Articles

This discussion of whales focuses on the global protection of whales, beginning with the International Whaling Commission and the problems arising from legally permitted whaling. The second section involves the United States and International laws protecting whales, beginning with the Marine Mammal Protection Act,the Endangered Species Act and Treaty of CITES. The third section involves additional threats to whales, focusing on the problems of fishing nets, pollution, ship collisions, and whale watching and how human actions can have an effect on whale populations.

This paper examines laws enacted in response to what some politicians see as a trend toward extremism in the name of protecting animals, Congress and several states have passed, or are currently considering passing, legislation setting harsher penalties for those involved in what has now been coined “ecoterrorism” or “agroterrorism.” This paper will examine some of the recently passed laws and legislation and the cases which have interpreted these laws. It will then analyze some of the constitutional issues raised by critics of the new legislation.

The FWS through this rule has designated a critical habitat in Santa Barbara County, California for the California Tiger Salamander (Ambystoma califoniese) (CTS) pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973. This rule fulfills the final requirements of the settlement agreement reached in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The reason for the designation of critical habitat for the CTS is the net loss in CTS grazing land over a 10 – 12 year period due to extensive farming, regardless of the efforts made to increase the amount of suitable grazing land. As a result of the designation of land as critical habitat for the CTS, federal agencies will have to consult with the FWS prior to undertaking or authorizing activities that may impact the habitat.

The law in United States categorizes animals as personal property. As a result, recovery of damages for the loss of a companion animal is oftentimes the fair market value. This inflexible approach to companion animals fails to distinguish between personal property such as a chair and a beloved pet. Some state court decisions have authorized human guardians of companion animals to plead and recover the “unique value” of the companion animal. Such decisions reflect a shift in the court’s view of companion animals, which acknowledges public policy concerns for the guardian of the companion animal. This article discusses the law in United States concerning recovery of damages in cases involving harm to companion animals and the reasoning behind why courts should acknowledge such a recovery.

The law in United States categorizes animals as personal property. As a result, recovery of damages for the loss of a companion animal is often times the fair market value. This inflexible approach to companion animals fails to distinguish between personal property such as a chair and a beloved pet. Needless to say, awarding damages at fair market value serves as little or no deterrence for the tortfeasor. This is especially true in cases where the companion animal lacks pedigree or special training. However, some decisions have authorized human guardians of companion animals to plead and recover the “unique value” of the companion animal. Such decisions reflect a shift in the court’s view of companion animals, which acknowledges public policy concerns for the guardian of the companion animal. This article discusses the law in United States on companion animals and proposes legislative action in the state of Florida for the recovery of the “loss of companionship” for owners of companion animals.

This article examines the holding in United States v. Hayashi and concludes that by narrowly defining what constitutes "harm" under the MMPA, the Ninth Circuit ignored the plain meaning of the term, the legislative history of the MMPA and the regulations interpreting the MMPA. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hayashi allows fishermen to harass marine mammals as long as the action does not seriously disrupt normal marine mammal behavior.

This article presents the remarks of Steven M. Wise on the status of animals in the legal system.

This article explores the history of dogfighting and its effects on today's society. It then suggests nuisance abatement as a possible way to regulate and perhaps eliminate dogfighting. The article discusses the evolution of the public nuisance cause of action. The article then offers closing thoughts on whether, and perhaps how, dogfighting should be managed under public nuisance law.

This article explores the dog meat debate in Korea from a socio-legal perspective. It first examines the legal status of dogs and dog meat, and the legal protection for dogs under the old and new legislative frameworks. It then discusses socio-legal challenges to banning dog meat in the Korean context, employing examples of both legal approaches taken by other countries and the politics of dog meat in Korea, specifically. The article argues that the controversy over dog meat must be reframed and dog meat be socially redefined in order to protect dogs, which are currently caught in the conflict over their socio-legal status as companion and livestock animals.

Legislation that affects dogs also affects persons with disabilities to some extent. This link shows up in statutory definitions, is justified by social construction theory, and has been reified in case law. Thus, it is important to examine statutes like Ontario’s pit bull legislation (OPBL) in terms of their potential impact on persons with disabilities. Upon close examination, it appears that the legislation suffers from vague definitions, conflicting onus of proof, absence of fair process, and severe penalties, including imprisonment. Further, it contains no reference to dogs used by persons with disabilities. This means that there is potential for persons with disabilities to suffer negative consequences and a need to consider disability rights in dog-focused legislation.

This article explores the conflict between conservation and the policy of free trade. The author concludes that the Tuna/Dolphin cases represented the inevitable clash between two laudable goals- environmental protection and free-trade. Resolution of this conflict and future conflicts can only come from the incorporation of both of these objectives into one global regime.

This Note discusses the problems with legislation and legal barriers created to battle the problems puppy mills pose to dogs bred in the United States. It then considers the applicability of legislation aimed at dealing with puppy mills at the retail level as a possible cure to the inadequacies of American regulation. This Note discusses the need for uniform regulation that goes to the heart of what sustains puppy mills, the supply and demand created by retail in the pet industry, using the model of legislation introduced in Australia, the NSW Animals (Regulation of Sale) Bill.

This Comment considers Queso's Law, its amendments to section 42.092 of the Texas Penal Code, and the impact of those amendments on animal cruelty law in Texas. Part II discusses the historical background of animal cruelty laws both in Texas, prior to the 80th Legislature, and elsewhere. Part III discusses animal cruelty law in the wake of Queso's Law, including the elements of the offense as well as constitutional and policy concerns. Part IV proposes a solution to the concerns raised by Queso's Law. Finally, the Comment concludes that the expanded definition of animal created by Queso's Law is too broad and that slightly re-wording the definition to create a “custody carve-out” would better protect the interests of feral animals.

Abstract: In 2003, the United States Department of the Interior (DOI) established three distinct population segments (DPSs) for the gray wolf, which encompassed its entire historic range. In addition, DOI downlisted the gray wolf from an endangered to threatened species in the Eastern and Western DPSs, despite the wolf's continued absence from ninety-five percent of its historic range. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon properly invalidated DOI's dysfunctional downlisting of the gray wolf. DOI's interpretation of “significant portion of its range” was inconsistent with the text, intent, and purposes of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In addition, DOI inverted its DPS policy, which provides different populations of the species different levels of protection in different portions of its historic range. Achieving the recovery plan goals did not warrant downlisting the gray wolf. DOI also failed to address the five downlisting factors of section 4(a) of the ESA across a significant portion of the gray wolf's historic range. Nevertheless, DOI could have established two DPSs encompassing the populations of gray wolves in the western Great Lakes and northern Rocky Mountains, and could have accordingly downlisted these populations to threatened species status.

The Federal Regulations (50 C.F.R. 22 et seq) govern the issuance of permits to take bald or golden eagles.  Only under these proscribed circumstances will permits be issued to take any eagles.  Included among these categories are Indian religious permits, scientific permits, falconry permit, and permits to take inactive golden eagle nests by mining operators (links pdf. versions of these applications are provided in this document). 

This article provides some general information on how to seek help when a person needs an emotional support animal to function in daily life and a landlord enforces a "no pets" policy.