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Giaconia v. Delaware County Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Summary: <p> Plaintiff brought various claims against Defendants after Plaintiff&rsquo;s cat was euthanized prior to the standard 72 hour waiting period. <span> &nbsp; </span> On Defendants&rsquo; motion to dismiss, the United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania found that Defendants were not acting under color of law. <span> &nbsp; </span> Because any and all claims for which the Court had original jurisdiction were being dismissed, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff&rsquo;s State law claims. <span> &nbsp; </span> </p>

Plaintiff brought various claims against Defendants after Plaintiff’s cat was euthanized prior to the standard 72 hour waiting period.   On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania found that Defendants were not acting under color of law.   Because any and all claims for which the Court had original jurisdiction were being dismissed, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims.  

Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Kempthorne

Summary: <span> Environmental groups brought challenge under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against a Rule promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) designating a particular geographic group of gray wolves as a &ldquo;distinct population segment&rdquo; (DPS) and removing the particular group from the endangered species list. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, held that the ESA is ambiguous with respect to whether the ESA permits FWS to use the DPS tool to remove ESA protections from a healthy sub-population of a listed species, and that the FWS rule was not entitled to <em> Chevron </em> deference, because the plain meaning of the statute is silent and/or ambiguous as to the particular issue at hand and there is no </span> <span> permissible agency construction to which the Court could defer. <span> &nbsp; </span> Lastly, the Court found that vacatur of the FWS Rule prior to remand was appropriate, because of the FWS&rsquo; failure to explain how its interpretation of the ESA comported with the policy objectives of the ESA, and because vacatur would result in very little to no confusion or inefficiency. </span>

Environmental groups brought challenge under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against a Rule promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) designating a particular geographic group of gray wolves as a “distinct population segment” (DPS) and removing the particular group from the endangered species list. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, held that the ESA is ambiguous with respect to whether the ESA permits FWS to use the DPS tool to remove ESA protections from a healthy sub-population of a listed species, and that the FWS rule was not entitled to Chevron deference, because the plain meaning of the statute is silent and/or ambiguous as to the particular issue at hand and there is no permissible agency construction to which the Court could defer.   Lastly, the Court found that vacatur of the FWS Rule prior to remand was appropriate, because of the FWS’ failure to explain how its interpretation of the ESA comported with the policy objectives of the ESA, and because vacatur would result in very little to no confusion or inefficiency.

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Kimbell

Summary: <p> After filing a complaint challenging certain decisions by the United States Forest Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service authorizing livestock grazing within a national forest, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction seeking an order prohibiting the authorization of livestock grazing on certain public lands until Plaintiffs&rsquo; claims could be heard on the merits. <span> &nbsp; </span> The United States District Court, D. Oregon granted Plaintiffs&rsquo; motion, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its claims, and that Plaintiffs made a sufficient showing that irreparable harm would likely occur if the relief sought is not granted. <span> &nbsp; </span> </p>

After filing a complaint challenging certain decisions by the United States Forest Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service authorizing livestock grazing within a national forest, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction seeking an order prohibiting the authorization of livestock grazing on certain public lands until Plaintiffs’ claims could be heard on the merits.   The United States District Court, D. Oregon granted Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its claims, and that Plaintiffs made a sufficient showing that irreparable harm would likely occur if the relief sought is not granted.  

Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc.

Summary: <p> In relevant part, the District of Columbia&rsquo;s Freedom from Cruelty to Animal Protection Act allows any humane officer to take possession of any animal to protect the animal(s) from neglect or cruelty. Plaintiffs, all of whom had their dogs seized under the Act, brought a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition for a count alleging that the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as customarily enforced. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, denied Plaintiffs&rsquo; motion without prejudice, finding the parties&rsquo; briefs in connection to the motion insufficient to determine whether an issue exists as to the Act&lsquo;s constitutionality. </p>

In relevant part, the District of Columbia’s Freedom from Cruelty to Animal Protection Act allows any humane officer to take possession of any animal to protect the animal(s) from neglect or cruelty. Plaintiffs, all of whom had their dogs seized under the Act, brought a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition for a count alleging that the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as customarily enforced. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, finding the parties’ briefs in connection to the motion insufficient to determine whether an issue exists as to the Act‘s constitutionality.

Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture

Summary: <span> Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff&rsquo;s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. <span> &nbsp; </span> The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA&rsquo;s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product&rsquo;s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA&rsquo;s interpretation of the word &ldquo;treatment&rdquo; as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that <span> &nbsp; </span> BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. </span>

Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits.   The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that   BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA.

Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne

Summary: <p> The Fund for Animals and others&nbsp;brought an action challenging public resource depredation order (PRDO) issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concerning a species of migratory bird known as the&nbsp;double-crested cormorant. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that&nbsp;the depredation order did not violate MBTA because the Order restricts the species, locations, and means by which takings could occur, thereby restricting the discretion exercised by third parties acting under the Order.&nbsp;Further, the depredation order did not conflict with international treaties (specifically the Mexico Convention) because the Treaty only mandates a close season only for game birds, which the parties agree do not include cormorants. Finally, the agency's adoption of the order was not arbitrary and capricious and complied with National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). </p>

The Fund for Animals and others brought an action challenging public resource depredation order (PRDO) issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concerning a species of migratory bird known as the double-crested cormorant. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the depredation order did not violate MBTA because the Order restricts the species, locations, and means by which takings could occur, thereby restricting the discretion exercised by third parties acting under the Order. Further, the depredation order did not conflict with international treaties (specifically the Mexico Convention) because the Treaty only mandates a close season only for game birds, which the parties agree do not include cormorants. Finally, the agency's adoption of the order was not arbitrary and capricious and complied with National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus

Summary: <p> On Plaintiffs&rsquo; motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The United States District Court, District of Columbia, determined that &ldquo;master schedules&rdquo; and &ldquo;performance reports&rdquo; were not documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain audio tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health status of any Asian elephants in Defendants&rsquo; custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants&rsquo; operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without being given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs&rsquo; mere speculation that Defendants hired an outside consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee&rsquo;s efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any further judicial action. </p>

On Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The United States District Court, District of Columbia, determined that “master schedules” and “performance reports” were not documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain audio tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health status of any Asian elephants in Defendants’ custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants’ operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without being given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs’ mere speculation that Defendants hired an outside consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee’s efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any further judicial action.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall

Summary: <p> <span> The case concerns the delisting of the wolf from the Endangered Species list that occurred in March of 2008. Plaintiffs-Defenders of Wildlife&nbsp;moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to reinstate ESA protections for the wolf. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that even though the Fish &amp; Wildlife Service&rsquo;s (&ldquo;Service&rdquo;) original environmental impact statement (EIS) on wolf reintroduction conditioned the delisting on a finding of genetic exchange between populations, and there is no evidence that such exchange has occurred. Further,&nbsp;the Service approved Wyoming's 2007 wolf management plan even though the Wyoming plan still contains provisions that the Service previously found inadequate. On the whole, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and granted plaintiff&rsquo;s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As a result, the Endangered Species Act protections were reinstated for the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf pending final resolution of this matter on the merits. </span> </p>

The case concerns the delisting of the wolf from the Endangered Species list that occurred in March of 2008. Plaintiffs-Defenders of Wildlife moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to reinstate ESA protections for the wolf. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that even though the Fish & Wildlife Service’s (“Service”) original environmental impact statement (EIS) on wolf reintroduction conditioned the delisting on a finding of genetic exchange between populations, and there is no evidence that such exchange has occurred. Further, the Service approved Wyoming's 2007 wolf management plan even though the Wyoming plan still contains provisions that the Service previously found inadequate. On the whole, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and granted plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As a result, the Endangered Species Act protections were reinstated for the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf pending final resolution of this matter on the merits.

Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne

Summary: <span> The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. </span>

The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations.

Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Dirk Kempthorne

Summary: <p> The Humane Society of the United&nbsp;States&nbsp;sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves.&nbsp;The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List.&nbsp; After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the&nbsp;appeal moot.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling. </p>

The Humane Society of the United States sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves. The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List.  After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the appeal moot.  The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling.

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