New York

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Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth.

Summary: In this case, the appellate court said that in order for the landlord to be held liable for injuries sustained as result of attack by tenant's pit bull, it must be demonstrated that the animal had vicious propensities and that landlord knew or should have known of these propensities. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the vicious nature of pit bulls, rather than letting the trier of fact determine whether the pit bull had displayed any signs of vicious or violent behavior prior to the incident. The order denying the defendant's motion for summary judgement dismissing the complaint was reversed.

In this case, the appellate court said that in order for the landlord to be held liable for injuries sustained as result of attack by tenant's pit bull, it must be demonstrated that the animal had vicious propensities and that landlord knew or should have known of these propensities. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the vicious nature of pit bulls, rather than letting the trier of fact determine whether the pit bull had displayed any signs of vicious or violent behavior prior to the incident. The order denying the defendant's motion for summary judgement dismissing the complaint was reversed.

Mitchell v. Snider

Summary: This is a case of an unmarried, co-habitating couple that jointly bought a dog and now dispute who should have the dog after the relationship has terminated. Mitchell brought this replevin action against his girlfriend, Snider, to recover possession of Django, their black lab. This court recognized the traditional way to treat such a case is to consider which party has superior possessory right to the dog. However, modern courts have started to recognize a special category of property in pets and have used a 'best for all concerned' analysis to decide who gets the animal. In this case, the court grants judgment for Snider in part because she had been solely responsible for the dog's care for the previous 20 months. No money was awarded to Mitchell because the expenses he paid were an expression of the parties' mutual love and desire to care for the dog.

This is a case of an unmarried, co-habitating couple that jointly bought a dog and now dispute who should have the dog after the relationship has terminated. Mitchell brought this replevin action against his girlfriend, Snider, to recover possession of Django, their black lab. This court recognized the traditional way to treat such a case is to consider which party has superior possessory right to the dog. However, modern courts have started to recognize a special category of property in pets and have used a 'best for all concerned' analysis to decide who gets the animal. In this case, the court grants judgment for Snider in part because she had been solely responsible for the dog's care for the previous 20 months. No money was awarded to Mitchell because the expenses he paid were an expression of the parties' mutual love and desire to care for the dog.

In re Clinton Cty.

Summary: Synopsis from the court: County filed notice of claim, directed toward estate of cattle farmer who had passed away after he was charged with animal cruelty, seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with care of seized cattle. The Surrogate's Court, Clinton County, Timothy J. Lawliss, J., held that: (1 ) county failed to establish that it was entitled to any relief based upon a theory of quantum meruit, and (2) even assuming that service providers, and thus county upon payment of service providers' bills, enriched farmer, county was not entitled to recover based upon a theory of unjust enrichment because criminal charges against farmer were dismissed upon his death. Notice of claim denied and dismissed.

Synopsis from the court: County filed notice of claim, directed toward estate of cattle farmer who had passed away after he was charged with animal cruelty, seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with care of seized cattle. The Surrogate's Court, Clinton County, Timothy J. Lawliss, J., held that: (1 ) county failed to establish that it was entitled to any relief based upon a theory of quantum meruit, and (2) even assuming that service providers, and thus county upon payment of service providers' bills, enriched farmer, county was not entitled to recover based upon a theory of unjust enrichment because criminal charges against farmer were dismissed upon his death. Notice of claim denied and dismissed.

Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept

Summary: Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus.

Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus.

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery

Summary: The Petitioners, including the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc . filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, two adult male chimpanzees. The petitions stated that chimpanzees are intelligent, have the ability to be trained by humans to be obedient to rules, and to fulfill certain duties and responsibilities. Therefore, chimpanzees should be afforded some of the same fundamental rights as humans which include entitlement to habeas relief. The Respondents, included Tommy’s owners, Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc. and its officers, as well as Kiko’s owners, the Primate Sanctuary, Inc. and its officers and directors. The Supreme Court, New York County, declined to extend habeas corpus relief to the chimpanzees. The Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed and held that:(1) the petitions were successive habeas proceedings which were not warranted or supported by any changed circumstances; (2) human-like characteristics of chimpanzees did not render them “persons” for purposes of habeas corpus relief; and (3) even if habeas relief was potentially available to chimpanzees, writ of habeas corpus did not lie on behalf of two chimpanzees at issue.

The Petitioners, including the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc . filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, two adult male chimpanzees. The petitions stated that chimpanzees are intelligent, have the ability to be trained by humans to be obedient to rules, and to fulfill certain duties and responsibilities. Therefore, chimpanzees should be afforded some of the same fundamental rights as humans which include entitlement to habeas relief. The Respondents, included Tommy’s owners, Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc. and its officers, as well as Kiko’s owners, the Primate Sanctuary, Inc. and its officers and directors. The Supreme Court, New York County, declined to extend habeas corpus relief to the chimpanzees. The Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed and held that:(1) the petitions were successive habeas proceedings which were not warranted or supported by any changed circumstances; (2) human-like characteristics of chimpanzees did not render them “persons” for purposes of habeas corpus relief; and (3) even if habeas relief was potentially available to chimpanzees, writ of habeas corpus did not lie on behalf of two chimpanzees at issue.

Tuman v. VL GEM LLC

Summary: <p>In this case, Tuman sued the owners of her apartment complex, VL GEM LLC and GEM Management Partners LLC, after the apartment complex refused to allow her to keep an emotional support dog in her apartment to help her deal with her post-traumatic stress disorder. Truman argued that she was discriminated against after she requested a “reasonable accommodation” for her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The defendants argued that Truman failed to provide sufficient medical documentation of her need for the support dog and therefore were not liable for discrimination under the FHA. The court found that Truman was able to establish a disability under FHA by showing that her PTSD “causes her to have severe anxiety and difficulties with socialization.” The court held that this satisfied the requirement under the FHA that the disability must “substantially limit one or more major life activities.” Since Truman qualified as disabled under the FHA, the court turned to whether or not she had provided the apartment complex with sufficient documentation and notice. Ultimately, the court found that Truman had provided the apartment with sufficient documentation because she provided them with a note from her doctor stipulating that Truman needed an accommodation in order to cope with her disability. Lastly, the court found that the apartment complex knew of Truman’s disability and request for an accommodation and still refused to allow her to have a dog, which resulted in a violation under the FHA. As a result, the court found for Truman.&nbsp;</p>

In this case, Tuman sued the owners of her apartment complex, VL GEM LLC and GEM Management Partners LLC, after the apartment complex refused to allow her to keep an emotional support dog in her apartment to help her deal with her post-traumatic stress disorder. Truman argued that she was discriminated against after she requested a “reasonable accommodation” for her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The defendants argued that Truman failed to provide sufficient medical documentation of her need for the support dog and therefore were not liable for discrimination under the FHA. The court found that Truman was able to establish a disability under FHA by showing that her PTSD “causes her to have severe anxiety and difficulties with socialization.” The court held that this satisfied the requirement under the FHA that the disability must “substantially limit one or more major life activities.” Since Truman qualified as disabled under the FHA, the court turned to whether or not she had provided the apartment complex with sufficient documentation and notice. Ultimately, the court found that Truman had provided the apartment with sufficient documentation because she provided them with a note from her doctor stipulating that Truman needed an accommodation in order to cope with her disability. Lastly, the court found that the apartment complex knew of Truman’s disability and request for an accommodation and still refused to allow her to have a dog, which resulted in a violation under the FHA. As a result, the court found for Truman. 

Blake v. County of Wyoming

Summary: <p><span>The City of Wyoming filed an appeal after the court dismissed the City’s motion for summary judgment. The initial law suit was filed by Cassandra Blake after she sustained injuries from a dog bite at the Wyoming County Animal Shelter. Blake was working at the shelter as a volunteer dog walker when the incident occurred. Blake filed suit against the City of Wyoming on the basis of strict liability. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to deny the City’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the City did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals rejected Blake’s argument that the City did have knowledge because the shelter was aware that the dog had previously knocked over a four year old child. The Court of Appeals found that this behavior was not notice to the shelter that the dog had any propensity to bite. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.</span></p>

The City of Wyoming filed an appeal after the court dismissed the City’s motion for summary judgment. The initial law suit was filed by Cassandra Blake after she sustained injuries from a dog bite at the Wyoming County Animal Shelter. Blake was working at the shelter as a volunteer dog walker when the incident occurred. Blake filed suit against the City of Wyoming on the basis of strict liability. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to deny the City’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the City did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals rejected Blake’s argument that the City did have knowledge because the shelter was aware that the dog had previously knocked over a four year old child. The Court of Appeals found that this behavior was not notice to the shelter that the dog had any propensity to bite. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.

NY - Research animals - § 239-b. Research dogs and cats

Summary: This New York law, effective in 2016, provides that a publicly-funded higher education research facility must assess the health of the dog or cat and determine whether it is suitable for adoption after the research and testing on the animal is completed. That research facility must then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption the dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal rescue/organization.

This New York law, effective in 2016, provides that a publicly-funded higher education research facility must assess the health of the dog or cat and determine whether it is suitable for adoption after the research and testing on the animal is completed. That research facility must then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption the dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal rescue/organization.

SHOULD THEY GO THE WAY OF THE HORSE AND BUGGY? HOW THE NEW YORK CITY HORSE-DRAWN CARRIAGE INDUSTRY HAS SURVIVED THIRTY YEARS OF OPPOSITION

Summary: <p>This Comment reviews the history of the horse-drawn carriage industry in New York City and details legislative efforts to regulate the business. Many cities in the United States feature horse-drawn carriages as a tourist attraction, but they are most associated with New York. The long-standing controversy over the working and living conditions of the horses that pull the cabs has garnered less national attention than other animal welfare issues, despite the fatalities and injuries suffered by the equines on traffic-choked Manhattan streets. Supporters of the industry defend it as an important contributor to the local economy, an iconic symbol of the city, and a source of livelihood for the operators. They maintain that municipal regulations are sufficient to protect the horses from mistreatment and the public from the perils of accidents involving carriages. However, city regulation has historically proven to be inadequate and ineffective in ensuring that the horses are not exposed to inhumane conditions. Moreover, the inherent hazards and stressors of New York City streets take a toll on the horses’ health and well-being that regulation cannot address. For these reasons, the protection of the horses and the public cannot be assured until the carriage business in the city is abolished. This Comment discusses the movement to ban the industry, including proposals that would replace the carriages with replicas of antique cars. With inadequate regulation and political obstacles to a ban, it may ultimately take a tide of public sentiment to end the suffering of carriage horses.</p>

This Comment reviews the history of the horse-drawn carriage industry in New York City and details legislative efforts to regulate the business. Many cities in the United States feature horse-drawn carriages as a tourist attraction, but they are most associated with New York. The long-standing controversy over the working and living conditions of the horses that pull the cabs has garnered less national attention than other animal welfare issues, despite the fatalities and injuries suffered by the equines on traffic-choked Manhattan streets. Supporters of the industry defend it as an important contributor to the local economy, an iconic symbol of the city, and a source of livelihood for the operators. They maintain that municipal regulations are sufficient to protect the horses from mistreatment and the public from the perils of accidents involving carriages. However, city regulation has historically proven to be inadequate and ineffective in ensuring that the horses are not exposed to inhumane conditions. Moreover, the inherent hazards and stressors of New York City streets take a toll on the horses’ health and well-being that regulation cannot address. For these reasons, the protection of the horses and the public cannot be assured until the carriage business in the city is abolished. This Comment discusses the movement to ban the industry, including proposals that would replace the carriages with replicas of antique cars. With inadequate regulation and political obstacles to a ban, it may ultimately take a tide of public sentiment to end the suffering of carriage horses.

People v. Meadows

Summary: <p>Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied.</p>

Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied.
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