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People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep't of Agric. & Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.

Summary: The plaintiffs, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sought documents from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), the entity within the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) that administers the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). The USDA took a large amount of documents off of its website relating to AWA compliance. The USDA claimed that the removal was for the purpose of removing certain personal information and although they did not say that the removal was temporary, the agency described the removal as provisional which suggests that it is temporary in nature. The plaintiffs filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief and invoking a provision known as FOIA’s reading room provision (5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(2)). The provision requires that agencies make available for public inspection in an electronic format five categories of documents. The plaintiffs allege that the agency removed (1) research facility annual reports; (2) inspection reports; (3) lists of entities licensed under the AWA; and (4) regulatory correspondence and enforcement records that had not yet received final adjudication. Category 4 and the portion of category 2 consisting of animal inventories were dismissed and not discussed in this case. Categories 1-3 appeared to be reposted by the agency which is why the district court dismissed them as moot. The appeal centers on the reposted records and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Ultimately the Court held that for the reposted records featuring new redactions, the complaint was most plausibly read as requesting that USDA repost all information that those records contained before their takedown. The Court stated that the district court should proceed to the merits on remand. As to “voluntary cessation,” the Court affirmed the mootness dismissal as to the research reports but remanded for further explanation as to the inspection reports and the entity lists. If the agency unambiguously commits to continued posting of those documents, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as moot, without discovery, even if USDA continues to regard its postings as voluntary.

The plaintiffs, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sought documents from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), the entity within the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) that administers the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). The USDA took a large amount of documents off of its website relating to AWA compliance. The USDA claimed that the removal was for the purpose of removing certain personal information and although they did not say that the removal was temporary, the agency described the removal as provisional which suggests that it is temporary in nature. The plaintiffs filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief and invoking a provision known as FOIA’s reading room provision (5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(2)). The provision requires that agencies make available for public inspection in an electronic format five categories of documents. The plaintiffs allege that the agency removed (1) research facility annual reports; (2) inspection reports; (3) lists of entities licensed under the AWA; and (4) regulatory correspondence and enforcement records that had not yet received final adjudication. Category 4 and the portion of category 2 consisting of animal inventories were dismissed and not discussed in this case. Categories 1-3 appeared to be reposted by the agency which is why the district court dismissed them as moot. The appeal centers on the reposted records and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Ultimately the Court held that for the reposted records featuring new redactions, the complaint was most plausibly read as requesting that USDA repost all information that those records contained before their takedown. The Court stated that the district court should proceed to the merits on remand. As to “voluntary cessation,” the Court affirmed the mootness dismissal as to the research reports but remanded for further explanation as to the inspection reports and the entity lists. If the agency unambiguously commits to continued posting of those documents, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as moot, without discovery, even if USDA continues to regard its postings as voluntary.

Commonwealth v. Baumgartner

Summary: Appellant Charles Baumgartner was charged and convicted of animal fighting for amusement or gain as a result of an incident that occurred on March 9, 2017. Baumgartner brought his white pit pull named "Menace" to fight a pit bull that belonged to Adam Aviles. Police learned of the dog fight after being informed a video of the fight had been uploaded to social media. Baumgartner was ultimately charged with animal fighting and assaulting Mr. Aviles, but was convicted by jury only of animal fighting. On appeal, Baumgartner contends that his conviction should be set aside because the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence of amusement or gain as required by statute. As a matter of first impression, this Court considered the term "amusement or gain" as an element of the animal fighting, which is undefined in the anti-cruelty laws. The court found that no cases or other jurisdiction defines the term with respect to animal fighting, and thus, under principles of statutory interpretation, relies on the common usage and dictionary definitions. The court found that there was sufficient evidence admitted a trial for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Baumgartner allowed his dog to engage in animal fighting for amusement or gain, i.e., for “pleasurable diversion” or “advantage acquired or increased.” The Court concluded that Baumgartner facilitated the dog fight as a means of retribution against Aviles for a prior dog fighting incident. Therefore, his motive was personal gain. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Baumgartner’s conviction. Judge Pellegrini dissented stating that she does not believe that retribution is the type of amusement or gain within the meaning of the statute. She interprets the statute as outlawing animal fighting as a sport rather than all animal fights.

Appellant Charles Baumgartner was charged and convicted of animal fighting for amusement or gain as a result of an incident that occurred on March 9, 2017. Baumgartner brought his white pit pull named "Menace" to fight a pit bull that belonged to Adam Aviles. Police learned of the dog fight after being informed a video of the fight had been uploaded to social media. Baumgartner was ultimately charged with animal fighting and assaulting Mr. Aviles, but was convicted by jury only of animal fighting. On appeal, Baumgartner contends that his conviction should be set aside because the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence of amusement or gain as required by statute. As a matter of first impression, this Court considered the term "amusement or gain" as an element of the animal fighting, which is undefined in the anti-cruelty laws. The court found that no cases or other jurisdiction defines the term with respect to animal fighting, and thus, under principles of statutory interpretation, relies on the common usage and dictionary definitions. The court found that there was sufficient evidence admitted a trial for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Baumgartner allowed his dog to engage in animal fighting for amusement or gain, i.e., for “pleasurable diversion” or “advantage acquired or increased.” The Court concluded that Baumgartner facilitated the dog fight as a means of retribution against Aviles for a prior dog fighting incident. Therefore, his motive was personal gain. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Baumgartner’s conviction. Judge Pellegrini dissented stating that she does not believe that retribution is the type of amusement or gain within the meaning of the statute. She interprets the statute as outlawing animal fighting as a sport rather than all animal fights.

Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Association, LLC

Summary: Deborah Sanzaro and Michael Sanzaro are the plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs are homeowners and members of a homeowners association ("HOA"). Three incidents occurred at the HOA clubhouse in which Deborah Sanzaro attempted to enter with her Chihuahua, which she claimed was a service animal. In each of these three incidents, Deborah was denied access to the clubhouse. The first incident occurred on March 11, 2009. Deborah entered the club house with her dog and the manager of the HOA asked her why she brought the dog into the clubhouse with her. Deborah explained that her dog assisted her with her disability and was a service animal, however, she could not provide any documentation to the manager as to that effect. She was then asked to leave the clubhouse to which she refused. Only after security was called did Deborah leave. Later, on that same day, Deborah entered the clubhouse with her service dog without any incident. The HOA sent a letter to the plaintiffs after the first incident notifying them that that Deborah had violated the HOA’s governing documents and that a hearing before the HOA board would take place on March 30, 2009. Plaintiffs never showed for this hearing which ultimately resulted in the Board finding that Deborah violated HOA rules and regulations by entering the clubhouse with her dog and not providing documentation. Deborah was assessed multiple fines. Prior to the hearing, the HOA sent out letters to the other residents letting them know that they would accommodate any legitimate service animal if their staff is properly advised of such. They also mailed out a letter regarding the incident with the plaintiffs to all of the other residents. The plaintiffs began to receive hate mail and verbal harassment regarding their dispute with the HOA board. The plaintiffs received many threats and had their property defaced by an anonymous homeowner who spray painted their garage door telling them to get out of the neighborhood. The HOA did nothing to stop this harassment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division and their claim was submitted to a non-binding arbitrator. Deborah provided a doctor’s statement requesting that her dog be registered as a service dog, a notice of entitlement to disability benefits from the SSA, a doctor’s statement regarding Deborah’s disability, and a statement from Deborah explaining how her dog had been trained to assist her. The Arbitrator found for the Ardiente Homeowners Association because she did not find Deborah’s explanation as to why she needed the dog as being persuasive. The arbitration decision was upheld by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada as well as by the Nevada Supreme Court. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog. They were told that they could not come in unless they provided more documentation despite the documentation that the Deborah had provided during the arbitration proceeding. On January 29, 2011 the plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog and they were again denied entry until the plaintiffs could provide documentation that the dog was a registered service animal. The HOA eventually foreclosed on the plaintiff’s home in order to recover the fines and attorney’s fees that were owed. For the plaintiff ADA claims, the Supreme Court found that Deborah is disabled as a matter of law and that the HOA and other defendants were aware of her disability at least as of July 27, 2009 (the date of the arbitration). The Court also found that the clubhouse was not a place of public accommodation and that the entire community including the clubhouse was a private establishment. As a result the plaintiffs were not able to establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. For the plaintiff’s FHA claims, the Court found the following: Deborah was qualified as handicapped under the FHA; the defendants were reasonably expected to know about her handicap; an accommodation was necessary for Deborah to use the clubhouse; the dog qualified as a service animal and permitting the dog to accompany Deborah was a reasonable accommodation; and the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation which makes them liable. For the Nevada law claim, it failed because the community and clubhouse are a private establishment and were not considered public accommodations. Plaintiffs were entitled to damages for their FHA claims only. The Court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages, $285,000 in punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation.

Deborah Sanzaro and Michael Sanzaro are the plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs are homeowners and members of a homeowners association ("HOA"). Three incidents occurred at the HOA clubhouse in which Deborah Sanzaro attempted to enter with her Chihuahua, which she claimed was a service animal. In each of these three incidents, Deborah was denied access to the clubhouse. The first incident occurred on March 11, 2009. Deborah entered the club house with her dog and the manager of the HOA asked her why she brought the dog into the clubhouse with her. Deborah explained that her dog assisted her with her disability and was a service animal, however, she could not provide any documentation to the manager as to that effect. She was then asked to leave the clubhouse to which she refused. Only after security was called did Deborah leave. Later, on that same day, Deborah entered the clubhouse with her service dog without any incident. The HOA sent a letter to the plaintiffs after the first incident notifying them that that Deborah had violated the HOA’s governing documents and that a hearing before the HOA board would take place on March 30, 2009. Plaintiffs never showed for this hearing which ultimately resulted in the Board finding that Deborah violated HOA rules and regulations by entering the clubhouse with her dog and not providing documentation. Deborah was assessed multiple fines. Prior to the hearing, the HOA sent out letters to the other residents letting them know that they would accommodate any legitimate service animal if their staff is properly advised of such. They also mailed out a letter regarding the incident with the plaintiffs to all of the other residents. The plaintiffs began to receive hate mail and verbal harassment regarding their dispute with the HOA board. The plaintiffs received many threats and had their property defaced by an anonymous homeowner who spray painted their garage door telling them to get out of the neighborhood. The HOA did nothing to stop this harassment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division and their claim was submitted to a non-binding arbitrator. Deborah provided a doctor’s statement requesting that her dog be registered as a service dog, a notice of entitlement to disability benefits from the SSA, a doctor’s statement regarding Deborah’s disability, and a statement from Deborah explaining how her dog had been trained to assist her. The Arbitrator found for the Ardiente Homeowners Association because she did not find Deborah’s explanation as to why she needed the dog as being persuasive. The arbitration decision was upheld by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada as well as by the Nevada Supreme Court. On July 26, 2010, Plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog. They were told that they could not come in unless they provided more documentation despite the documentation that the Deborah had provided during the arbitration proceeding. On January 29, 2011 the plaintiffs entered the clubhouse again with the dog and they were again denied entry until the plaintiffs could provide documentation that the dog was a registered service animal. The HOA eventually foreclosed on the plaintiff’s home in order to recover the fines and attorney’s fees that were owed. For the plaintiff ADA claims, the Supreme Court found that Deborah is disabled as a matter of law and that the HOA and other defendants were aware of her disability at least as of July 27, 2009 (the date of the arbitration). The Court also found that the clubhouse was not a place of public accommodation and that the entire community including the clubhouse was a private establishment. As a result the plaintiffs were not able to establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. For the plaintiff’s FHA claims, the Court found the following: Deborah was qualified as handicapped under the FHA; the defendants were reasonably expected to know about her handicap; an accommodation was necessary for Deborah to use the clubhouse; the dog qualified as a service animal and permitting the dog to accompany Deborah was a reasonable accommodation; and the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation which makes them liable. For the Nevada law claim, it failed because the community and clubhouse are a private establishment and were not considered public accommodations. Plaintiffs were entitled to damages for their FHA claims only. The Court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages, $285,000 in punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation.

KS - Racing - 74-8801 to 74-8842. Parimutuel Wagering

Summary: This statute creates the Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission. The Commission has the power to observe and inspect all racetracks and is responsible for promulgating regulations including regulations establishing what drugs and at what levels are allowable in the blood or urine of horses and greyhounds. The statute specifies age limits for horses and greyhounds to be able to race. Horses cannot compete until they reach 2 years of age. Greyhounds cannot compete in a race until they reach the age of 15 months. In order to construct or own a racetrack facility a license must be obtained from the Commission.

This statute creates the Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission. The Commission has the power to observe and inspect all racetracks and is responsible for promulgating regulations including regulations establishing what drugs and at what levels are allowable in the blood or urine of horses and greyhounds. The statute specifies age limits for horses and greyhounds to be able to race. Horses cannot compete until they reach 2 years of age. Greyhounds cannot compete in a race until they reach the age of 15 months. In order to construct or own a racetrack facility a license must be obtained from the Commission.

WI - Racing - Chapter 562. Regulation of Racing and on-Track Pari-Mutuel Wagering

Summary: Wisconsin's department of administration is responsible for issuing licenses for occupations of participants in horse racing and dog racing. In order to own and operate a racetrack where pari-mutuel wagering is conducted a license must be obtained. Before a license is obtained, a public hearing must be held and the city in which the racetrack is to operate must adopt the resolution. The Department is required to appoint an administrator that has experience in gaming management and knowledge of animal racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Greyhounds are required to be registered with the National Greyhound Association of Abilene, Kansas in order to enter into a race. This statute also prohibits the use of live lure or bait in the training of race dogs. A dog may not be entered into a race if it was trained with live bait.

Wisconsin's department of administration is responsible for issuing licenses for occupations of participants in horse racing and dog racing. In order to own and operate a racetrack where pari-mutuel wagering is conducted a license must be obtained. Before a license is obtained, a public hearing must be held and the city in which the racetrack is to operate must adopt the resolution. The Department is required to appoint an administrator that has experience in gaming management and knowledge of animal racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Greyhounds are required to be registered with the National Greyhound Association of Abilene, Kansas in order to enter into a race. This statute also prohibits the use of live lure or bait in the training of race dogs. A dog may not be entered into a race if it was trained with live bait.

AR - Racing - Arkansas Greyhound Racing Law

Summary: This Act gives the Arkansas Racing Commission sole jurisdiction over the business and the sport of greyhound racing. Greyhound racing may only be conducted in the State of Arkansas by a franchise that is approved by the Arkansas Racing Commission. A franchise must be a corporation organized under the state of Arkansas. A franchise may not be a individual, partnerships, associations, or trusts. A franchise may not be granted by the Commission until it is authorized by a majority of the qualified electors within the county in which the franchise intends to operate. The voters will be able to choose whether to allow or reject the Racing Commission's grant to the franchise to conduct greyhound racing. Each county is only allowed to have one franchise conducting greyhound racing.

This Act gives the Arkansas Racing Commission sole jurisdiction over the business and the sport of greyhound racing. Greyhound racing may only be conducted in the State of Arkansas by a franchise that is approved by the Arkansas Racing Commission. A franchise must be a corporation organized under the state of Arkansas. A franchise may not be a individual, partnerships, associations, or trusts. A franchise may not be granted by the Commission until it is authorized by a majority of the qualified electors within the county in which the franchise intends to operate. The voters will be able to choose whether to allow or reject the Racing Commission's grant to the franchise to conduct greyhound racing. Each county is only allowed to have one franchise conducting greyhound racing.

WV - Racing - Article 23. Horse and Dog Racing

Summary: This Act requires a license from the West Virginia Racing Commission in order to conduct horse or dog racing. Anyone who participates or has anything to do with dog racing or horse racing at a licensed track, such as employees and horse/dog owners, must have a permit from the commission. This Act allows for the West Virginia Racing Commission to continue its existence as a public corporation. The Commission has full jurisdiction over and must supervise all horse and dog race meetings and all persons involved in the holding or conducting of horse and dog race meetings. Each county that already permits horse racing must vote and approve dog racing in order for the Commission to issue a license for a racing facility.

This Act requires a license from the West Virginia Racing Commission in order to conduct horse or dog racing. Anyone who participates or has anything to do with dog racing or horse racing at a licensed track, such as employees and horse/dog owners, must have a permit from the commission. This Act allows for the West Virginia Racing Commission to continue its existence as a public corporation. The Commission has full jurisdiction over and must supervise all horse and dog race meetings and all persons involved in the holding or conducting of horse and dog race meetings. Each county that already permits horse racing must vote and approve dog racing in order for the Commission to issue a license for a racing facility.

VT - Trapping - § 4254c. Notice of trapping; dog or cat

Summary: This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat.

This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat.

FL - Sharks - 379.2426. Possession of separated shark fins on the water prohibited; penalties

Summary: This Florida law prohibits a person from possessing in or on the waters a shark fin that has been separated from a shark or land a separated shark fin unless possession is authorized by a commission rule or such fin has been lawfully obtained on land, prepared by taxidermy, and is possessed for the purposes of display. A first-time violation is a misdemeanor of the second degree, which includes a fine of up to $4,500 and suspension of license privileges for 180 days. Subsequent violations result in enhanced penalties.

This Florida law prohibits a person from possessing in or on the waters a shark fin that has been separated from a shark or land a separated shark fin unless possession is authorized by a commission rule or such fin has been lawfully obtained on land, prepared by taxidermy, and is possessed for the purposes of display. A first-time violation is a misdemeanor of the second degree, which includes a fine of up to $4,500 and suspension of license privileges for 180 days. Subsequent violations result in enhanced penalties.

AL - Racing - § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47. Horse Racing and Greyhound Racing in Class 1 Municipalities

Summary: This set of statutes allows for municipalities in Alabama to vote on whether or not they wish to authorize horse and greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Each municipality that authorizes it must create a commission which must be incorporated in order for a municipality to conduct horse and greyhound racing. The commissions each regulate horse and greyhound racing only in their respective municipalities. A license must be obtained by the commission of the respective municipality in which one desires to operate or construct a racing facility.

This set of statutes allows for municipalities in Alabama to vote on whether or not they wish to authorize horse and greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Each municipality that authorizes it must create a commission which must be incorporated in order for a municipality to conduct horse and greyhound racing. The commissions each regulate horse and greyhound racing only in their respective municipalities. A license must be obtained by the commission of the respective municipality in which one desires to operate or construct a racing facility.
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