United States

Summary: Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision.

Summary: Abstract: The constitutionality of restrictions on speech depicting actual cruelty to animals is a question that continues to divide courts and commentators. In U.S. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a 1999 ban on depictions of animal cruelty. The Court invalidated the ban on its face because, as written, the statute extended beyond acts of actual animal cruelty to other forms of unlawful animal harm, such as hunting out of season. Thus, the Court did not resolve the core question presented. Congress responded by drafting a new statute, one narrowed to “crush” videos--obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in an effort to avoid constitutional problems. This new statute, however, continues to raise constitutional and public policy concerns--despite its recent upholding in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richards. This article is the first to analyze the constitutional and public policy issues presented by Congress's new animal cruelty speech regulation. This article contends that the modified statute is poor public policy and remains constitutionally problematic. First, as a policy matter, the statute is ineffective because it fails to criminalize the most widespread and troubling form of animal cruelty speech: animal fighting videos. Second, the statute's overly narrow reach--limited to obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in fact increases its constitutional problems by triggering the “virulence” doctrine first articulated in R.A.V. Since courts are unlikely to view obscene depictions of animal cruelty as virulently “prurient” obscenity, as opposed to the kind of “morbidly” violent speech entitled to the protections of strict scrutiny as established in Brown, the statute will likely be invalidated. The article concludes with an exploration of possible new legislation, which could effectively prevent animal cruelty, while also preserving free speech rights.

Summary: In 2016, the State of Alaska added language allowing the inclusion of pets in protective orders for domestic violence. Effective January 17. 2017 under Section 18.65.520, a petitioner may seek a protective order that includes a provision to "grant you [the petitioner] possession and use of a vehicle and other essential personal items, including a pet, regardless of the ownership of those items." In the new amendment to Section 18.65.590, “pet” means "a vertebrate living creature maintained for companionship or pleasure, but does not include dogs primarily owned for participation in a generally accepted mushing or pulling contest or practice or animals primarily owned for participation in rodeos or stock contests."

Summary: The Washington State Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) includes Emergency Support Function #6 and #11, which concerns service animals and pets. The EOP also defines "animal," "household pet," and "service animal."

Summary: The Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan contains references to both household pets and service animals. The plan defines "household pet" as "[a] domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), or turtle that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes and can travel in commercial carriers and be housed in temporary facilities. Household pets do not include reptiles (except turtles), amphibians, fish, insects/arachnids, farm animals (including horses), and animals kept for racing purposes"

Summary: The New Mexico All-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan has an Emergency Support Function (ESF) that deals with animal safety provisions. In addition to food safety, livestock, and zoonotic disease concerns, the plan addresses the "safety and well-being of household pets, service animals, farm animals, and zoo animals during an emergency response or evacuation situation."

Summary: The purpose of this Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 Annex is to coordinate State agencies, OKVOAD, Federal and other response entities in efforts to control and eradicate, as appropriate, any outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic (i.e. transmitted between animals and people) disease, or any outbreak of an economically devastating plant pest or disease; ensure the safety and security of the commercial food supply; protect natural resources; and provide for the safety and well-being of household pets during an emergency response or evacuation situation. [See FEMA Disaster Assistance Policy DAP9523.19 Title: “Eligible Costs Related to Pet Evacuation and Sheltering” for definition of “Household Pet”.]

Summary: The Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) is the agency that oversees the Maryland Emergency Preparedness Program (MEPP). The plan references pets and disaster planning, recognizing the need for mass care services for household pets and service animals in one emergency support functions (ESF), and the need to provide a framework and protective actions for animals in ESF #16.

Summary: The Iowa Emergency Response Plan contains several specific references to pets and service animals. In fact, "[p]rovisions will be made for the care of pets in nearby locations. Service animals for persons with disabilities are allowed by law to stay in shelter with their owner and are not considered pets." There are requirements under the plan for agency coordination to shelter pets.

Summary: The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) is the agency in charge of emergency response in the state. The issue of animals in disaster are dealt with in Emergency Support Function #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex (2019).