Disability and Animals

MD - Service animal - § 9-957. Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program

Summary: This 2017 law establishes the Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program. A purpose of the Program is to refer eligible veterans who inquire about participation in the Program to one or more nonprofit training entities. The Department shall select at least one qualified nonprofit training entity to implement a training protocol that will teach each Program participant methodologies, strategies, and techniques for partnering with service dogs or support dogs. This entity will also help select and facilitate training of service or support dogs. The Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program Fund is also established to fund the Program.

This 2017 law establishes the Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program. A purpose of the Program is to refer eligible veterans who inquire about participation in the Program to one or more nonprofit training entities. The Department shall select at least one qualified nonprofit training entity to implement a training protocol that will teach each Program participant methodologies, strategies, and techniques for partnering with service dogs or support dogs. This entity will also help select and facilitate training of service or support dogs. The Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program Fund is also established to fund the Program.

Sentencia T-608, 2011

Summary: The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) acting as the legal guardian of her husband, who had spastic quadriplegia and mixed aphasia as a result of a severe cranioencephalic trauma, against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’. The Plaintiff argued that Corpocaldas had violated the rights to health and dignified life of her husband when the Defendant confiscated a parrot that was part of the Plaintiff’s rehabilitation treatment. The Plaintiff sought immediate restitution of the parrot by the Defendant. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court to deny the Plaintiff’s petition. The court determined that the confiscation of the parrot by Corpocaldas was reasonable and according to the law, therefore there was not a violation of the rights of the Plaintiff. The court stated that as wild animals belong to the nation and they can only be reduced to property when the are obtained through legal hunting or from legal breeders. In this particular case, the Plaintiff obtained the parrot as a present from her cousin, and she did not present evidence of title. The court concluded that the bird belonged to the nation, and therefore the environmental authority had acted in accordance to its duties. The court stated that even though there was a narrow relationship between the rights to health and life with the right to environment, the protection of the environment did not only aim to the protection of humans. The court indicated that the environment should be protected whether or not it offered a benefit to the human species. The rest of the beings that are part of the environment are dignified beings that are not at the absolute and unlimited disposition of the human beings. Humans are just another element of nature, and not a superior entity that has the environment at their disposition. Therefore, the use of natural resources should not cause damage or deterioration that could threaten diversity and environmental integrity, the court stated in its reasoning.

The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) acting as the legal guardian of her husband, who had spastic quadriplegia and mixed aphasia as a result of a severe cranioencephalic trauma, against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’. The Plaintiff argued that Corpocaldas had violated the rights to health and dignified life of her husband when the Defendant confiscated a parrot that was part of the Plaintiff’s rehabilitation treatment. The Plaintiff sought immediate restitution of the parrot by the Defendant. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court to deny the Plaintiff’s petition. The court determined that the confiscation of the parrot by Corpocaldas was reasonable and according to the law, therefore there was not a violation of the rights of the Plaintiff. The court stated that as wild animals belong to the nation and they can only be reduced to property when the are obtained through legal hunting or from legal breeders. In this particular case, the Plaintiff obtained the parrot as a present from her cousin, and she did not present evidence of title. The court concluded that the bird belonged to the nation, and therefore the environmental authority had acted in accordance to its duties. The court stated that even though there was a narrow relationship between the rights to health and life with the right to environment, the protection of the environment did not only aim to the protection of humans. The court indicated that the environment should be protected whether or not it offered a benefit to the human species. The rest of the beings that are part of the environment are dignified beings that are not at the absolute and unlimited disposition of the human beings. Humans are just another element of nature, and not a superior entity that has the environment at their disposition. Therefore, the use of natural resources should not cause damage or deterioration that could threaten diversity and environmental integrity, the court stated in its reasoning.

US - Air travel, disability - § 41705. Discrimination against handicapped individuals

Summary: The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) was enacted in 1986. The law prohibits discrimination by commercial airlines on the basis of disability. An individual is considered "disabled" if he or she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.; (2) l has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. This law requires that each complaint under this section are investigated and those data reviewed/reported. Regulations promulgated under the ACAA in 2008 set forth requirements for service brought animals aboard commercial flights.

The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) was enacted in 1986. The law prohibits discrimination by commercial airlines on the basis of disability. An individual is considered "disabled" if he or she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.; (2) l has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. This law requires that each complaint under this section are investigated and those data reviewed/reported. Regulations promulgated under the ACAA in 2008 set forth requirements for service brought animals aboard commercial flights.

Colombia, LEY 1801 DE 2016, National Code of Police and Coexistence

Summary: This is the National Code of Police and coexistence. Under Title XIII entitled, “Of the Relationship with Animals," this law regulates concerns to the relationship of humans and domestic animals, the responsibilities that owners have towards their pets, and the responsibilities pet owners have towards society. It regulates topics such as domestic animals in public places and public transportation; the creation of animal welfare centers in districts and municipalities to provide attention to abandoned animals; behaviors that pet owners must avoid to not disrupt the healthy and peaceful coexistence of the members of society; and the general provisions regarding the treatment of potentially dangerous dogs.

This is the National Code of Police and coexistence. Under Title XIII entitled, “Of the Relationship with Animals," this law regulates concerns to the relationship of humans and domestic animals, the responsibilities that owners have towards their pets, and the responsibilities pet owners have towards society. It regulates topics such as domestic animals in public places and public transportation; the creation of animal welfare centers in districts and municipalities to provide attention to abandoned animals; behaviors that pet owners must avoid to not disrupt the healthy and peaceful coexistence of the members of society; and the general provisions regarding the treatment of potentially dangerous dogs.

Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div.

Summary: This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED.

This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED.

Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips

Summary: In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded.

In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded.

Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association

Summary: Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association

Summary: In this case, a condominium owner, who suffered from an anxiety disorder and had been prescribed use of emotional support animal, brought action against condominium association, its board, and certain association members, alleging, inter alia, imposition of a fine for owner's violation of association's “no dogs” policy violated Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff sent information about her emotional support dog and a letter from a licensed psychologist indicating that plaintiff was diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder to defendant Association's office manager. Plaintiff alleged that the President of the Association shared the content of her documents with some of the Association members, and approximately one year later plaintiff received an e-mail stating plaintiff had violated the "no dogs" policy contained in the Associations Rules and Regulations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, On each of the counts, the could held that: 1) owner's initial request to have emotional support dog was not specific; 2) association's alleged delay in processing condominium owner's request to have emotional support dog did not constitute refusal to grant reasonable accommodation; 3) association's notice of fine did not subject owner to adverse action; 4) there was no causal link between association's implementation of “no dogs” policy and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 5) there was no causal link between alleged disclosure of owner's confidential information and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 6) neighbor's blog posts regarding owner did not rise to level of interference with owner's FHA rights; and 7) condominium building was not public accommodation under ADA. With regard to the ADA claim, the court noted that a condominium can be a place of public accommodation if it operates as a place of lodging. Here, the bylaws specifically provided that Cowpet Bay West was a place of residence and not one of public accommodation. In addition, a single advertisement for a temporary rental on a webpage by one tenant was insufficient to show that owners were likely to rent to the public. On the issue of the blog posts constituting harassment under Section 3617, the court found that they did not rise to the level of interference with plaintiff's rights under the FHA. Instead, they reflected more of a "dispute between neighbors, not unlawful discrimination." The court found that the Board, the Association, and Talkington are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. The Court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over local counts, Seven through Eighteen, as against the Board, the Association, Talkington, Verdiramo, and Cockayne, as no federal counts remain as against any of said defendants; an appropriate Judgment was to follow this memorandum.

In this case, a condominium owner, who suffered from an anxiety disorder and had been prescribed use of emotional support animal, brought action against condominium association, its board, and certain association members, alleging, inter alia, imposition of a fine for owner's violation of association's “no dogs” policy violated Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff sent information about her emotional support dog and a letter from a licensed psychologist indicating that plaintiff was diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder to defendant Association's office manager. Plaintiff alleged that the President of the Association shared the content of her documents with some of the Association members, and approximately one year later plaintiff received an e-mail stating plaintiff had violated the "no dogs" policy contained in the Associations Rules and Regulations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, On each of the counts, the could held that: 1) owner's initial request to have emotional support dog was not specific; 2) association's alleged delay in processing condominium owner's request to have emotional support dog did not constitute refusal to grant reasonable accommodation; 3) association's notice of fine did not subject owner to adverse action; 4) there was no causal link between association's implementation of “no dogs” policy and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 5) there was no causal link between alleged disclosure of owner's confidential information and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 6) neighbor's blog posts regarding owner did not rise to level of interference with owner's FHA rights; and 7) condominium building was not public accommodation under ADA. With regard to the ADA claim, the court noted that a condominium can be a place of public accommodation if it operates as a place of lodging. Here, the bylaws specifically provided that Cowpet Bay West was a place of residence and not one of public accommodation. In addition, a single advertisement for a temporary rental on a webpage by one tenant was insufficient to show that owners were likely to rent to the public. On the issue of the blog posts constituting harassment under Section 3617, the court found that they did not rise to the level of interference with plaintiff's rights under the FHA. Instead, they reflected more of a "dispute between neighbors, not unlawful discrimination." The court found that the Board, the Association, and Talkington are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. The Court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over local counts, Seven through Eighteen, as against the Board, the Association, Talkington, Verdiramo, and Cockayne, as no federal counts remain as against any of said defendants; an appropriate Judgment was to follow this memorandum.

Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc.

Summary: This case dealt with a woman's request to have her emotional-support dog live with her before purchasing land in a mobile home community, known as Brookhaven. Prior to purchasing her lot, the plaintiff allegedly received permission from the president of Brookhaven's board of directors to keep her dog, even though the plaintiff was purchasing a lot in the "no pet" section of Brookhaven. The plaintiff provided the president of the board with the documentation requested, and the president told plaintiff she had been approved by the board to have her dog. Approximately one year after plaintiff purchased her lot, Brookhaven's attorney sent a letter requesting that plaintiff remove her dog, citing Brookhaven's policies disallowing her dog. After several letters sent back and forth between plaintiff's attorney and Brookhaven's attorney concerning requirements of the Fair Housing Act and the party's respective actions, both parties cross-moved for summary judgement. The court held that 1) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether tenant had an actual disability; 2) landlord was not prejudiced by tenant's untimely disclosure of expert report; 3) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord constructively denied tenant an accommodation; and 4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord retaliated against tenant for requesting a disability accommodation. As a result, all motions for summary judgement were denied.

This case dealt with a woman's request to have her emotional-support dog live with her before purchasing land in a mobile home community, known as Brookhaven. Prior to purchasing her lot, the plaintiff allegedly received permission from the president of Brookhaven's board of directors to keep her dog, even though the plaintiff was purchasing a lot in the "no pet" section of Brookhaven. The plaintiff provided the president of the board with the documentation requested, and the president told plaintiff she had been approved by the board to have her dog. Approximately one year after plaintiff purchased her lot, Brookhaven's attorney sent a letter requesting that plaintiff remove her dog, citing Brookhaven's policies disallowing her dog. After several letters sent back and forth between plaintiff's attorney and Brookhaven's attorney concerning requirements of the Fair Housing Act and the party's respective actions, both parties cross-moved for summary judgement. The court held that 1) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether tenant had an actual disability; 2) landlord was not prejudiced by tenant's untimely disclosure of expert report; 3) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord constructively denied tenant an accommodation; and 4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether landlord retaliated against tenant for requesting a disability accommodation. As a result, all motions for summary judgement were denied.

Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.

Summary: On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied.

On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied.