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Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs sued&nbsp;the Navy&nbsp;over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared&nbsp;that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life.&nbsp; This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material.&nbsp; The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged. </p>

Plaintiffs sued the Navy over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life.  This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material.  The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged.

Lacy v. U.S.

Summary: <p> The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration.&nbsp;Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of&nbsp;its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known.&nbsp;While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of&nbsp; the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that&nbsp;substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness. </p>

The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration. Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known. While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of  the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness.

U.S. v. Friday

Summary: <p> <span> The Defendant, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming, was charged with violating the Eagle Act after he illegally shot a bald eagle for&nbsp;an important religious ritual. The Defendant claimed that prosecution was prevented by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Friday claimed that the government failed to protect eagles killed when they strike power lines. The Court of Appeals held that the permitting process did not facially violate the RFRA and any difference in government's treatment of Native Americans taking eagles for religious purposes and power companies whose power lines killed eagles did not indicate that government failed to protect eagles in least restrictive manner.&nbsp; </span> </p>

The Defendant, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming, was charged with violating the Eagle Act after he illegally shot a bald eagle for an important religious ritual. The Defendant claimed that prosecution was prevented by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Friday claimed that the government failed to protect eagles killed when they strike power lines. The Court of Appeals held that the permitting process did not facially violate the RFRA and any difference in government's treatment of Native Americans taking eagles for religious purposes and power companies whose power lines killed eagles did not indicate that government failed to protect eagles in least restrictive manner. 

Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne

Summary: <p> Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA.&nbsp; Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. &sect; 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there&nbsp;was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court. </p>

Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA.  Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court.

Campbell v. Supervalu

Summary: <span id="mDocumentText_ctl00_mTextDisplay"> North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. </span>

North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA.

Center For Biological Diversity v. Lohn

Summary: <p> In this case, the court is&nbsp;asked to decide whether the federal government's policy for listing killer whales under the Endangered Species Act is invalid. The Center for Biological Diversity, along with eleven co-petitioners not parties to this appeal, petitioned the National Marine Fisheries Service to list the Southern Resident killer whale&nbsp;as an endangered species under the ESA. Initially, the Service issued a proposed ruling based on its DPS policy that concluded listing the Southern Resident was &ldquo;not warranted&rdquo; because the Southern Resident was not &ldquo;significant&rdquo; to its taxon. After the Center challenged this action, the district court set aside the Service's &ldquo;not warranted&rdquo; finding because it failed to utilize the best available scientific data when determining whether the Southern Resident was &ldquo;significant&rdquo; under that policy. Pursuant to the district court's order, the Service reexamined the listing petition and issued a proposed rule that recommended listing the Southern Resident as a threatened species.&nbsp;The Center&nbsp;appealed, and the Service issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as&nbsp;endangered (as opposed to threatened). The Service contends that this case is now moot because it has ultimately issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered species. This court agreed, finding that declaring the DPS Policy unlawful would serve no purpose in this case because the Service has listed the Southern Resident as an endangered species, the Center's ultimate objective. </p>

In this case, the court is asked to decide whether the federal government's policy for listing killer whales under the Endangered Species Act is invalid. The Center for Biological Diversity, along with eleven co-petitioners not parties to this appeal, petitioned the National Marine Fisheries Service to list the Southern Resident killer whale as an endangered species under the ESA. Initially, the Service issued a proposed ruling based on its DPS policy that concluded listing the Southern Resident was “not warranted” because the Southern Resident was not “significant” to its taxon. After the Center challenged this action, the district court set aside the Service's “not warranted” finding because it failed to utilize the best available scientific data when determining whether the Southern Resident was “significant” under that policy. Pursuant to the district court's order, the Service reexamined the listing petition and issued a proposed rule that recommended listing the Southern Resident as a threatened species. The Center appealed, and the Service issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as endangered (as opposed to threatened). The Service contends that this case is now moot because it has ultimately issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered species. This court agreed, finding that declaring the DPS Policy unlawful would serve no purpose in this case because the Service has listed the Southern Resident as an endangered species, the Center's ultimate objective.

In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health

Summary: <p> This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (&ldquo;IDA&rdquo;) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (&ldquo;APF&rdquo;) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's&nbsp;Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH&rsquo;s arguments that the records are not &ldquo;agency records&rdquo; because they belong to NIH's contractor,&nbsp;Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (&ldquo;CRL&rdquo;), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is &ldquo;essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,&rdquo; and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. <strong> This Order was Superseded by <a href="/cases/causfd543fsupp3d70.htm"> <em> In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health </em> , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008). </a> </strong> </p>

This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. This Order was Superseded by In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008).

Ing v. American Airlines

Summary: <p> A man shipped his dog on an American Airlines airplane, and the dog died shortly after landing. The court found that the contract signed prior to take-off limited the liability of the airline. However,&nbsp;the airline could be liable because&nbsp;after landing, the man had asked for his dog back, to give it veterinary care, but the airline took more than four hours to give&nbsp;it back. Also, the airline could be liable if the plane temperature had been higher than for which the&nbsp;contract called. </p>

A man shipped his dog on an American Airlines airplane, and the dog died shortly after landing. The court found that the contract signed prior to take-off limited the liability of the airline. However, the airline could be liable because after landing, the man had asked for his dog back, to give it veterinary care, but the airline took more than four hours to give it back. Also, the airline could be liable if the plane temperature had been higher than for which the contract called.

Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. A.S.P.C.A.

Summary: <p> Pending before the Court is Defendant American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.'s (&ldquo;ASPCA&rdquo;) Motion to Temporarily Stay All Proceedings.&nbsp;The suit arises from Feld Entertainment, Inc. (&ldquo;FEI&rdquo;) claim against the ASPCA and other defendants, including Tom Rider, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (&ldquo;RICO&rdquo;). The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Tom Rider has been bribed by the organizational defendants to participate in the ESA Action against FEI in violation of federal law. The court agreed that the public interest in the ESA claim weighs in favor of granting the temporary stay. </p>

Pending before the Court is Defendant American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.'s (“ASPCA”) Motion to Temporarily Stay All Proceedings. The suit arises from Feld Entertainment, Inc. (“FEI”) claim against the ASPCA and other defendants, including Tom Rider, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Tom Rider has been bribed by the organizational defendants to participate in the ESA Action against FEI in violation of federal law. The court agreed that the public interest in the ESA claim weighs in favor of granting the temporary stay.

Stephens v. City of Spokane

Summary: <p> Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which&nbsp;they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the&nbsp;ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the&nbsp;ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by &ldquo;habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.&rdquo; </p>

Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by “habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.”

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