Indiana

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IN - Facility - 35-40-5-13 Witness under the age of sixteen allowed comfort

Summary: A child under 16 years old may bring a comfort item or comfort animal shall be allowed to remain in the courtroom with the child during the child's testimony unless the court finds that the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial will be unduly prejudiced.

A child under 16 years old may bring a comfort item or comfort animal shall be allowed to remain in the courtroom with the child during the child's testimony unless the court finds that the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial will be unduly prejudiced.

IN - Exotic animals, contact - Chapter 26.5. Specified Animals

Summary: This set of Indiana laws was enacted in 2022. A person that owns or possesses a specified animal may not allow a member of the public to (1) come into direct contact with; or (2) enter into a proximity that allows for or permits direct contact with the specified animal, regardless of the age of the specified animal. Essentially, public contact with certain animals that include lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, and mountain lions (or their hybrids) is prohibited.

This set of Indiana laws was enacted in 2022. A person that owns or possesses a specified animal may not allow a member of the public to (1) come into direct contact with; or (2) enter into a proximity that allows for or permits direct contact with the specified animal, regardless of the age of the specified animal. Essentially, public contact with certain animals that include lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, and mountain lions (or their hybrids) is prohibited.

Daniels v. Drake

Summary: Plaintiff Damon Daniels appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Drakes. The incident stems from an unprovoked dog bite at defendants' home. The Drakes live on a large, rural property in Indiana with no neighbors. The Drakes own five dogs including "Max," a large Great Dane. Max would roam the property unrestrained. Daniels is a FedEx driver. In September of 2020, Daniels entered the property to deliver a package. Upon approaching the residence, Daniels honked his horn a couple times to get the attention of Lisa Drake. Daniels, who was still inside the vehicle, asked Lisa if Max was "okay," to which Lisa indicated a "thumbs up." However, after walking toward Lisa with the package, Max barked once and then bit Daniels in the abdomen. Daniels sustained puncture wounds, a one-centimeter laceration, swelling and a hematoma from the bite. Approximately two months later, Daniels filed the instant complaint seeking damages related to the dog bite. The Drakes filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they did not have actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities prior to the bite. In response, Daniels contended that Great Danes have a "natural propensity" to be territorial, which is exacerbated by isolation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal here, the court explained that Indiana law states that knowledge of a dog's dangerous or vicious tendencies may not be inferred from a first-time, unprovoked bite, but that knowledge may be inferred where evidence shows that the particular breed to which the owner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies." While the court observed that the Drakes presented evidence of a lack of actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities, the expert who testified on Great Dane behavior presented evidence that Great Danes might behave with "territorial aggressive tendencies" in a given situation. The Drakes argued on appeal (for the first time) that this evidence by a canine behavioral expert was "immaterial" and cannot be used to show what lay people would know about Great Danes. The court was unpersuaded by the Drakes' novel argument, and this created a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, this court reversed the order granting summary judgment for the Drakes and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Damon Daniels appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Drakes. The incident stems from an unprovoked dog bite at defendants' home. The Drakes live on a large, rural property in Indiana with no neighbors. The Drakes own five dogs including "Max," a large Great Dane. Max would roam the property unrestrained. Daniels is a FedEx driver. In September of 2020, Daniels entered the property to deliver a package. Upon approaching the residence, Daniels honked his horn a couple times to get the attention of Lisa Drake. Daniels, who was still inside the vehicle, asked Lisa if Max was "okay," to which Lisa indicated a "thumbs up." However, after walking toward Lisa with the package, Max barked once and then bit Daniels in the abdomen. Daniels sustained puncture wounds, a one-centimeter laceration, swelling and a hematoma from the bite. Approximately two months later, Daniels filed the instant complaint seeking damages related to the dog bite. The Drakes filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they did not have actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities prior to the bite. In response, Daniels contended that Great Danes have a "natural propensity" to be territorial, which is exacerbated by isolation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal here, the court explained that Indiana law states that knowledge of a dog's dangerous or vicious tendencies may not be inferred from a first-time, unprovoked bite, but that knowledge may be inferred where evidence shows that the particular breed to which the owner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies." While the court observed that the Drakes presented evidence of a lack of actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities, the expert who testified on Great Dane behavior presented evidence that Great Danes might behave with "territorial aggressive tendencies" in a given situation. The Drakes argued on appeal (for the first time) that this evidence by a canine behavioral expert was "immaterial" and cannot be used to show what lay people would know about Great Danes. The court was unpersuaded by the Drakes' novel argument, and this created a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, this court reversed the order granting summary judgment for the Drakes and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Brown by Brown v. Southside Animal Shelter, Inc.

Summary: This case from Indiana explores whether an animal shelter had a duty to inform a dog adopter of a dog's vicious propensities. Plaintiffs (the Browns) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Southside Animal Shelter, Inc. (“Southside”). The case stems from the adoption of a dog from defendant animal shelter. In 2014, the dog was surrendered by its owner to a neighboring animal shelter because it did not get along with another dog. The dog was then adopted to another party where it attacked the family's two-year-old boy, causing significant injuries. The dog was then surrendered to the county animal shelter, who recorded the bite incident upon intake of the dog. After the mandated quarantine, the dog was eventually transferred to defendant animal shelter who was informed of the bite according to deposition testimony. However, during an 8-day aggression observation, the dog showed no signs of aggression. In late 2015, plaintiffs adopted the dog with a release that stated the history of the dog was unknown and the shelter was released from all liability resulting from illness or actions by the dog. Less than a month later, the dog attacked the Brown's six-year-old daughter causing injuries to her face. In the trial court action by the Browns against Southside, the court granted the defendant's motion of summary judgment based on the adoption release and dismissed the case. In this instant appeal before the Indiana Court of Appeals, the court focused on whether Southside owed a duty to the Browns to establish liability for the dog bite. The court found factual disputes remain as to whether Southside knew or should have known of the dog's past aggression and whether the knowledge from the volunteer who did intake for the dog imputed knowledge to the animal shelter. Additionally, the court indicated there was a question of fact whether Southside exercised reasonable care in evaluating the dog's behavioral history prior to adoption. Ultimately, the Court found that Southside had a duty to the Browns to inform them of the dog's past bite history, and factual issues relating to that duty preclude the granting of summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case from Indiana explores whether an animal shelter had a duty to inform a dog adopter of a dog's vicious propensities. Plaintiffs (the Browns) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Southside Animal Shelter, Inc. (“Southside”). The case stems from the adoption of a dog from defendant animal shelter. In 2014, the dog was surrendered by its owner to a neighboring animal shelter because it did not get along with another dog. The dog was then adopted to another party where it attacked the family's two-year-old boy, causing significant injuries. The dog was then surrendered to the county animal shelter, who recorded the bite incident upon intake of the dog. After the mandated quarantine, the dog was eventually transferred to defendant animal shelter who was informed of the bite according to deposition testimony. However, during an 8-day aggression observation, the dog showed no signs of aggression. In late 2015, plaintiffs adopted the dog with a release that stated the history of the dog was unknown and the shelter was released from all liability resulting from illness or actions by the dog. Less than a month later, the dog attacked the Brown's six-year-old daughter causing injuries to her face. In the trial court action by the Browns against Southside, the court granted the defendant's motion of summary judgment based on the adoption release and dismissed the case. In this instant appeal before the Indiana Court of Appeals, the court focused on whether Southside owed a duty to the Browns to establish liability for the dog bite. The court found factual disputes remain as to whether Southside knew or should have known of the dog's past aggression and whether the knowledge from the volunteer who did intake for the dog imputed knowledge to the animal shelter. Additionally, the court indicated there was a question of fact whether Southside exercised reasonable care in evaluating the dog's behavioral history prior to adoption. Ultimately, the Court found that Southside had a duty to the Browns to inform them of the dog's past bite history, and factual issues relating to that duty preclude the granting of summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

IN - Domestic Violence - 31-9-2-42 “Domestic or family violence”

Summary: This section of the Family Law Code defines "domestic or family violence" as "[a]busing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), or killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member."

This section of the Family Law Code defines "domestic or family violence" as "[a]busing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), or killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member."

Liddle v. Clark

Summary: In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

IN - Vehicle - Chapter 30. Immunity for Removing a Domestic Animal from a Locked Motor Vehicle

Summary: This Indiana chapter on pets in motor vehicles was enacted in 2017. Under the chapter, "domestic animal" means a dog, cat or other vertebrate animal kept as a household pet (not including livestock). Section 34-30-30-3 provides that a person who forcibly enters a motor vehicle to remove a domestic animal from a motor vehicle is liable for one-half the cost of repairing the damage to the motor vehicle caused by the forcible entry. To meet this immunity, the person must reasonably believe that the domestic animal is in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily harm. The person must do all the following first: (1) determine the motor vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary to remove the domestic animal; (2) call 911 or attempt to contact law enforcement/animal control; (3) use no more force than is necessary to remove the domestic animal from the vehicle; and (4) remain with the animal until first responders or law enforcement arrive. The statute gives complete immunity from the costs of damage to any first responder, law enforcement/animal control officer, public safety government employee, or veterinary professional. Finally, the chapter immunizes the owner of the domestic animal from liability for bites or physical injury to the rescuer.

This Indiana chapter on pets in motor vehicles was enacted in 2017. Under the chapter, "domestic animal" means a dog, cat or other vertebrate animal kept as a household pet (not including livestock). Section 34-30-30-3 provides that a person who forcibly enters a motor vehicle to remove a domestic animal from a motor vehicle is liable for one-half the cost of repairing the damage to the motor vehicle caused by the forcible entry. To meet this immunity, the person must reasonably believe that the domestic animal is in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily harm. The person must do all the following first: (1) determine the motor vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary to remove the domestic animal; (2) call 911 or attempt to contact law enforcement/animal control; (3) use no more force than is necessary to remove the domestic animal from the vehicle; and (4) remain with the animal until first responders or law enforcement arrive. The statute gives complete immunity from the costs of damage to any first responder, law enforcement/animal control officer, public safety government employee, or veterinary professional. Finally, the chapter immunizes the owner of the domestic animal from liability for bites or physical injury to the rescuer.

IN - Law enforcement - Chapter 42.5. Burial with Law Enforcement Animals or Service Animals

Summary: This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration.

This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration.

IN - Wild Animals - Chapter 26. Wild Animal Permit

Summary: This set of laws deals with Wild Animal Permits in Indiana. Section 3 allows the Director to adopt rules that require permits to possess wild animals protected by laws or rules. The director may also adopt a rule that requires a permit to possess a wild animal that may be harmful or dangerous to plants or animals. Permits under this chapter may be suspended by the director and animal may be seized if the animal is in a position to harm another animal or the life or health of the animal is in peril. This chapter does not apply to licensed commercial animal dealers, zoological parks, circuses, or carnivals.

This set of laws deals with Wild Animal Permits in Indiana. Section 3 allows the Director to adopt rules that require permits to possess wild animals protected by laws or rules. The director may also adopt a rule that requires a permit to possess a wild animal that may be harmful or dangerous to plants or animals. Permits under this chapter may be suspended by the director and animal may be seized if the animal is in a position to harm another animal or the life or health of the animal is in peril. This chapter does not apply to licensed commercial animal dealers, zoological parks, circuses, or carnivals.

IN - Spay, neuter - Chapter 4. Spay-Neuter Requirement for Animal Care Facilities

Summary: This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility.

This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility.
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