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Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp.

Summary: <p> Tenant brought action under the Federal Fair Housing Act alleging that her landlord failed to reasonably accommodate her mental disability by&nbsp;refusing to allow her to keep companion animals in her rental unit.&nbsp;Tenant put forth evidence establishing that the animals lessened the effects of her mental disability by providing companionship. The housing authority argued that only service dogs are a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the housing authority's argument, holding that animals other than service animal can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Also, the court noted that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring an analysis of the burdens imposed on the housing authority and the benefits to the disabled person. </p>

Tenant brought action under the Federal Fair Housing Act alleging that her landlord failed to reasonably accommodate her mental disability by refusing to allow her to keep companion animals in her rental unit. Tenant put forth evidence establishing that the animals lessened the effects of her mental disability by providing companionship. The housing authority argued that only service dogs are a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the housing authority's argument, holding that animals other than service animal can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Also, the court noted that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring an analysis of the burdens imposed on the housing authority and the benefits to the disabled person.

SENTELL v. NEW ORLEANS & C. R. CO.

Summary: <p> This was an action originally instituted by Sentell in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, to recover the value of a Newffoundland bitch, known as 'Countess Lona,' alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company.&nbsp; <span> The company answered, denying the allegation of negligence, and set up as a separate defense that plaintiff had not complied either with the requirements of the state law, or of the city ordinances, with respect to the keeping of dogs, and was therefore not entitled to recover.&nbsp; Recognizing that an owner has only a conditional interest in a dog as a form of property, the Supreme Court held&nbsp;that the Louisiana law was within&nbsp;its police power, and the judgment of the court of appeals against plaintiff was therefore affirmed. </span> </p>

This was an action originally instituted by Sentell in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, to recover the value of a Newffoundland bitch, known as 'Countess Lona,' alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company.  The company answered, denying the allegation of negligence, and set up as a separate defense that plaintiff had not complied either with the requirements of the state law, or of the city ordinances, with respect to the keeping of dogs, and was therefore not entitled to recover.  Recognizing that an owner has only a conditional interest in a dog as a form of property, the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana law was within its police power, and the judgment of the court of appeals against plaintiff was therefore affirmed.

Geer v. Connecticut

Summary: <p> Defendant&nbsp;was charged with the possession of game birds, for the purpose of transporting them beyond the state, which birds had been lawfully killed within the state.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The sole issue which the case presents is, was it lawful, under the constitution of the United States (section 8, art. 1) (the Commerce Clause), for the state of Connecticut to allow the killing of birds within the state during a designated open season, to allow such birds, when so killed, to be used, to be sold, and to be bought for use, within the state, and yet to forbid their transportation beyond the state?&nbsp; The Court held that, aside from the authority of the state, derived from the common ownership of game, and the trust for the benefit of its people which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is another view of the power of the state in regard to the property in game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because, by doing so, interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected.&nbsp; This decision was later overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322. </p>

Defendant was charged with the possession of game birds, for the purpose of transporting them beyond the state, which birds had been lawfully killed within the state.   The sole issue which the case presents is, was it lawful, under the constitution of the United States (section 8, art. 1) (the Commerce Clause), for the state of Connecticut to allow the killing of birds within the state during a designated open season, to allow such birds, when so killed, to be used, to be sold, and to be bought for use, within the state, and yet to forbid their transportation beyond the state?  The Court held that, aside from the authority of the state, derived from the common ownership of game, and the trust for the benefit of its people which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is another view of the power of the state in regard to the property in game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because, by doing so, interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected.  This decision was later overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322.

Lawton v. Steele

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs sued defendant fish and game protectors to recover damages for the loss of their seized fishing nets.&nbsp; At issue was the New York statute that prohibited fishing in the area where plaintiffs were fishing and proscribed seizure of fishing gear used in violation of the statute.&nbsp; The U.S. Supreme Court held that such a statute is a constitutional exercise of state police power, as the protection of fish and game has always been within the proper domain of police power.&nbsp; Further, the court found the legislature acted properly in providing a seizure component to the statute to control what it termed a "public nuisance."&nbsp; </p>

Plaintiffs sued defendant fish and game protectors to recover damages for the loss of their seized fishing nets.  At issue was the New York statute that prohibited fishing in the area where plaintiffs were fishing and proscribed seizure of fishing gear used in violation of the statute.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that such a statute is a constitutional exercise of state police power, as the protection of fish and game has always been within the proper domain of police power.  Further, the court found the legislature acted properly in providing a seizure component to the statute to control what it termed a "public nuisance." 

U.S. v. Thompson

Summary: <p> Act May 25, 1900, c. 553, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 188, incorporated in former section 393 of Title 18, was limited in its application to animals or birds killed in violation of game laws, and animals or birds killed during the open season - "the export of which is not prohibited by law," according to the court.&nbsp; The court held an indictment would not stand for a failure to mark a package containing game killed during the open season but the export of which was prohibited by the law of the state where the same was killed. </p>

Act May 25, 1900, c. 553, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 188, incorporated in former section 393 of Title 18, was limited in its application to animals or birds killed in violation of game laws, and animals or birds killed during the open season - "the export of which is not prohibited by law," according to the court.  The court held an indictment would not stand for a failure to mark a package containing game killed during the open season but the export of which was prohibited by the law of the state where the same was killed.

U.S. v. Tomono

Summary: <p> Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 3372(a)(1) &amp; 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. &sect; 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences."&nbsp; The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough&nbsp;to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure. </p>

Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences."  The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure.

United States v. McKittrick

Summary: <p> Defendant McKittrick shot and killed a wolf in Montana.&nbsp; Defendant claimed that the federal government's importing of wolves from Canada violated the Endangered Species Act because that Act required that imported "experimental populations" had to be "wholly separate" from any other populations of the same species.&nbsp; McKittrick claimed that because there had been lone wolf sightings in the area before the wolves were brought from Canada to the Yellowstone region, the new population was not "wholly separate" from an existing population.&nbsp; The court held that the regulations importing the wolves from Canada were valid because a few lone wolves do not constitute a "population", and that therefore defendant was guilty of unlawfully taking a wolf. </p>

Defendant McKittrick shot and killed a wolf in Montana.  Defendant claimed that the federal government's importing of wolves from Canada violated the Endangered Species Act because that Act required that imported "experimental populations" had to be "wholly separate" from any other populations of the same species.  McKittrick claimed that because there had been lone wolf sightings in the area before the wolves were brought from Canada to the Yellowstone region, the new population was not "wholly separate" from an existing population.  The court held that the regulations importing the wolves from Canada were valid because a few lone wolves do not constitute a "population", and that therefore defendant was guilty of unlawfully taking a wolf.

Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agr.

Summary: <p> A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions. </p>

A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions.

U.S. v. Senchenko

Summary: <p> During the two year period alleged in the indictment, between September 1993 and September 1995, government agents found or were directed to four illegal bear snares in Colville National Forest, Washington that were later linked to defendant.&nbsp; The Lacey Act provision that makes it felony to knowingly engage in conduct that involves intent to sell wildlife with market value in excess of $350 encompasses several types of conduct in furtherance of commercial activity (transporting, selling, receiving, acquiring, and purchasing wildlife) and government could aggregate value of parts related to such conduct to arrive at requisite $350 value, because defendant's various acts formed a single continuing scheme. </p>

During the two year period alleged in the indictment, between September 1993 and September 1995, government agents found or were directed to four illegal bear snares in Colville National Forest, Washington that were later linked to defendant.  The Lacey Act provision that makes it felony to knowingly engage in conduct that involves intent to sell wildlife with market value in excess of $350 encompasses several types of conduct in furtherance of commercial activity (transporting, selling, receiving, acquiring, and purchasing wildlife) and government could aggregate value of parts related to such conduct to arrive at requisite $350 value, because defendant's various acts formed a single continuing scheme.

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