legal rights to some nonhuman animals. The analogy is drawn from the precedent-breaking eighteenth century English case Somerset v. Stewart, which liberated an African slave. The article highlights the complex cultural backdrop in each situation, and suggests that the comparison helps one see the nature and possibilities of precedent-breaking decisions that rely on various non-legal resources available to judges who, because of conscience, principle, or policy considerations, choose not to follow established precedent.

(From article) This article chronicles the evolution of enforcing after-death gifts for the benefit of pet animals. Part II reviews the common law background. Part III details the wide variety of approaches adopted by United States courts, legislatures, and commentators. These approaches treat after-death gifts for pets in three basic categories: (1) invalid; (2) tolerated, but not enforceable; and (3) valid and enforceable. After establishing the current milieu in which a pet owner must function, Part IV recommends the steps an owner may take to maximize the chances of the pet receiving the desired care after the owner's death.

Part I of this Note discusses the current conditions on factory farms, including the suffering endured by the animals, the unsanitary and crowded conditions, the unwholesome contents of animal feed, and the drugs regularly administered to the animals. Part II describes how those conditions pose significant health risks for humans who consume factory-farmed meat and dairy products, including threats of antibiotic resistance, bacterial infections, cancer, heart disease, animal-origin influenza, and mad cow disease. Finally, Part III proposes six specific on-farm regulations that could drastically reduce such risks and explores whether the proposed regulations could be enacted by the FDA under the existing regulatory scheme.