Federal

Summary: <span> <span> Animal rights group brought action challenging validity of regulation exempting breeders who sell dogs from their residences from licensure under Animal Welfare Act. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, J., held that regulation was invalid, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals,&nbsp;Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that regulation was reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent. </span> </span>

Summary: <p> In 1999, President Clinton&nbsp;ordered the Forest Service ("FS") to initiate a nationwide plan to protect inventoried and uninventoried roadless areas in national forests, which eventually&nbsp;became termed the "Roadless Rule" (after extensive study was conducted in the 1970's).&nbsp; The Kootenai Tribe, several livestock and recreational groups, and other plaintiffs filed suit contending that the Roadless Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming the rule would prevent access to national forests for proper purposes (e.g., fighting wildfires and threats from insects or disease).&nbsp; On appeal of the grant of preliminary injunction,&nbsp;the Court held the&nbsp;Forest Service complied with the APA and NEPA in implementing the roadless rule, the court noted the extensive public notification process as well as the impact statements, which considered a full range of reasonable&nbsp;alternatives.&nbsp; The court held that the district court erred in finding a strong likelihood that the Forest Service violated NEPA, as there was&nbsp;only minimal showing of irreparable harm ("restrictions on human intervention are not usually irreparable in the sense required for injunctive relief").&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <p> This order accompanies the Ninth Circuit's decision in National Audubon v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002).

Summary: <p> In 1998, California voters passed Proposition 4, which restricted the use of certain kinds of traps, specifically steel-jawed leghold traps.&nbsp; The National Audubon Society, among other groups, challenged the statute, arguing that it was preempted by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), and the and National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (NWRSIA).&nbsp; The Ninth Circuit held that the statute was preempted by the Endangered Species Act and the National Wildlife Refuge System Act.&nbsp; Contrary to the trapper-plaintiffs contentions, the statute, however, did not violate the Commerce Clause. </p>

Summary: <p> Condominium resident filed a complaint alleging the housing authority violated the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act by failing to waive the "no pets" as a reasonable accommodation for&nbsp;his handicap. The court held that where the primary handicap is mental or emotional in nature, an animal "must be peculiarly suited to ameliorate the unique problems of the mentally disabled," and granted the housing authority's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the housing authority's failure to make a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. </p>

Summary: <p> Pitbull owner filed suit seeking compensatory damages arising from the shotting and killing of his dog by police.&nbsp; Defendants removed the action based on federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment, and the dog owner moved to amend the complaint.&nbsp; Motions granted. </p>

Summary: <p> This case&nbsp;questions whether Arizona's 10% cap on nonresident hunting of bull elk throughout the state and of antlered deer north of the Colorado River substantially affects commerce such that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the regulation.&nbsp;&nbsp;The Court that Arizona's cap on nonresident hunting substantially affects and discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was remanded to determine the extent of Arizona's legitimate interests in regulating hunting to conserve its population of game and maintain recreational opportunities for its citizens.&nbsp; </p>

Summary: <p> The zoo sought to import wild elephants from a foreign country, but advocates contended that the officials did not follow CITES properly for the import. The court held that the advocates failed to show a likelihood of success to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, since no overall detriment to the species was shown. </p>

Summary: <p> Roosevelt Fountain, Sr. ("Fountain") and his daughter, Shirley Fountain Ellison ("Ellison") operated an oyster fishing business in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, called Fountain Seafood, Inc., where their convictions arose from the manner in which they operated the business (i.e., tagging violations, taking of oysters from closed areas, taking of excess limits of oysters, and licensing violations).&nbsp; The indictment further contended that the appellants worked to accomplish this goal by creating false records relating to their oyster sales.&nbsp; The court held that it was not error for no instruction on the term "willfully,"&nbsp;since the false record provision refers to "knowingly" as the mens rea requirement.&nbsp; Further, the court held that "materiality" is also not a provision of the Lacey Act's false records provision. </p>

Summary: <p> The Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 703-712 (2000), extends protection to all birds covered by four migratory bird treaties, which, in relevant part, define migratory birds to include the family Anatidae (which includes the mute swan).&nbsp; Under the authority, delegated by Congress the Secretary of the Interior&nbsp;has published lists of protected migratory birds.&nbsp; The instant case arose when appellant Joyce Hill filed a law suit pro se in District Court claiming that the Secretary's regulation violated the MBTA in excluding mute swans from the List of Migratory Birds promulgated at 50 C.F.R. &sect; 10.13 (2000). The District Court rejected Hill's claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.&nbsp; In reversing the the District Court's decision, the court found that the Secretary pointed to nothing in the statute, applicable treaties, or administrative record that justified the exclusion of mute swans from the List of Migratory Birds.&nbsp; It also ordered&nbsp;the Secretary's List of Migratory Birds, codified at 50 C.F.R. &sect; 10.13, insofar as the list excludes mute swans, to be vacated.&nbsp; This case more or less set the stage for the revisions to the MBTA in 2004 by Congress's passing of the MBTRA. </p>