United States

Summary: In this case, the Lesters appealed the judgment of the trial court awarding the Montgomerys $200,000 for the injury and death of their thoroughbred house that was caused by the Lester’s dog. The Lester’s dog chased after and barked at the horse, causing the horse to attempt to climb a fence which severely injured the horsed. The injuries were so severe that the horse was later euthanized. The Montgomerys filed suit against the Lesters and awarded $200,000 in damages. On appeal, the Lesters argued that the claims filed by the Montgomerys should be dismissed because they have “no personal right to claim the damages asserted” because “the registered owner of the horse at issue was Montgomery Equine Center, LLC and not the [Montgomerys].”The court reviewed the issue and determined that the Montgomerys were entitled to damages because they were the rightful owners of the horse. The court held that “registration of a horse does not prove ownership under Louisiana Law.” As a result, the court found that although the horse was registered to the Montgomery Equine Center, the Montgomerys were still the owners of the horse and therefore entitled to the damages that were awarded by the trial court judge.

Summary: Official Summary: Existing Oregon law does not prohibit sale of wildlife parts/products for non native species, except shark fins. Existing federal law does not prohibit intrastate sales of wildlife parts, with exceptions. Measure amends ORS 498.022 to prohibit purchase, sale, or possession with intent to sell of parts/products from elephant, rhinoceros, whale, tiger, lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, pangolin, sea turtle, shark, ray. Imposes civil penalties. Creates exceptions: law enforcement activities; activities authorized by federal law; fish managed under federal plan; certain antiques (over l00 years old) and musical instruments with less than 200 grams of parts; noncommercial transfers through estates, trusts, gifts; possession by tribal members. Other exceptions. Fish and Wildlife Commission may adopt rules, including prohibiting purchase/sale of parts "closely" resembling listed species parts. A "Yes" vote prohibits purchase/sale of parts/products from certain wildlife species; exceptions for specified activities, gift/inheritances, and certain antiques/musical instruments; civil penalties. A "No" vote maintains current Oregon law which does not prohibit purchase or sale of parts or products from species not native to Oregon, except for shark fins.

Summary: Initiative 177 is a law proposed by initiative petition (cited in the law as "Montana Trap-Free Public Lands Act"). According to the official summary, "I- 177 generally prohibits the use of traps and snares for animals on any public lands within Montana and establishes misdemeanor criminal penalties for violations of the trapping prohibitions. I-177 allows the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks to use certain traps on public land when necessary if nonlethal methods have been tried and found ineffective. I-177 allows trapping by public employees and their agents to protect public health and safety, protect livestock and property, or conduct specified scientific and wildlife management activities. I-177, if passed by the electorate, will become effective immediately." A "yes" vote is in favor of the law that would prohibit the use of traps and snares on state public lands. A "no" vote is a vote against the proposed law that would prohibit the public from placing traps and snares on public lands.

Summary: Massachusetts Question 3 is a law proposed by initiative petition and appears on the 2016 ballot. This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The Secretary of the Commonwealth's official summary states: "This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The proposed law would also prohibit any business owner or operator in Massachusetts from selling whole eggs intended for human consumption or any uncooked cut of veal or pork if the business owner or operator knows or should know that the hen, breeding pig, or veal calf that produced these products was confined in a manner prohibited by the proposed law. The proposed law would exempt sales of food products that combine veal or pork with other products, including soups, sandwiches, pizzas, hotdogs, or similar processed or prepared food items." A "yes" vote would prohibit any confinement of pigs, calves, and hens that prevents them from lying down, standing up, fully extending their limbs, or turning around freely. A "no" vote would make no change in current laws relative to the keeping of farm animals.

Summary: Amendment 1 is a legislatively referred constitutional amendment in the 2016 general election. The explanatory statement on the ballot says, "This amendment is to preserve constitutionally the right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife subject to reasonable laws and regulations. The right of the public to hunt, fish and trap shall not modify any provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass, eminent domain or any other private property rights." A "yes" vote would constitutionally preserve the right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife that has traditionally been taken by hunters, trappers and anglers. A "no" vote would provide for no constitutional right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife. It would maintain existing state laws and rules and regulations governing hunting, fishing and trapping wildlife.

Summary: Question 1 is a legislatively referred constitutional amendment that appears on the 2016 general election ballot. The official summary states the following: "Provides that the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife is a valued part of Indiana's heritage and shall be forever preserved for the public good. Provides that the people have a right, which includes the right to use traditional methods, to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife, subject only to the laws prescribed by the general assembly and rules prescribed by virtue of the authority of the general assembly to: (1) promote wildlife conservation and management; and (2) preserve the future of hunting and fishing. Provides that hunting and fishing are the preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. Provides that this constitutional amendment does not limit the application of any laws relating to trespass or property rights. This proposed amendment has been agreed to by one general assembly." A "yes" vote is in favor of such a constitutional amendment and a "no" vote is against amending the state constitution.

Summary: The Defendant Patrick Daly was convicted in the District Court of Norfolk County, Massachusetts of animal cruelty involving a “snippy," eight-pound Chihuahua. The incident occurred when Daly flung the dog out of an open sliding door and onto the deck of his home after the dog bit Daly’s daughter, which led to the dog's death. On appeal, defendant raised several arguments. He first challenged the animal cruelty statute as vague and overbroad because it failed to define the terms "kill," "unnecessary cruelty," or "cruelly beat." The court disregarded his claim, finding the terms of the statute were "sufficiently defined" such that a person would know that he or she "may not throw a dog on its leash onto a deck with force enough to cause the animal to fall off the deck, twelve feet to its death . . ." Defendant also claimed that a photo of his daughter's hand showing the injury from the dog bite was improperly excluded. However, the court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the judge's failure to admit the photo. Under a claim that his conduct was warranted, defendant argues that the jury was improperly instructed on this point. It should not have been instructed on defense of another because that relates only to defending against human beings and, instead, the jury should have been instructed on a defense of attack by an animal. The court found while there is no precedent in Massachusetts for such a claim, the rationale is the same as the given instruction, and defendant cannot complain that the jury was improperly instructed where he invited the instruction with his claims that his actions were necessary to protect his daughter. His other claims were also disregarded by the court and his judgment was affirmed.

Summary: The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed.

Summary: The Plaintiff, the Bulldog Rescue Mission, is a nonprofit dog welfare organization organized under Louisiana law to advocate for dog welfare in New Orleans. The plaintiff sought information under Louisiana’s Public Records Law related to the dogs euthanized by the Defendant, the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (LSPCA). LSPCA declared that they were not a public body and thus, not subject to the Public Records Law. The Bulldog Rescue Mission filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed their petition and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held that LSPCA was a quasi-public entity subject to Public Records Law because the organization performed municipal functions on behalf of the municipal government. The court found LSPCA receives an annual compensation of almost two million dollars for providing services for quasi-municipal functions such as enforcing code violations and taking and receiving animals. Thus, it cannot characterize the service as "voluntary" since it "clearly operates[s] under the color of City Authority." Bulldog rescue also claims error with the trial court ruling that, even if LSPCA is subject to public records laws, these obligations are met through its Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) reporting requirement. This court found that the CEA contractual agreement made between the city of Louisiana and LSPCA allowing the organization to provide mandated city services related to animal control could not be used to circumscribe Public Records Law compliance. In other words, the limited statistical reporting required under the CEA is not a valid substitute for a public record request that would show all governmental functions and duties performed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed where this court found the trial court clearly erred in dismissing the Bulldog Rescue petition for a writ of mandamus.

Summary: Subsection 11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for veterinarians provides that a licensee shall not reveal confidential, proprietary or privileged facts or data or any other sensitive information contained in a patient's medical records without the prior consent of the client except as otherwise authorized or required by law, regulation, or other order. The subsection specifically states that "[w]hen these situations [of abuse and neglect] cannot be resolved through education, the board considers it the responsibility of the veterinarian to report such cases to the appropriate authorities." Thus, the rule seems to create an ethical responsibility that mandates the reporting of abuse or neglect by veterinarians.