Federal

Summary: <p> Defendant was convicted of a number of offenses related to his role in a wildlife smuggling operation. If trial did not begin within the requisite time period and defendant moved for dismissal prior to trial, the court had to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. The court held that the circumstances in the case, where it was clear that the delay in the trial caused the delay in the hearing, rather than the other way around, and where defendant repeatedly asked the court to set the case for trial and was otherwise ready to proceed to trial, plaintiff United States' pending pretrial motion could not serve as a basis for exclusion for a 117 day period. Because the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act, defendant's convictions had to be reversed, his sentences vacated, and his indictments dismissed. </p>

Summary: <p> Two hunters were convicted of violating the Lacey Act after they hunted on a federal wildlife refuge, killed a deer and transported the carcass out-of-state.&nbsp; The trial court imposed sentences of probation and fines.&nbsp; The District Court affirmed the conviction and sentences holding they were reasonable. </p>

Summary: <p> The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.&nbsp; The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere&nbsp;and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted.&nbsp; In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition. </p>

Summary: <p> Minor child fell off of a horse while horseback riding at a resort ranch and sustained severe injuries.&nbsp; Parents of the minor child brought a personal injury claim against the stable and the stable moved for summary judgment.&nbsp; The trial court precluded summary judgment due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact relating the parent's&nbsp;assumption of the risk. </p>

Summary: <p> Public school student circulated a petition during class and recess that opposed a school field trip to the circus. School officials prevented her from circulating the petition, and she complained of a violation of her First Amendment right to free speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the school, holding that the student's rights had not been violated because a school may regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated when it interferes with educational goals or the rights of other students. </p>

Summary: <p> Owner of oil and gas mineral rights sued the operators of commercial hog confinement facilities for negligence, claiming that the operator's allowed hog waste to escape the confines of the facility and flow into the mineral rights.&nbsp;&nbsp; The District Court held that plaintiff's alleged damages were not barred by a rule prohibiting recovery of economic loss in tort actions; that defendant's alleged violations were evidence of negligence, but not negligence per se; and that defendant's owed a duty of ordinary care to plaintiff. </p>

Summary: <p> Appellants Stephen Gordon and the Diamond G Ranch, Inc. challenged the Fish and Wildlife Service's&nbsp;control of gray wolves introduced under the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan near the Diamond G in the Dunoir Valley of northwestern Wyoming. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they filed this action in federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the regulations promulgated under the Endangered Species Act. The district court dismissed the takings claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the ESA claims as not yet ripe for review. This court&nbsp;affirmed the lower court. </p>

Summary: <p> Defendant was a member of a Canadian tribe when he brought eagle feathers across the border to the U.S. for a "potlatch" ceremony (exchange of eagle parts for money and goods, which was religiously significant to defendant).&nbsp; On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction under the RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act), arguing in part that the government lacked an asserted compelling interest where&nbsp;the USFWS had issued a proposed delisting of the eagle from the ESA list.&nbsp; The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the evidentiary weight of the proposed delisting was lacking and that defendant was not discriminated against based on religion, but rather was excluded from the permit system based on the secular component of the Act (i.e., the requirement for membership in a federally-recognized tribe). </p>

Summary: <p> The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. &sect; 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler)&nbsp;lack standing under Article III of the Constitution.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals held that the former&nbsp;elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler&nbsp;alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits. </p>

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs, The Wilderness Society and the Alaska Center for the Environment, challenge a decision by Defendant United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) to permit a sockeye salmon enhancement project (the Project) at Tustumena Lake (within a designated wilderness area in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska). Plaintiffs argue that the Project violates the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 1131- 1136, because it contravenes that Act's requirement to preserve the "natural condition" and "wilderness character" of the area, and because it constitutes an impermissible "commercial enterprise" within a wilderness area.&nbsp; With regard to the "wilderness character" question, the court held that the Service permissibly interpreted the Act, and that the activities in question did not contravene the wilderness character of the Refuge, as the Service's decision that the Project is "compatible" with the purposes of the Refuge is entitled to deference.&nbsp; With regard to the prohibition against "commercial activities," the Court held that the Service reasonably determined that non-wilderness commercial activities providing funding for a nonprofit organization conducting a project did not render project "commercial enterprise" barred by statute. </p>