Animal Rights

Summary: Appeal, brought by the Plaintiff, who sought compensation for negligence on the part of the municipality of Anserma for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in the corrals of the slaughterhouse of Anserma when a bull charged him, causing him to fall and hit his head. The Plaintiff alleged that the slaughterhouse facilities were in poor condition, which was the cause of her husband’s death. If the facilities have been in good condition, he would not have had the accident. The court analyzed whether the damage was a result of the municipality's negligence as it did not maintained the facilities in a safe condition, or, if alternatively, it was an unfortunate accident not imputable to the Defendant. The court concluded that the Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to prove that the conditions of the facilities were the cause of the death of her husband. The court also found that the municipality was not in charge of the cattle in the slaughterhouse. Therefore, the damages were not imputable to the municipality. Furthermore, the court found the deceased was not an employee of the municipality, he was an independent employee that was hired by the slaughterhouse workers to assist them during the slaughter of cattle. The Court affirms the decision of the lower court and declares an exception of unconstitutionality of the expression “and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” of the Article 2354 of the Civil Code In its reasoning, the court determined that the accident was a result of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the part of the deceased, and not a result of the behavior of the animal. The court addressed Article 2354 of the Civil Code, that established that the caretaker of a fierce animal that does not report any benefit for the owner will be responsible for the damages the animal may cause, but if he alleges that if the damages were unavoidable, he will not be heard. The court declared unconstitutional the line “ and if he alleges that he was not able to avoid the damage, he will not be heard.” The court stated that it was inappropriate to address this scenario that involves responsibility derived from the behavior of animals under the parameters in the Civil Code that treated animals as goods. As today, it was of common acceptance that animals are sentient beings. Animals just as disabled people and other beings had dignity in themselves. They have a vital purpose, so much that they can enter a direct and permanent relationship with humans. The court continues to say that without this idea, the notion of legal capacity and the recognition of fundamental rights for legal persons could not exist. Animals should not be compared to objects or things, as they have dignity. The court recognized that animals and other living beings have their own value, and that even if it is acceptable that they are used for the human’s own benefit, it does not prevent us from recognizing that they are living beings, endowed with own value, and therefore subject to some rights.

Summary: In this case the petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants, Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, which are owned by the respondents, R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. and William R. Commerford, as president of R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. The issue was whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are “persons” entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus. The court denied the petition on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs lacked standing) and the petition was wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms (elephants are not "persons" according to the court). The court he court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas, but pointed to the state's anti-cruelty laws "as a potential alternative method of ensuring the well-being of any animal."

Summary: This law adopts the National Development Plan for 2014-2018, denominated “All for a new country." Article 248 states: “Public policy in defense of animal rights and/or animal protection. The national government will promote public policies and governmental actions in which the rights of animals and/or animal protection are promoted and promulgated. To accomplish this goal, the national government will work in coordination with social organizations of animal defense to design policies where concepts, institutional powers, conditions, aspects, limitations and specifications on animal care regarding the reproduction, possession, adoption, production, distribution, and commercialization of domestic animals not suitable for reproduction will be established. The territorial and decentralized entities will be responsible for monitoring, controlling, and promoting respect for animals and their physical and mental integrity.”

Summary: This New York cases balances animal right protestors' First Amendment rights against the government's interest in preserving public safety and flow of traffic on public streets. Plaintiff here is a business that operates horse-drawn carriage rides in Central Park. Defendant is an animal rights organization that protests the horse-and-carriage industry, often demonstrating where carriage operators drop off and pick up customers. At issue, is the manner in which defendants conduct their protests in the designated horse-drawn carriage zones. Plaintiff's claim defendants harass and threaten customers and drivers, and create a public safety issue by chasing after carriages. The court granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined defendants from things like physically blocking or impeding persons from riding or disembarking from carriages, physically touching associated persons or horses, yelling or shouting at persons or horses, obstructing the progress of a carriage ride, and handing literature to a person situated within a horse carriage. The court found the plaintiffs also established a likelihood of success on an action for public nuisance and a showing of a "special injury" aimed at plaintiff's business. Finding the injunction was content-neutral, this reviewing court then considered whether the challenged portions of the injunction burden speech no more than is necessary to assert the significant government interest. The court agreed with defendant that the "floating buffer zone" of the original order would be difficult for a protestor to assess and would burden speech more than is necessary. Thus, this court modified the order to prohibit any person from knowingly approaching within nine feet of a person in the loading/unloading carriage zone (a “conversational distance," said the court). The court also noted that the First Amendment does not require that protestors be allowed to interrupt the flow of traffic or endanger the public in the delivery of speech. The court also limited language in the original order that extended the reach of the injunction to “anyone else who becomes aware of this [d]ecision and [o]rder.” The court changed to this to defendants and “those acting in concert with the named parties” The order from the Supreme Court, New York County was modified as specified in this decision.

Summary: This article considers the legal avenues available to protect nonhuman animals in the U.S. and Australia, focusing particularly on the attribution of legal personhood. Section 2 of the article reviews attempts by the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) to establish legal personhood protections for nonhuman animals through writ of habeas corpus petitions under U.S. common law. Section 3 surveys the options for recognition of animal personhood under Australian law, discussing issues of standing, habeas corpus, and guardianship models. Section 4 discusses the growing movement to assign legal personhood rights to natural resources. The article proposes that to the extent that natural resources have received legal personhood protection to recognize their inherent value, similar protections should be afforded to animals. In the meantime, habeas corpus, standing, and guardianship theories provide valuable procedural platforms for incremental progress toward protecting nonhuman animals in both the U.S. and Australia.

Summary: Two proposed state bills out of Oklahoma and Missouri would prohibit an “animal rights charitable organization” from soliciting contributions in-state intended for either out-of-state use or “political purposes.” It is worthwhile to examine the bills and the factual context out of which they arose because of the important constitutional rights that they implicate and the potential chilling effect of this sort of legislation on the ability of nonprofits to advocate for their causes. While today it is “animal rights” groups under attack—by way of the bills discussed herein and other legislation such as so-called “ag-gag” bills, which suffer from some of the same constitutional deficiencies—it is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which other nonprofit groups with a viewpoint unwelcome to a legislature, or to powerful private interests, could be similarly targeted.

Summary: Steven M. Wise gives the introduction to Syracuse Law Review's Animal Law Book from 2017.

Summary: This article provides the foreword to Syracuse Law Review's Symposium on Animal Law from 2017.

Summary: The Animal Rights Law Reporter was published from 1980 - 1983 by the Society for Animal Rights, Inc. The Reporter was edited by Professor Henry Mark Holzer. Each issue begins with a segment entitled, "In the Courts," which outlines significant court cases involving animals. The issues also contain sections for "In the Legislatures," where recent animal-related legislation is discussed. "In the Legal Literature" gives updates on pertinent law reviews in the field. Finally, the Reporter provides a quarterly "Bulletin Board," "Available Resources," and "Editor's Comment" from Professor Holzer.

Summary: This Note evaluates the methods advocates have taken toward furthering great ape protection in the United States (U.S.). Many animal advocates argue that abolishing animals’ property status is essential to establishing effective protections; nonetheless, it will take time for our society to accept the concept of legal personhood for animals. Therefore, this Note suggests that for the time being, great ape protection should be framed in a human context, to protect animals within the existing, property-based animal law system. In general, this Note provides background on the property status of animals in the U.S., specifically analyzes the legal status of great apes domestically and abroad, and suggests how advocates may most efficiently work toward great ape protection today.