Horse Slaughter

THE KENTUCKY HORSE: THE REALITY VS. THE MYTH AND WHAT COULD BE DONE TO CLOSE THE GAP

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Summary: The iconic status of the horse in Kentucky belies the bitter reality faced by the vast majority of horses in that state. This Article explains how multiple aspects of the current law enforcement system in the state permit the persistent failure to protect horses against gross neglect and abuse, as exemplified in particular by two case studies. The Kentucky Equine Health and Welfare Council, a legislative construct promoted by its backers as a unique safeguard for Kentucky horses, was in fact ill-suited ab initio for this role and has proved uninterested in it. Although there is no legislative cure for indifference on the part of those charged with enforcing laws against neglect and abuse, there are a number of legislative changes that would improve the now lamentable odds faced by Kentucky's horses. These changes, discussed in Part IV of this Article, are designed to increase the likelihood of action being taken against an offender, including through civil as well as criminal proceedings; secure immediate care for horses which have been victimized and prevent recidivism by offenders; increase the severity of the offense; dampen the current robust market for slaughter horses, and fund the costs inherent in creating a more effective enforcement system. All of the changes proposed are already law in at least some other states-in some instances in many other states--and these existing laws offer a ready model for Kentucky to follow if it so chooses. Although the focus of this Article is on Kentucky, all the legislative recommendations made are more broadly applicable to any state which does not yet have a statute as proposed in place.

The iconic status of the horse in Kentucky belies the bitter reality faced by the vast majority of horses in that state. This Article explains how multiple aspects of the current law enforcement system in the state permit the persistent failure to protect horses against gross neglect and abuse, as exemplified in particular by two case studies. The Kentucky Equine Health and Welfare Council, a legislative construct promoted by its backers as a unique safeguard for Kentucky horses, was in fact ill-suited ab initio for this role and has proved uninterested in it. Although there is no legislative cure for indifference on the part of those charged with enforcing laws against neglect and abuse, there are a number of legislative changes that would improve the now lamentable odds faced by Kentucky's horses. These changes, discussed in Part IV of this Article, are designed to increase the likelihood of action being taken against an offender, including through civil as well as criminal proceedings; secure immediate care for horses which have been victimized and prevent recidivism by offenders; increase the severity of the offense; dampen the current robust market for slaughter horses, and fund the costs inherent in creating a more effective enforcement system. All of the changes proposed are already law in at least some other states-in some instances in many other states--and these existing laws offer a ready model for Kentucky to follow if it so chooses. Although the focus of this Article is on Kentucky, all the legislative recommendations made are more broadly applicable to any state which does not yet have a statute as proposed in place.

Front Range Equine Rescue v. Vilsack

Summary:

Between 2006 and 2011, Congress prevented commercial equine slaughter by prohibiting the use of funds for inspection of equine slaughterhouses.  In 2012, Congress lifted the ban on funding and the Food Safety Inspection Service  (FSIS) , which is a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), issued grants of inspection to two commercial equine slaughter facilities: Valley Meat Company, LLC and Responsible Transportation, LLC. Plaintiffs, Front Range Equine Rescue, the Humane Society of the United States, and several other individuals and organizations (collectively, “Front Range”) sued officials of the USDA (“Federal Defendants”). Plaintiffs were seeking a declaration that the grants of inspection violated the National Environmental Policy Act and requested that the court set aside the grants of inspection.  The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,  granted Front Range's motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), which prohibited the Federal Defendants from sending inspectors to the equine slaughterhouses  or providing equine inspection services to them. The district court also ordered Front Range to post injunction bonds for Valley Meat and for Responsible Transportation and denied Front Range's request for a permanent injunction. Front Range appealed but the appeal was dismissed as moot. However, Valley Meat and Responsible Transportation then filed a motion in the district court to recover the injunction bonds. The motion was denied. Valley Meat then appealed the denial of damages on the injunction bond.  The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth affirmed the district court and held that Valley Meat was not entitled to recover. The Appeals Court reasoned that even if Valley Meat suffered damages, it cannot recover against the bond unless it first showed wrongful enjoinment. Valley Meat failed to do so and therefore could not collect damages.

Between 2006 and 2011, Congress prevented commercial equine slaughter by prohibiting the use of funds for inspection of equine slaughterhouses.  In 2012, Congress lifted the ban on funding and the Food Safety Inspection Service  (FSIS) , which is a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), issued grants of inspection to two commercial equine slaughter facilities: Valley Meat Company, LLC and Responsible Transportation, LLC. Plaintiffs, Front Range Equine Rescue, the Humane Society of the United States, and several other individuals and organizations (collectively, “Front Range”) sued officials of the USDA (“Federal Defendants”). Plaintiffs were seeking a declaration that the grants of inspection violated the National Environmental Policy Act and requested that the court set aside the grants of inspection.  The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,  granted Front Range's motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), which prohibited the Federal Defendants from sending inspectors to the equine slaughterhouses  or providing equine inspection services to them. The district court also ordered Front Range to post injunction bonds for Valley Meat and for Responsible Transportation and denied Front Range's request for a permanent injunction. Front Range appealed but the appeal was dismissed as moot. However, Valley Meat and Responsible Transportation then filed a motion in the district court to recover the injunction bonds. The motion was denied. Valley Meat then appealed the denial of damages on the injunction bond.  The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth affirmed the district court and held that Valley Meat was not entitled to recover. The Appeals Court reasoned that even if Valley Meat suffered damages, it cannot recover against the bond unless it first showed wrongful enjoinment. Valley Meat failed to do so and therefore could not collect damages.

Responsibility in the "Sport of Kings": Imposing an Affirmative Duty of Care on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries of the Thoroughbred Horseracing Industry

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Summary: Horseracing industry participants must be held accountable for the wellbeing of retired racehorses. In Part I of this article, I explore the historic role of the horse in American society, and explain how “unwanted horses” become neglected, abused, abandoned, or shipped across U.S. borders to be slaughtered. In Part II, I address the unique susceptibility of thoroughbred racehorses to becoming unwanted horses, and how the wealth and glamour associated with horseracing serves to mask the problem. In Part III, I outline the legislation pertaining to horseracing, arguing that it does not adequately ensure the welfare of ex-racehorses. In Part IV, I explain that the burden for caring for these horses falls to under-funded private horse Rescue/Adoption/Retraining facilities (hereinafter “RAR facilities”). In Parts V and VI, I employ a loss-spreading rationale and the reasoning behind the “special relationship” doctrine, contending that the cost of providing adequate funds to RAR facilities should be imposed on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries (hereinafter “PFBs”) of the horseracing industry. In Part VII, I argue that this financial burden should be placed on PFBs in the form of “Participation Fees” proportional to the PFB’s level of investment in the industry. In Part VIII, I contend that this mandate could be carried out by either private state racing associations, the National Thoroughbred Racing Association, state governments, or the federal government. In Part IX, I further explore the logistics of implementing such a scheme.

Horseracing industry participants must be held accountable for the wellbeing of retired racehorses. In Part I of this article, I explore the historic role of the horse in American society, and explain how “unwanted horses” become neglected, abused, abandoned, or shipped across U.S. borders to be slaughtered. In Part II, I address the unique susceptibility of thoroughbred racehorses to becoming unwanted horses, and how the wealth and glamour associated with horseracing serves to mask the problem. In Part III, I outline the legislation pertaining to horseracing, arguing that it does not adequately ensure the welfare of ex-racehorses. In Part IV, I explain that the burden for caring for these horses falls to under-funded private horse Rescue/Adoption/Retraining facilities (hereinafter “RAR facilities”). In Parts V and VI, I employ a loss-spreading rationale and the reasoning behind the “special relationship” doctrine, contending that the cost of providing adequate funds to RAR facilities should be imposed on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries (hereinafter “PFBs”) of the horseracing industry. In Part VII, I argue that this financial burden should be placed on PFBs in the form of “Participation Fees” proportional to the PFB’s level of investment in the industry. In Part VIII, I contend that this mandate could be carried out by either private state racing associations, the National Thoroughbred Racing Association, state governments, or the federal government. In Part IX, I further explore the logistics of implementing such a scheme.

CA - Initiatives - Proposition 6 (horse slaughter)

Summary: This proposition would prohibit any person from possessing, transferring, receiving or holding any horse, pony, burro or mule with intent to kill it or have it killed, where the person knows or should know that any part of the animal will be used for human consumption. It provides that a violation constitutes a felony offense. There is also a provision making the sale of horsemeat for human consumption a misdemeanor offense, with subsequent violations punished as felonies. The measure was passed in 1998 with 59.4% of the vote.

This proposition would prohibit any person from possessing, transferring, receiving or holding any horse, pony, burro or mule with intent to kill it or have it killed, where the person knows or should know that any part of the animal will be used for human consumption. It provides that a violation constitutes a felony offense. There is also a provision making the sale of horsemeat for human consumption a misdemeanor offense, with subsequent violations punished as felonies. The measure was passed in 1998 with 59.4% of the vote.

WY - Horses - § 11-30-115. Unlawful killing of wild horses

Summary: This Wyoming statute provides that any person, without legal justification, who willfully and maliciously kills a wild horse is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6), months or both.

This Wyoming statute provides that any person, without legal justification, who willfully and maliciously kills a wild horse is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6), months or both.

WV - Horse Slaughter - Article 2B. Inspection of Meat and Poultry.

Summary: The stated purpose of this article is to provide for the inspection, labeling and disposition of animals, poultry, carcasses, meat products and poultry products which are to be sold or offered for sale through commercial outlets for human consumption, the licensing of commercial slaughterers, custom slaughterers and processors, and the inspection of slaughterhouses and processing plants located in the state of West Virginia. With regard to horse slaughter, the article makes it unlawful to add kangaroo meat, horse meat, mule meat or other equine meat to any animal meat, meat product or poultry product to be sold or offered for sale through commercial outlets or distributors for human consumption.

The stated purpose of this article is to provide for the inspection, labeling and disposition of animals, poultry, carcasses, meat products and poultry products which are to be sold or offered for sale through commercial outlets for human consumption, the licensing of commercial slaughterers, custom slaughterers and processors, and the inspection of slaughterhouses and processing plants located in the state of West Virginia. With regard to horse slaughter, the article makes it unlawful to add kangaroo meat, horse meat, mule meat or other equine meat to any animal meat, meat product or poultry product to be sold or offered for sale through commercial outlets or distributors for human consumption.

WI - Horsemeat - 97.45. Labeling of horsemeat

Summary: [97.45. Repealed by 2015 Act 243, § 59, eff. March 3, 2016]. This former statute states that no person shall sell any horsemeat, unless it is conspicuously labeled, marked, branded or tagged “horsemeat.” Violation is a Class H felony.

[97.45. Repealed by 2015 Act 243, § 59, eff. March 3, 2016]. This former statute states that no person shall sell any horsemeat, unless it is conspicuously labeled, marked, branded or tagged “horsemeat.” Violation is a Class H felony.