Farming or Food Production

Summary: Twenty years after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, uncertainty reigns in the lower courts and among commentators over the issue of constitutionally compelled religious exemptions. Despite the Court’s general disavowal of such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith, Lukumi appeared to breathe life into a potentially significant exception to Smith. Under that exception—which this Article calls the “selective-exemption rule”—the Free Exercise Clause may still require religious exemptions from a law when the government selectively makes available other exemptions from that law. This Article addresses the key unresolved questions about the scope of the selective-exemption rule and challenges the broad interpretation of the rule that leading religious-liberty advocates have been pressing in courts around the country. That broad interpretation, which played a prominent role in the recent animal-sacrifice case of Merced v. Kasson and has been further developed in the ongoing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky litigation over emergency contraception, would go a long way to achieving a de facto reversal of Smith. But while there are credible arguments for reconsidering Smith and its “equal protection” interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, those arguments should not be advanced through the backdoor of the selective-exemption rule. That rule was adopted as part of the Smith paradigm, and it only makes sense to interpret it within that paradigm. Accordingly, this Article makes the case for a more appropriately tailored reading of the selective-exemption rule—a reading grounded in the rule’s origins as a tool to prevent intentional discrimination, and a reading that would enable the government to enforce animal welfare laws that have only an incidental effect of limiting religious animal sacrifice.

Summary: The meat processing conglomerates that currently control the majority of the market share in the meatpacking industry are responsible for its most systemic animal abuses. Increased concentration has enabled these larger processors to dictate animal treatment standards maintained by meat producers, most of whom have caved to economic pressure and moved their animals from small farms into Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations. Animal welfare proponents have failed to adequately challenge the concentration of the meat industry and in 2012 have yet to fully explore strategies made available by the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 (PSA). This Article proposes that a coalition between animal welfare activists and small meat producers, who have yet to be absorbed or driven out of business by the meatpacking giants, could effectively attack the concentration of the meat industry. First, animal welfare activists should work with small producers to expose to the public the negative human externalities associated with market concentration, such as intensive farming techniques that directly compromise consumer health. Second, the animal welfare movement should harness its legal experience to encourage small meat producers to pursue PSA-based civil suits aimed at challenging the power of the meatpacking conglomerates.

Summary: Over the last sixty years, industrial agriculture has expanded in the United States and throughout the world, including in Brazil. Any benefit this expansion has brought comes at significant environmental and social costs. Industrial agriculture is a leading contributor to global climate change, air and water pollution, deforestation, and dangers in the workplace. This Article discusses the impact of industrial animal agriculture in the U.S. and Brazil. It also examines the laws pertaining to industrial agriculture in both countries and provides a comparative analysis of the two legal regimes. Finally, this Article concludes with the observation that although the price to the U.S. and Brazil of remedying these impacts are high, the costs to humans, animals, and the environment by failing to do so is immeasurable.

Summary: In recent years, livestock care standards boards have emerged as an innovative way for state agencies to regulate farm animal welfare. Far from improving farm animal welfare, however, these boards are frequently a way to codify existing industry standards. The Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board, for example, had a nominal mission to establish regulations governing the care and well-being of livestock and poultry. Other states have created similar mechanisms for regulating farm animal welfare. This Comment maintains that the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board regulations merely codify the existing status quo on Ohio factory farms rather than improving the health and welfare of animals. This Comment also discusses the successes and failures of other livestock care standards boards. This Comment then considers ways that livestock care standards boards, or alternative methods, could improve farm animal welfare.

Summary:

One year ago, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed approval of the first genetically engineered (GE or transgenic) animal for food production—a salmon engineered to grow much faster than normal using genetic material from an ocean pout. Faced with concerns from scientists and the public that these “super” salmon will escape into the wild and be the final blow to wild salmon, proponents crafted a scheme that is half Michael Crichton, half Kurt Vonnegut: The engineered salmon eggs will begin life in a lab on a frozen Canadian island, then be airlifted to a guarded Panamanian fortress, where they will grow in inland tanks. After the fish reach maturity, the company will ship them back to the U.S. and sell them in grocery stores, likely without any labeling. Unfortunately, this is not a bad science fiction novel. How did we get to this juncture, the brink of this approval? This Essay is a snapshot of GE animals through the lens of the first one proposed for commercial approval.

Summary:

Although much attention has been given to the Animal Enterprise Terrorism  Act, a federal statute enacted to deter and punish extra-legal animal rights activism, comparatively little attention has been afforded the various state versions of this law. This Article is an attempt to help remedy this deficit. It offers a comprehensive overview of existing state animal use protection statutes and describes legislative trends in this area.

Summary:

For many consumers, farm animal welfare matters. To ensure the well-being of farm animals, consumers often pay premium prices for animal products with humane labels. Because “organic” is an example of a label presumed to convey information about animal husbandry practices, animal products with this label may offer an alternative to products from animals that were raised “conventionally” on large, industrialized farms with minimal welfare protections. The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and enacting regulations require that organic animals be able to engage in natural behaviors. However, many of the requirements are general and thus result in significant variations in livestock living conditions, confounding consumer expectations of uniform organic production and high standards for organic farm animal welfare. This Comment discusses the background of organic regulations, including issues with their application in the areas of organic dairy and egg production. Next, this Comment analyzes aspects of organic regulations as applied to organic laying hens and organic pigs. Finally, this Comment suggests ways to make organic regulations more quantifiable and thus more enforceable so organic animals are able to engage in natural behaviors.

Summary:

It is often argued that one of the most humane methods of killing an animal is through the performance of kosher slaughter. Indeed, the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (HMLSA) of 1978 goes so far as to define kosher slaughter, and handling in connection with such slaughter, as humane, and consequently fails to provide any regulation over this method of killing. It is thus concerning that a number of kosher slaughterhouses have, in recent years, been discovered to be using blatantly inhumane practices, which the relevant religious authorities have insisted are completely kosher.

This Article examines the Jewish law concerning kosher slaughter and asks how it is possible for a slaughter that has been performed in an inhumane fashion to remain kosher. The answer, it concludes, is that the religious rules provide little guidance on the handling of animals in connection with slaughter. There thus exists a need for either the religious authorities or the law to supplement the existing religious rules with further requirements aimed at ensuring humane-slaughter practices. After analyzing both comparative law on this issue and the relevant First Amendment considerations, this Article argues that there is a need for Congress to remove the HMLSA’s current exemption of handling in connection with kosher slaughter and for regulations to be passed governing this issue. It makes suggestions as to how such regulations could provide for more humane-slaughter practices in a manner that fails to offend either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Summary:

Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary: In this case, Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County after Cotton’s cattle was seized for alleged animal cruelty and roaming at large. Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department arguing that he had been deprived of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Hill County and the Sheriff's Department. The court granted summary judgment because Cotton was unable to establish that his rights were violated under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotton was unable to establish that his Due Process rights were violated because he was unable to provide any evidence that the allegations against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department were “the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the county or that the County acted with deliberate indifference to these rights.” Also, the court found that there was not a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause because under state law, Georgia provided for a “post deprivation remedy for the loss.” Lastly, the court found that Cotton’s claims against the Sheriff's Department failed as a matter of law because Cotton was unable to establish that anyone from the Sheriff’s Department actually participated in the seizure and impoundment of the cattle. For those reasons, the court held in favor of Ben Hill County and granted summary judgment.