United States

Summary: In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed.

Summary: In this Maryland appeal, appellant Rohrer questions the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615 (the law that allows an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner). Rohrer also challenges the legal ownership of the animals in state custody. The seizure of Rohrer's animals began in 2014, when an anonymous tip led humane investigators to Rohrer's farm. Field officers and a local veterinarian observed cattle that were "extremely thin" on Rohrer's farm. These concerns led to a search warrant of appellant's property. Due to the presence of dead animal bodies intermingled with the living, high piles of animal feces, and goats with hooves so overgrown they could not walk, the Humane Society (HS) and Sheriff's office seized all the animals under the warrant. The actual "seizure" resulted in a transfer of some animals to foster farms and an agreement between HS and Rohrer to adequately care for remaining animals on the property. Rohrer was charged with 318 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty, eventually being found guilty on only 5 counts and sentenced to supervised probation. During the initial proceedings, Rohrer filed a "petition for return of seized animals" under CR § 10–615(d)(2). When the District Court gave conclusions on the petition, it lamented on the "lack of guidance" in the statute and noted that that the "statute really doesn't say" whether Rohrer would lose ownership of the animals. After the criminal trial, Rohrer again sought return of the animals after negotiations with the HS failed. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's denial of the Petition for Return, finding the ruling was not clearly erroneous and it was not in the best interests of the animals to return to Rohrer. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Rohrer raises three issues: (1) can the HS seize an animal already in state custody from a search warrant; (2) must the seizure by the HS be justified by the conditions at the time of seizure or may it be based on previously observed conditions; and (3) how does a denial of a petition to return the animals affect the owner's property rights in the animals? In looking at prior codifications of the law as well as surrounding legislative history, the court first held that a HS officer may notify the owner of animal seized by the state in connection with a criminal warrant of its intent to take possession of the animal upon its release from state custody. Secondly, a HS officer may rely on previously-observed conditions to justify seizure under Section 10-615. The court noted that, similar to a search warrant, the factors justifying seizure can become weaker with time. So, when an owner files a petition for return, the HS has the burden of showing the court the seizure was necessary under the statute. In Rohrer's case, this Court found the District and Circuit Courts did not reach the question of whether the necessity supporting HS' possession of the animals continued. Since the animals were released after the criminal trial concluded, this Court stated that the District Court may now consider this question. Finally, the Court weighed in on whether the denial of a Petition for Return affects ownership interests. This Court declined to adopt the standard of "best interests" of the animals. Instead, the Court found that the function of the Petition for Return is to determine who has the right to temporarily possess an animal in question and this does not vest ownership rights in the animal if the petition is denied. This case was remanded to Circuit Court so that court can determine whether the final disposition of the criminal case and subsequent release of the animals held under the search warrant affects the disposition of Rohrer's Petition for Return of this animals.

Summary: This Minnesota states that a person may not use a motor vehicle to intentionally drive, chase, run over, kill, or take a wild animal.

Summary: This North Dakota statute states that any person operating a motorcycle, snowmobile, or other motor vehicle who willfully harasses or frightens any domestic animal, is, upon conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor and is also liable for the value of the animal and exemplary damages.

Summary: This Georgia states that except as otherwise provided in this Code, any person may lawfully possess native wildlife which have been accidentally killed by a motor vehicle. However, the person taking possession of a bear accidentally killed by a motor vehicle shall notify a law enforcement officer within 48 hours after taking possession of the bear; and this Code section shall not authorize any person to take possession of any animal of a species designated as a protected species under Article 5 of this chapter or under federal law.

Summary: This North Dakota statute states that no person operating or controlling the operation of any aircraft or motor vehicle in the state may intentionally kill, chase, or harass any wild animal or wild bird, protected or unprotected, unless exceptions under the statute apply. Also no person, while operating a snowmobile in the state, may intentionally kill, chase, flush, or harass any wild animal or wild bird, protected or unprotected.

Summary: This Nebraska statute states that it shall be unlawful to hunt rabbits, squirrels, or any fur-bearing animal with or by the aid of a ferret. It is also unlawful to have a ferret in one's possession or control in a field or forest or in any vehicle going to or from hunting territory. Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor and shall be fined at least fifty dollars.

Summary: This South Dakota statute states that if any deer or antelope is killed by a motor vehicle on a public highway, the person who desires to possess that animal shall notify a conservation officer. The conservation officer may give a dated and written authorization allowing possession of the animal at no fee. However, no part of an animal so obtained may be sold, bartered, or traded.

Summary: This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime.

Summary: This Rhode Island statute states that the driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to a domesticated animal, shall immediately stop the vehicle and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver renders all possible assistance to the injured animal. The driver shall immediately and by the quickest means known, give notice of the accident to the owner of the animal or to a nearby office of local or state police. Any person failing to stop or comply with the requirements of this section shall upon be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00).