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U.S. v. Stevens

Summary: <p> Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note:&nbsp; <a href="/statutes/stusfd18usc48.htm"> 18 U.S.C. &sect; 48 </a> was amended following this ruling in late 2010). </p>

Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note:  18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010).

Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture

Summary: <p> North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary. </p>

North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary.

Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman

Summary: <p> In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and&nbsp;APHIS&nbsp;violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of &ldquo;animal&rdquo; under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that&nbsp;all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on <em> Lujan </em> , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. </p>

In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA.

Dauphine v. U.S.

Summary: <p> Defendant, Dr. Nico Dauphine, was convicted of attempted cruelty to animals, contrary to D.C.Code &sect;&sect; 22&ndash;1001, &ndash;1803 (2001). After an investigation, Dr. Dauphine was captured on surveillance video placing bromadialone, an anticoagulant rodenticide, near the neighborhood cats' food bowls. On appeal, Dauphine contended that there was insufficient evidence that she committed the crime "knowingly" with malice. This court found the inclusion of the word "knowingly" did not change the statute from a general to specific intent crime, and simply shows that the actor had no justification for his or her actions. The government met its burden to prove that appellant attempted to commit the crime of animal cruelty. </p>

Defendant, Dr. Nico Dauphine, was convicted of attempted cruelty to animals, contrary to D.C.Code §§ 22–1001, –1803 (2001). After an investigation, Dr. Dauphine was captured on surveillance video placing bromadialone, an anticoagulant rodenticide, near the neighborhood cats' food bowls. On appeal, Dauphine contended that there was insufficient evidence that she committed the crime "knowingly" with malice. This court found the inclusion of the word "knowingly" did not change the statute from a general to specific intent crime, and simply shows that the actor had no justification for his or her actions. The government met its burden to prove that appellant attempted to commit the crime of animal cruelty.

Center for Biological Diversity v. California Fish & Game Com'n

Summary: <p> The California Fish &amp; Game Commission (Commission) rejected a petition by the Center for Biological Diversity (Center) to add the California tiger salamander to the Commission&rsquo;s list of endangered species under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA), on grounds that the petition lacked sufficient information to indicate that the listing may be warranted. The Court of Appeal, Third District, California, held that the Trial Court did not err in directing the Commission to enter a decision accepting the Center&rsquo;s petition, as inferences drawn from evidence offered in support of the petition clearly afforded sufficient information to indicate that listing action may be warranted. The Court found that information in the administrative record indicating that the salamander species &ldquo;does not breed prolifically, is vulnerable to several significant threats, has lost most of its original habitat, and has been displaced by a hybrid from a significant portion of its range&rdquo; was not outweighed by the Commission&rsquo;s evidence and arguments regarding the introduction of artificial ponds which could provide increased breeding habitat, and the listing of the species under the Federal Endangered Species Act. </p>

The California Fish & Game Commission (Commission) rejected a petition by the Center for Biological Diversity (Center) to add the California tiger salamander to the Commission’s list of endangered species under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA), on grounds that the petition lacked sufficient information to indicate that the listing may be warranted. The Court of Appeal, Third District, California, held that the Trial Court did not err in directing the Commission to enter a decision accepting the Center’s petition, as inferences drawn from evidence offered in support of the petition clearly afforded sufficient information to indicate that listing action may be warranted. The Court found that information in the administrative record indicating that the salamander species “does not breed prolifically, is vulnerable to several significant threats, has lost most of its original habitat, and has been displaced by a hybrid from a significant portion of its range” was not outweighed by the Commission’s evidence and arguments regarding the introduction of artificial ponds which could provide increased breeding habitat, and the listing of the species under the Federal Endangered Species Act.

Pulaski v. Chrisman

Summary: <p> Residents of a mobile home park attempted to get injunction preventing the conversion of their mobile home park into a community campground.&nbsp; Plaintiffs claimed violation of the Endangered Species Act due to the possible removal of endangered species during the renovation.&nbsp; The court held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain part of plaintiffs Endangered Species&nbsp;claim because of a procedural violation&nbsp;and that plaintiffs failed to show violation of the Endangered Species Act was likely on the remainder of their claims.&nbsp; </p>

Residents of a mobile home park attempted to get injunction preventing the conversion of their mobile home park into a community campground.  Plaintiffs claimed violation of the Endangered Species Act due to the possible removal of endangered species during the renovation.  The court held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain part of plaintiffs Endangered Species claim because of a procedural violation and that plaintiffs failed to show violation of the Endangered Species Act was likely on the remainder of their claims. 

Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs filed action against Interior and FWS to set aside FWS's finding that the desert bald eagle does not qualify as a distinct population segment (&ldquo;DPS&rdquo;) entitled to protection under the Endangered Species Act (&ldquo;ESA&rdquo;). Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment was granted. The Court found that FWS' 12&ndash;month finding was based on the 2007 delisting rule, which failed to comport with the notice, comment, and consultation requirements of the ESA. The Court set aside the 12&ndash;month finding as an abuse of discretion. <br/> </p>

Plaintiffs filed action against Interior and FWS to set aside FWS's finding that the desert bald eagle does not qualify as a distinct population segment (“DPS”) entitled to protection under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment was granted. The Court found that FWS' 12–month finding was based on the 2007 delisting rule, which failed to comport with the notice, comment, and consultation requirements of the ESA. The Court set aside the 12–month finding as an abuse of discretion.

Strahan v. Linnon

Summary: <p> Coast Guard vessels struck and killed Northern Right whales. Plaintiffs claim that these incidents constitute takings in violation of the ESA and MMPA. Court holds that the Coast Guard could implement reasonable and prudent alternatives that would reduce the striking of whales. </p>

Coast Guard vessels struck and killed Northern Right whales. Plaintiffs claim that these incidents constitute takings in violation of the ESA and MMPA. Court holds that the Coast Guard could implement reasonable and prudent alternatives that would reduce the striking of whales.

U.S. v. Gonzales

Summary: <p> Court held that defendant has standing to raise a facial&nbsp;challenge to the Indian eagle permit process where he declined to apply for a permit based on the intrusiveness of the questions.&nbsp; Defendant is a member of a highly secretive religious sect of his tribe.&nbsp; In the RFRA analysis, the court held that the permit application was not the least restrictive means of implementing the government's compelling interest where the permit required intrusive information about religious practices.&nbsp; For further discussion on Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#religious"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act </a> . </p>

Court held that defendant has standing to raise a facial challenge to the Indian eagle permit process where he declined to apply for a permit based on the intrusiveness of the questions.  Defendant is a member of a highly secretive religious sect of his tribe.  In the RFRA analysis, the court held that the permit application was not the least restrictive means of implementing the government's compelling interest where the permit required intrusive information about religious practices.  For further discussion on Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Summary: <p> Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA&nbsp;after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe.&nbsp; Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans.&nbsp; For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see <a href="/articles/ddusbgepa.htm#nonindian"> Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. </a> </p>

Appellant was the pastor of an all-race Native American church that required the use of eagle feathers during certain worship who challenged the BGEPA after being denied a permit to obtain eagle feathers because he was not a member of a recognized Indian tribe.  Under an equal protection analysis, the court found the limitation on the use of eagle parts to Native Americans is rationally related to the government's interest in preserving the eagle population as well as the special religious and cultural interests of Native Americans.  For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by non-Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.

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