Equine Issues

Judgment 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01 - Peru

This case regards the use of horses as transportation and control by police. The suit was brought by the Peruvian Institute of Legal Counsel for the Environment and Biodiversity against the Ministry of the Interior to challenge a law relating to the police force and the use of horses. The Institute cites Law 30407, which prescribes the protection of animal welfare, as the horses are put in peril when used in policing matters.

Sentencia 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01, 2019 - Peru

Summary: Este caso se refiere al uso de caballos como medio de transporte y control por parte de la policía. La demanda fue interpuesta por el Instituto Peruano de Asesoría Legal en Medio Ambiente y Biodiversidad contra el Ministerio del Interior para impugnar una ley relativa a la policía y el uso de caballos. El Instituto cita la Ley 30407, que prescribe la protección del bienestar animal, ya que los caballos corren peligro cuando se utilizan en asuntos policiales. El tribunal discutió en su dictamen cuestiones de bienestar animal, constitucionalidad y varios casos precedentes, incluida la interpretación de la palabra "montado", y sostuvo que la demanda era nula de pleno derecho.

Este caso se refiere al uso de caballos como medio de transporte y control por parte de la policía. La demanda fue interpuesta por el Instituto Peruano de Asesoría Legal en Medio Ambiente y Biodiversidad contra el Ministerio del Interior para impugnar una ley relativa a la policía y el uso de caballos. El Instituto cita la Ley 30407, que prescribe la protección del bienestar animal, ya que los caballos corren peligro cuando se utilizan en asuntos policiales. El tribunal discutió en su dictamen cuestiones de bienestar animal, constitucionalidad y varios casos precedentes, incluida la interpretación de la palabra "montado", y sostuvo que la demanda era nula de pleno derecho.

Quigley v. McClellan

Summary: This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of two horses, who alleges defendant veterinarian negligently performed pre-purchase examinations of the two horses. These pre-purchase examinations caused the plaintiff to purchase horses with physical problems that impeded their ability to be used as competition horses. The jury found that the veterinarian was negligent in performing the examinations for one of the horses, and the trial court awarded $46,000 in damages for plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of an applicable standard of care, and reversed the judgment of the lower court.

This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of two horses, who alleges defendant veterinarian negligently performed pre-purchase examinations of the two horses. These pre-purchase examinations caused the plaintiff to purchase horses with physical problems that impeded their ability to be used as competition horses. The jury found that the veterinarian was negligent in performing the examinations for one of the horses, and the trial court awarded $46,000 in damages for plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of an applicable standard of care, and reversed the judgment of the lower court.

Henry v. Zurich American Ins. Co.

Summary: This case concerns whether a veterinarian committed malpractice during the performance of a minor surgical procedure on a racing horse that led to the death of that horse. The owners of that racing horse filed suit against the veterinarian, veterinary clinic, and insurer of the clinic, seeking damages for the death of the racing horse. The trial court held in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the court found no error in the trial court's reasoning when issuing the judgment in favor of defendants, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

This case concerns whether a veterinarian committed malpractice during the performance of a minor surgical procedure on a racing horse that led to the death of that horse. The owners of that racing horse filed suit against the veterinarian, veterinary clinic, and insurer of the clinic, seeking damages for the death of the racing horse. The trial court held in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the court found no error in the trial court's reasoning when issuing the judgment in favor of defendants, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Loman v. Freeman

Summary: This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion.

This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion.

Moreland v. Lowdermilk

Summary: This case concerns the untimely death of a female racehorse, whose owners brought this veterinary malpractice action against the veterinarians that treated this mare. Her owners sought reimbursement for her future potential racing earnings, her future potential earnings as a brood mare, and recovery of monies owed for veterinary services rendered. However, the court held that the sole cause of the condition that led to the mare's death was the owner's failure to administer a proper worming program to the mare, not the actions of the veterinarians. The court held that the veterinarians could not have administered treatment to save the mare, and therefore had not committed malpractice.

This case concerns the untimely death of a female racehorse, whose owners brought this veterinary malpractice action against the veterinarians that treated this mare. Her owners sought reimbursement for her future potential racing earnings, her future potential earnings as a brood mare, and recovery of monies owed for veterinary services rendered. However, the court held that the sole cause of the condition that led to the mare's death was the owner's failure to administer a proper worming program to the mare, not the actions of the veterinarians. The court held that the veterinarians could not have administered treatment to save the mare, and therefore had not committed malpractice.

D. Sociedad Protectora de Cocheros de Viña del Mar y otros con Ilustre Municipalidad de Viña del Mar

Summary: Valparaíso, dos de abril de dos mil quince. VISTO: A fojas 10, comparece don M.I.S.Á., abogado, domiciliado en Plaza de Justicia Nº 45, Oficina 412, comuna de Valparaíso, en representación de Sociedad Protectora de Cocheros de Viña del Mar y de Dueños de Coches Victoria, deduciendo acción de protección en contra de la Ilustre Municipalidad de Viña del Mar, representada por su Alcaldesa, doña V.R.B., con domicilio en calle A.N. 615, comuna de Viña del Mar, en razón del acto arbitrario e ilegal consistente en la dictación del Decreto Alcaldicio Nº 11.349, de fecha 12 de noviembre de 2014, que aprueba la Ordenanza para el Transporte de Pasajeros en Coches Victoria en la comuna de Viña del Mar.

Valparaíso, dos de abril de dos mil quince. VISTO: A fojas 10, comparece don M.I.S.Á., abogado, domiciliado en Plaza de Justicia Nº 45, Oficina 412, comuna de Valparaíso, en representación de Sociedad Protectora de Cocheros de Viña del Mar y de Dueños de Coches Victoria, deduciendo acción de protección en contra de la Ilustre Municipalidad de Viña del Mar, representada por su Alcaldesa, doña V.R.B., con domicilio en calle A.N. 615, comuna de Viña del Mar, en razón del acto arbitrario e ilegal consistente en la dictación del Decreto Alcaldicio Nº 11.349, de fecha 12 de noviembre de 2014, que aprueba la Ordenanza para el Transporte de Pasajeros en Coches Victoria en la comuna de Viña del Mar.

IN - Farriers - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (LICENSING OF FARRIERS) RULES, 1965

Summary: The Rules, drafted under Section 38(2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate farriers (persons who attach shoes to hooves of animals). It is mandatory for farriers to obtain a license.

The Rules, drafted under Section 38(2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate farriers (persons who attach shoes to hooves of animals). It is mandatory for farriers to obtain a license.

Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Board

Summary: This appeal examines the protection afforded to New Mexico's free-roaming horses under NMSA 1978, Section 77-18-5 (2007). The New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) appeals from a district court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (WHOA). WHOA brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and others regarding the status of horses corralled by a private citizen on private property. The citizen had initially complained to the Board about the free-roaming horses on her property and was told that the Board only takes possession of horses corralled by citizens. The citizen did so and the Board took possession of the herd, where it then posted on its website that the horses would be sold at auction. WHOA filed the instant emergency action, stating that the Board exceeded its authority and unlawfully treated the subject horses as estray livestock. The group sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Board from impounding or selling the subject horses. The district court granted WHOA's request for a TRO, thereby prohibiting the Board from taking any action with the horses. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court determined that the Board's actions to take possession and sell the subject horses were contrary to the Board's statutory authority, enjoined the Board from “further unlawful possession and selling” of the subject horses, and awarded WHOA costs and attorney fees. The Board appeals here, arguing that the horses were captured on private, rather than public land, and the district court erred in concluding them to be “wild horses." The Board also contends that the district court made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence, issued a vague injunction, erred in awarding attorney fees, and erred in refusing to impose an injunction bond upon WHOA. This court found no error with the lower court concluding that the horses should be protected as “wild horses” because the definition of that term does not depend on whether, at the moment of their capture, the horses were on land that is private, but instead depends on whether the horses generally roam public land. Therefore, the horses were not estrays. As to whether the Board should have conducted its statutory duties with respect to horses including history and DNA testing, this court held that duty does not extend testing of a wild horse if it is captured on private land. Thus, the district court erred in determining that the Board failed to follow its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5(B). In fact, the Board has no authority to test the conformation, history, and DNA of such horses found on private land any more than it does to take possession of and remove the wild horses from those lands. The court also found the injunction was not vague or impracticable and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an injunction bond. Ultimately, this court affirmed the district court's order to the extent that it correctly determined that the subject horses are wild horse rather than estray, but reversed the district court's determination that the Board should have acted according to its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and further consideration of attorney fees.

This appeal examines the protection afforded to New Mexico's free-roaming horses under NMSA 1978, Section 77-18-5 (2007). The New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) appeals from a district court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (WHOA). WHOA brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and others regarding the status of horses corralled by a private citizen on private property. The citizen had initially complained to the Board about the free-roaming horses on her property and was told that the Board only takes possession of horses corralled by citizens. The citizen did so and the Board took possession of the herd, where it then posted on its website that the horses would be sold at auction. WHOA filed the instant emergency action, stating that the Board exceeded its authority and unlawfully treated the subject horses as estray livestock. The group sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Board from impounding or selling the subject horses. The district court granted WHOA's request for a TRO, thereby prohibiting the Board from taking any action with the horses. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court determined that the Board's actions to take possession and sell the subject horses were contrary to the Board's statutory authority, enjoined the Board from “further unlawful possession and selling” of the subject horses, and awarded WHOA costs and attorney fees. The Board appeals here, arguing that the horses were captured on private, rather than public land, and the district court erred in concluding them to be “wild horses." The Board also contends that the district court made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence, issued a vague injunction, erred in awarding attorney fees, and erred in refusing to impose an injunction bond upon WHOA. This court found no error with the lower court concluding that the horses should be protected as “wild horses” because the definition of that term does not depend on whether, at the moment of their capture, the horses were on land that is private, but instead depends on whether the horses generally roam public land. Therefore, the horses were not estrays. As to whether the Board should have conducted its statutory duties with respect to horses including history and DNA testing, this court held that duty does not extend testing of a wild horse if it is captured on private land. Thus, the district court erred in determining that the Board failed to follow its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5(B). In fact, the Board has no authority to test the conformation, history, and DNA of such horses found on private land any more than it does to take possession of and remove the wild horses from those lands. The court also found the injunction was not vague or impracticable and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an injunction bond. Ultimately, this court affirmed the district court's order to the extent that it correctly determined that the subject horses are wild horse rather than estray, but reversed the district court's determination that the Board should have acted according to its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and further consideration of attorney fees.

Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management

Summary: This case involves a motion for a preliminary injunction by the group Friends of Animals to prevent the Bureau of Land Management from gathering and removing excess horses inside and adjacent to the Onaqui Mountain Herd Management Area (“Onaqui Mountain HMA”) to reduce the number of horses to the low end of the appropriate management level (“AML”). The BLM contends such an accelerated removal is necessary because of the historic drought that has gripped the American West. The court first examined the language and legislative history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHA), noting that the overarching goal of the act is provide balance between the horses and ecological impact on the lands. The WLA requires the Secretary to strike this balance by setting appropriate management levels and deciding on how to deal with excess animals. In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is also implicated with decisions to gather horses which is done primarily through the Environmental Assessment (EA) process. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction finding the advocacy organizations were unlikely to succeed on merits.

This case involves a motion for a preliminary injunction by the group Friends of Animals to prevent the Bureau of Land Management from gathering and removing excess horses inside and adjacent to the Onaqui Mountain Herd Management Area (“Onaqui Mountain HMA”) to reduce the number of horses to the low end of the appropriate management level (“AML”). The BLM contends such an accelerated removal is necessary because of the historic drought that has gripped the American West. The court first examined the language and legislative history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHA), noting that the overarching goal of the act is provide balance between the horses and ecological impact on the lands. The WLA requires the Secretary to strike this balance by setting appropriate management levels and deciding on how to deal with excess animals. In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is also implicated with decisions to gather horses which is done primarily through the Environmental Assessment (EA) process. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction finding the advocacy organizations were unlikely to succeed on merits.