Animal Rights

Summary: This Essay examines the moral status of animals and the definition of humanity under traditional Jewish law, as contained in Biblical texts and commentaries by ancient and historical Jewish scholars. Examining whether animals are capable of moral behavior, it provides examples from various Judaic sources to support the idea that animals are capable of making conscious, moral choices. This Essay goes on to investigate the effect that morality has on the rights and rewards given to animals under Jewish law, and whether, as conscious moral actors, animals have souls. Turning more broadly to the definition of humanity, this Essay discusses whether there might be an expansive contextual definition that would encompass animals with the cognitive ability to communicate and interact like people. Possible tests for humanity under Jewish law, all of which could include animals, such as the contextual/functionality test, or the moral intelligence test, suggest that from a Jewish law perspective, animals that possess the ability to make moral choices may be more human than not.

Summary:

This Introduction provides an overview of the evolution of animal law over the past twenty years, demonstrating how changes in the law, social awareness, and legal education have directly affected this field. This Introduction describes both the positive and negative changes that have taken place, from the banning of dogfighting and cockfighting by federal law and some state laws; a spread in voter-adopted legislation providing for the protection of agricultural animals; and movements to reduce the use of chimpanzees in animal research; to the limitations of the Animal Welfare Act; changes in the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) policy lifting the ban on USDA inspection of horsemeat; discrimination of certain breeds of dogs through breed-specific legislation; and the weakening of a number of federal laws providing protection to wildlife. This Introduction also provides an overview of case law, discussing attempts to achieve standing for animals and differing approaches in calculating damages for harm to pets. With respect to legal institutions, there has been an increasing presence of animal law sections within the American Bar Association and state bar associations. Animal law has also expanded within legal education. This is evidenced by the emergence of animal law conferences, publications in animal focused law reviews and textbooks, animal law courses at prestigious law schools, and full-time professors specializing in the area of animal law.

Summary:

Twenty volumes is no small feat for an independently funded, entirely student-run journal. With a total staff of twenty students, including a small Board comprised of Editor in Chief, James Goldstein, Jr.; Managing Editor, William Fig; Articles Editor, Kelly Jeffries; and Form and Style Editor, Benjamin Allen, Animal Law published the inaugural volume of the world’s first animal law journal in 1995. This landmark event was the result of the hard work of Lewis & Clark students, with some key support. In this first volume, Animal Law gave “special thanks to Benjamin Allen for his hard work and dedication in founding [the] journal, to Matthew Howard and Nancy Perry for their inspiration, and to Richard Katz for his invaluable support throughout the process.” Animal Law also gave “thanks to Michael Blumm for his advice and encouragement, and to the Board of [Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)] for their support.”

Summary: This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. In Part I of this Article, it was discovered that while economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In this Part II of the Article, it is found that in the recent modern historical period we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes—animal protection—motivating animal law. In our present historical period, this Part II of the Article uncovers a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal-welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward the use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Part II of the Article, however, that only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal-protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from the premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.

Summary: On its face, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the conditions and practices of slavery and involuntary servitude wherever they may exist in this country—irrespective of the victim’s race, creed, sex, or species. In 2011, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, on behalf of five wild-captured orcas, sued SeaWorld for enslaving the orcas in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The case presented, for the first time, the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections can extend to nonhuman animals. This Article examines the lawsuit’s factual, theoretical, and strategic underpinnings, and argues that the district court’s opinion ultimately dismissing the suit failed to address the critical issues that animated this case of first impression: Who “counts” as a legal person for the purposes of law? Is it time to recognize nonhuman animals as legal persons, based on progressing scientific and normative views? What principles underlie the Thirteenth Amendment? When and how does the application of the Constitution expand? Can the meaning of the Constitution evolve to encompass the interests of nonhuman animals? Drawing on the United States Supreme Court’s long history of evolving constitutional interpretation, this Article presents four theories of constitutional change, under which the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” are expansive enough to include nonhuman animals. Despite the district court’s decision, the case can be properly viewed as the first step toward the legal recognition that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the rights of nonhuman animals to be free from bondage.

Summary: This article provides the introduction to Volume 19, part 2.

Summary: This Essay is a translation of the author’s original French text. It examines the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights of 1978, which lays out fundamental rights for animals in fourteen articles. This Essay explores the origins of and influences behind the original Declaration, as well as details the changes which were brought to it in a revised version in 1989. It then examines the scope of the Declaration and why it has not had the far-reaching implications its authors once hoped for. Finally, this Essay questions what the Declaration means for the future of animal rights and whether the document will have any lasting impact.

Summary: This Article, presented in two parts, travels through animal law from ancient Babylonia to the present, analyzing examples of laws from the ancient, medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment, recent modern, and modern historical periods. In performing this analysis, particular attention is focused on the primary motives and purposes behind these laws. What is discovered is that there has been a historical progression in the primary motives underlying animal laws in these different periods. While economic and religious motives dominate the ancient and medieval periods, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment we see social engineering—efforts to change human behavior—come to the fore. In the recent modern period, we finally see protecting animals for their own sakes, animal protection, motivating animal law. In our present historical period there is a movement towards what is defined as “scientific animal welfare”—the use of modern animal welfare science as the inspiration for animal laws and regulations. Does this historical trend toward use of modern science in making animal law portend a change that may transform our relationship with animals? Modern science tells us that many animals have substantial cognitive abilities and rich emotional lives, and this science would seem to lead us to question the use of animals in agriculture, experimentation, and entertainment altogether. It is ultimately concluded in this Article, however, that so far only a very narrow science of animal welfare is actually being applied in modern animal protection laws and regulations, one that proceeds from a premise that present uses of animals are legally, ethically, and morally appropriate. It is only in the future that the true implications of modern science may ever be translated into legal reality.

Summary: This is one of the fundamental questions that frame the study of animal law: To what extent should nonhuman animals be considered legal persons? Of course, this question presupposes that we share or can arrive at a common and stable conception of legal personhood. In fact, there are a variety of conceptions of legal personhood. This Introduction will explore one in particular and, in the process, question the extent to which simply being born Homo sapiens satisfies the potentially complex and demanding requirements of being a legal person. This argument will lead us to reframe animal law a bit and question whether we protect animals by focusing on their status or whether we are better off focusing on the status of humans—and not so much who we are but who, as legal persons that constitute legalities, we ought to be.

Summary:

This Article uses the theory of deliberative democracy, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and others, to suggest that public discourse is essential to encouraging democratic change in animal welfare law. The author examines the legal regimes of Canada and New Zealand to determine which country better facilitates a public dialogue about the treatment of animals. The Article concludes that, while Canada has a number of laws that ostensibly protect animals, New Zealand’s regime is much better at creating the public discourse required to meaningfully advance animal protection. The author does not suggest that New Zealand’s regime is perfect; rather, New Zealand’s model is preferable to Canada’s because it allows the public to meaningfully engage in laws affecting animals at regular intervals. In Canada, generating discussion in government about animal welfare is too often left to the whim of legislators. Due to New Zealand’s model of encouraging and requiring public discourse, its protection laws have begun to surpass those of Canada, and there is reason to believe this will continue. Encouraging public discourse about our assumptions about animals fosters hope for meaningful progress in their lives.