Farming or Food Production

Summary: Attached are the Animal Welfare Regulations from 2015 on confined pigs, available in both English and Hebrew. These Israeli regulations ban the use of gestation crates without exception (isolation is allowed for up to a week for insemination, but in a compartment wide enough to allow the sow to turn around) and farrowing crates are allowed only up to 2 weeks after the sow gave birth.

Summary: Any person furnishing feed, pasture or otherwise boarding any animal(s), at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien upon the animal(s), and may retain possession thereof until the sum due for the feed, pasture or board has been paid. Before foreclosing the lien by sale, the person furnishing the feed, pasture or board shall mail a registered or certified letter to the owner of the animal(s), at the owner's last known address, demanding payment. Any person who takes and drives away any such animal(s), while in the possession of the person feeding, pasturing or boarding them, without the consent of that person, and without first having paid all reasonable charges due thereon, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Summary: These statutes create the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management grant within the department of agriculture. Further, a four-member advisory board is established to advise the department on the expenditure of the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management grant funds. The board must help direct funding for the deployment of nonlethal deterrence resources, including human presence, and locally owned and deliberately located equipment and tools. In addition, the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management account is created as a nonappropriated account in the custody of the state treasurer.

Summary: This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed.

Summary: In this Maryland appeal, appellant Rohrer questions the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615 (the law that allows an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner). Rohrer also challenges the legal ownership of the animals in state custody. The seizure of Rohrer's animals began in 2014, when an anonymous tip led humane investigators to Rohrer's farm. Field officers and a local veterinarian observed cattle that were "extremely thin" on Rohrer's farm. These concerns led to a search warrant of appellant's property. Due to the presence of dead animal bodies intermingled with the living, high piles of animal feces, and goats with hooves so overgrown they could not walk, the Humane Society (HS) and Sheriff's office seized all the animals under the warrant. The actual "seizure" resulted in a transfer of some animals to foster farms and an agreement between HS and Rohrer to adequately care for remaining animals on the property. Rohrer was charged with 318 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty, eventually being found guilty on only 5 counts and sentenced to supervised probation. During the initial proceedings, Rohrer filed a "petition for return of seized animals" under CR § 10–615(d)(2). When the District Court gave conclusions on the petition, it lamented on the "lack of guidance" in the statute and noted that that the "statute really doesn't say" whether Rohrer would lose ownership of the animals. After the criminal trial, Rohrer again sought return of the animals after negotiations with the HS failed. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's denial of the Petition for Return, finding the ruling was not clearly erroneous and it was not in the best interests of the animals to return to Rohrer. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Rohrer raises three issues: (1) can the HS seize an animal already in state custody from a search warrant; (2) must the seizure by the HS be justified by the conditions at the time of seizure or may it be based on previously observed conditions; and (3) how does a denial of a petition to return the animals affect the owner's property rights in the animals? In looking at prior codifications of the law as well as surrounding legislative history, the court first held that a HS officer may notify the owner of animal seized by the state in connection with a criminal warrant of its intent to take possession of the animal upon its release from state custody. Secondly, a HS officer may rely on previously-observed conditions to justify seizure under Section 10-615. The court noted that, similar to a search warrant, the factors justifying seizure can become weaker with time. So, when an owner files a petition for return, the HS has the burden of showing the court the seizure was necessary under the statute. In Rohrer's case, this Court found the District and Circuit Courts did not reach the question of whether the necessity supporting HS' possession of the animals continued. Since the animals were released after the criminal trial concluded, this Court stated that the District Court may now consider this question. Finally, the Court weighed in on whether the denial of a Petition for Return affects ownership interests. This Court declined to adopt the standard of "best interests" of the animals. Instead, the Court found that the function of the Petition for Return is to determine who has the right to temporarily possess an animal in question and this does not vest ownership rights in the animal if the petition is denied. This case was remanded to Circuit Court so that court can determine whether the final disposition of the criminal case and subsequent release of the animals held under the search warrant affects the disposition of Rohrer's Petition for Return of this animals.

Summary: In 2014, California added amendments to its law on "Live Animals" in the Retail Food Code related to pet dogs in outdoor dining areas. If a food establishment owner allows it, patrons may bring their pet dogs to an outdoor dining area if requirements are met. Like other states, there must be an outdoor entrance, employees must wash hands if they touch the dogs, dogs must be leashed and under control, pet waste must be properly dealt with, and "food and water provided to pet dogs shall only be in single-use disposable containers." This last provision is interesting because it considers the needs of the canine customers.

Summary: Animal-based food industries—meat, egg, and dairy—have a history of opposing even relatively minor attempts to reduce human consumption of animal-based foods. In the face of growing evidence that eating meat, eggs, and dairy is detrimental to human health, these industries and their supporters maintain the opposite: that these foods are essential for a healthy diet and have no negative impact as normally consumed. Recognizing parallels between animal-based food industries and another industry heavily invested in maintaining the notion that its product was benign as normally consumed, this Article argues the tobacco litigation saga holds instructive lessons for combatting the current animal-based food industries. This Article, using the Hallmark slaughterhouse suit as a case study, illustrates how plaintiffs can deploy key strategies that prevailed against the tobacco industry—whistleblowing, fraud claims, government involvement in litigation, and identification of negatively impacted children. Finally, this Article outlines the potential developments that would deepen the parallels between the animal-based food and tobacco industries, suggesting conditions under which the litigation strategies used against the tobacco industry would become increasingly applicable and valuable.

Summary: This Article examines the marginalization of fish under current animal welfare laws and regulations, explores the treatment of farm-raised fish during transport and slaughter, and proposes legislation and regulations in these two areas. While evidence indicates that fish are capable of experiencing pain, fear, and suffering—the traditional considerations informing concepts of animal welfare—current pre-slaughter transport and slaughter practices are completely uninformed by notions of fish welfare. Comparing the cognitive and sensory capacities of fish to other animals currently receiving animal welfare recognition through official regulation, this Article argues that protections afforded to animals during transport and slaughter should similarly apply to fish. Using the World Organization for Animal Health’s Aquatic Animal Health Code as a model, this Article proposes model legislation for fish transport: the Humane Transport of Fish Act. This legislation would supplement regulations already in place at the state and federal level, which currently pertain only to regulating the aquaculture industry and food safety. This Article also proposes amending the “Humane Methods” section of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act to include the slaughter of fish, and proposes related regulations to ensure that fish are humanely slaughtered. The massive amount of fish farmed in the United States and globally each year speaks to the potential impact formal regulation could have on the improvement and protection of fish welfare.

Summary: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates meat labeling under the statutory authority of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). The FMIA’s labeling preemption clause prohibits labeling requirements beyond federal requirements, and would thus preclude state causes of action on the basis of deceptive labels that were properly approved under federal law. Through the eyes of Kat, a hypothetical consumer concerned with the origins of the meat she purchases for her family, this Article argues that consumers should be able to pursue state law claims based on fraudulent animal welfare labels on packages of meat. This is true for two reasons: first, the FMIA’s labeling preemption only covers the USDA’s statutory scope of authority, which does not include on-farm treatment of animals; and second, both FMIA and a state cause of action would require the same thing—a non-fraudulent label. However, even if a court did find that a state cause of action based on a fraudulent label was preempted, consumer plaintiffs would have other avenues through which to pursue their claims.

Summary: In many Western nations, rising public concern about the welfare of agricultural animals is reflected in the adoption of direct regulatory standards governing the treatment of these animals. The United States has taken a different path, tending to rely on a “market-regulation” approach whereby consumers express their desire for specific welfare practices through their purchasing decisions. This Article explores the failure of market regulation and the welfare-preference paradox posed by consumers who express a strong preference for improved animal welfare in theory, but who simultaneously fail to demand heightened welfare standards in practice. It argues that market regulation is failing in this country because current animal-welfare labeling does not clearly or credibly disclose to consumers the actual treatment of agricultural animals. As a corollary, effective market regulation of agricultural animal welfare could be empowered simply by improving current animal-welfare labeling practices.