United States

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Giardiello v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C.

Summary: This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss.

This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss.

IN - Domestic Violence - 34-26-5-9 Ex parte orders; authority and jurisdiction of court; relief available

Summary: This Indiana law allows a court to grant ex parte orders for protection in cases of domestic or family violence. Effective July 1, 2017, a court may grant a petitioner the exclusive possession, care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or cared for by the petitioner, respondent, minor child of either the petitioner or respondent, or any other family or household member. Additionally, the court may prohibit a respondent from removing, transferring, injuring, concealing, harming, attacking, mistreating, threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of an animal described in subdivision (c)(5).

This Indiana law allows a court to grant ex parte orders for protection in cases of domestic or family violence. Effective July 1, 2017, a court may grant a petitioner the exclusive possession, care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or cared for by the petitioner, respondent, minor child of either the petitioner or respondent, or any other family or household member. Additionally, the court may prohibit a respondent from removing, transferring, injuring, concealing, harming, attacking, mistreating, threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of an animal described in subdivision (c)(5).

US - AWA - Subpart J. Importation of Live Dogs

Summary: This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided.

This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided.

US - AWA - Animal Welfare; Retail Pet Stores and Licensing Exemptions

Summary: SUMMARY: We are revising the definition of retail pet store and related regulations in order to ensure that the definition of retail pet store in the regulations is consistent with the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), thereby bringing more pet animals sold at retail under the protection of the AWA. Specifically, we are narrowing the definition of retail pet store to mean a place of business or residence at which the seller, buyer, and the animal available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may personally observe the animal prior to purchasing and/or taking custody of that animal after purchase, and where only certain animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail, for use as pets. Retail pet stores are not required to be licensed and inspected under the AWA. In addition, we are removing the limitation on the source of gross income from the licensing exemption in the regulations for any person who does not sell or negotiate the sale of any wild or exotic animal, dog, or cat and who derives no more than $500 gross income from the sale of the animals other than wild or exotic animals, dogs, or cats during any calendar year. We are also increasing from three to four the number of breeding female dogs, cats, and/or small exotic or wild mammals that a person may maintain on his or her premises and be exempt from the licensing and inspection requirements if he or she sells only the offspring of those animals born and raised on his or her premises, for pets or exhibition. This exemption applies regardless of whether those animals are sold at retail or wholesale. These actions are necessary so that all animals sold at retail for use as pets are monitored for their health and humane treatment.

SUMMARY: We are revising the definition of retail pet store and related regulations in order to ensure that the definition of retail pet store in the regulations is consistent with the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), thereby bringing more pet animals sold at retail under the protection of the AWA. Specifically, we are narrowing the definition of retail pet store to mean a place of business or residence at which the seller, buyer, and the animal available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may personally observe the animal prior to purchasing and/or taking custody of that animal after purchase, and where only certain animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail, for use as pets. Retail pet stores are not required to be licensed and inspected under the AWA. In addition, we are removing the limitation on the source of gross income from the licensing exemption in the regulations for any person who does not sell or negotiate the sale of any wild or exotic animal, dog, or cat and who derives no more than $500 gross income from the sale of the animals other than wild or exotic animals, dogs, or cats during any calendar year. We are also increasing from three to four the number of breeding female dogs, cats, and/or small exotic or wild mammals that a person may maintain on his or her premises and be exempt from the licensing and inspection requirements if he or she sells only the offspring of those animals born and raised on his or her premises, for pets or exhibition. This exemption applies regardless of whether those animals are sold at retail or wholesale. These actions are necessary so that all animals sold at retail for use as pets are monitored for their health and humane treatment.

Detailed Discussion of Commercial Breeders and Puppy Mills

Summary: This paper gives an overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States, beginning with a discussion of the industry’s various market forms, including brick and mortar pet stores, Internet websites, and foreign breeders. The paper then examines the underlying federal law and administrative regulations that provide minimum care standards for certain breeders. What follows is information on various state laws and recent legislation, including an examination of the increasing prevalence of local laws that address the puppy mill industry. The paper then explains the enforcement of puppy mill laws, which is criticized as insufficient to address the problem, and concludes with the observation that local laws and consumer education appear to be the most feasible solutions to combatting the prevalence of commercial breeding.

This paper gives an overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States, beginning with a discussion of the industry’s various market forms, including brick and mortar pet stores, Internet websites, and foreign breeders. The paper then examines the underlying federal law and administrative regulations that provide minimum care standards for certain breeders. What follows is information on various state laws and recent legislation, including an examination of the increasing prevalence of local laws that address the puppy mill industry. The paper then explains the enforcement of puppy mill laws, which is criticized as insufficient to address the problem, and concludes with the observation that local laws and consumer education appear to be the most feasible solutions to combatting the prevalence of commercial breeding.

MI - Ferrets - Chapter 287. Ferrets

Summary: This chapter concerns ownership of ferrets in Michigan. A person shall not own or harbor a ferret over 12 weeks of age unless the ferret has a current vaccination against rabies with an approved rabies vaccine. A person may engage in hobby breeding of ferrets provided all requirements are met under Section 287.893. A person shall not release a ferret into the wild or abandon a ferret.

This chapter concerns ownership of ferrets in Michigan. A person shall not own or harbor a ferret over 12 weeks of age unless the ferret has a current vaccination against rabies with an approved rabies vaccine. A person may engage in hobby breeding of ferrets provided all requirements are met under Section 287.893. A person shall not release a ferret into the wild or abandon a ferret.

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert

Summary: This case deals with the constitutionality of Utah's "ag gag" law, enacted in 2012. The law criminalizes lying to obtain access to an agricultural operation and the subsequent recording or filming once inside. According to statements made enactment, it is directed at undercover operations that investigate farm animal abuse. Plaintiffs assert that the law violates their First Amendment rights. On review of motions, the court first looked at whether the First Amendment applies to this type of "lying." Because a recent U.S. Supreme Court case makes lying that causes "cognizable legal harm" outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court examined the type of lying at issue in the Utah law. Ultimately, the court found that lying to gain access to these agricultural facilities does not in itself cause a legally cognizable harm. Thus, "absent an additional showing of harm, under either interpretation, at least some of the lies criminalized by the Act retain First Amendment protection." With regard to First Amendment protections for the act of recording once at an agricultural operation and whether a strict scrutiny standard applies, the court looked to other circuits that found the act of making speech (i.e., recording/filming) is protected. The State countered with the fact that such recording occurs on private property, but the court found the government cannot place criminal restrictions on speech simply because it occurs on private property. The court noted that the property owner can indeed remove the person from the property and sue for any damages resulting from the trespass, which is different than prosecution by the state to curtail speech. Finally, after finding that the act impinges protected speech, the court then analyzed whether it withstood a strict scrutiny review. The State proffered government interests that include concerns over worker protection and disease outbreak. However, the court noted nothing in the legislative history on these claims or any actual incidents that supported these asserted government interests. The court found the Act did not survive strict scrutiny as it was not narrowly tailored and instead was directed at the content of the speech (the act of recording a facility). The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

This case deals with the constitutionality of Utah's "ag gag" law, enacted in 2012. The law criminalizes lying to obtain access to an agricultural operation and the subsequent recording or filming once inside. According to statements made enactment, it is directed at undercover operations that investigate farm animal abuse. Plaintiffs assert that the law violates their First Amendment rights. On review of motions, the court first looked at whether the First Amendment applies to this type of "lying." Because a recent U.S. Supreme Court case makes lying that causes "cognizable legal harm" outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court examined the type of lying at issue in the Utah law. Ultimately, the court found that lying to gain access to these agricultural facilities does not in itself cause a legally cognizable harm. Thus, "absent an additional showing of harm, under either interpretation, at least some of the lies criminalized by the Act retain First Amendment protection." With regard to First Amendment protections for the act of recording once at an agricultural operation and whether a strict scrutiny standard applies, the court looked to other circuits that found the act of making speech (i.e., recording/filming) is protected. The State countered with the fact that such recording occurs on private property, but the court found the government cannot place criminal restrictions on speech simply because it occurs on private property. The court noted that the property owner can indeed remove the person from the property and sue for any damages resulting from the trespass, which is different than prosecution by the state to curtail speech. Finally, after finding that the act impinges protected speech, the court then analyzed whether it withstood a strict scrutiny review. The State proffered government interests that include concerns over worker protection and disease outbreak. However, the court noted nothing in the legislative history on these claims or any actual incidents that supported these asserted government interests. The court found the Act did not survive strict scrutiny as it was not narrowly tailored and instead was directed at the content of the speech (the act of recording a facility). The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

State v. Graves

Summary: In this Ohio case, defendant Graves appeals his misdemeanor cruelty to animals conviction under R.C. 959.13(A)(3). The conviction stems from an incident in 2016 where Graves left his dog in locked and sealed van while he went into a grocery store. According to the facts, the van was turned off in an unshaded spot with windows closed on a 90+ degree day. Witnesses at the scene called police after they engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to get defendant to leave the store. In total, the dog spent about 40-45 minutes locked in the van. Graves was issued a citation for cruelty to animals and later convicted at a bench trial. On appeal, Graves first asserts that R.C. 959.13(A)(3) is unconstitutional because the statute is void for vagueness as applied to him and overbroad. This court found that the definition of cruelty was not so unclear that it could not be reasonably understood by Graves. The court was unconvinced by appellant's arguments that the statute provided insufficient guidance to citizens, and left open relevant question such as length of time a dog can be left unattended, exact weather conditions, and issues of the size of dogs left in vehicles. The court noted that most statutes deal with "unforeseen circumstances" and do not spell out details with "scientific precision." In fact, the court noted "[t]he danger of leaving an animal locked in a sealed vehicle in hot and humid conditions is well-known." Additionally, the court did not find the law to be overbroad, as defendant's right to travel was not infringed by the law. Finally, defendant contends that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In rejecting this argument, the court found Graves acted recklessly under the law based on the hot and humid weather conditions and the fact that humans outside the van were experiencing the effects of extreme heat. Thus, the lower court's judgment was affirmed.

In this Ohio case, defendant Graves appeals his misdemeanor cruelty to animals conviction under R.C. 959.13(A)(3). The conviction stems from an incident in 2016 where Graves left his dog in locked and sealed van while he went into a grocery store. According to the facts, the van was turned off in an unshaded spot with windows closed on a 90+ degree day. Witnesses at the scene called police after they engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to get defendant to leave the store. In total, the dog spent about 40-45 minutes locked in the van. Graves was issued a citation for cruelty to animals and later convicted at a bench trial. On appeal, Graves first asserts that R.C. 959.13(A)(3) is unconstitutional because the statute is void for vagueness as applied to him and overbroad. This court found that the definition of cruelty was not so unclear that it could not be reasonably understood by Graves. The court was unconvinced by appellant's arguments that the statute provided insufficient guidance to citizens, and left open relevant question such as length of time a dog can be left unattended, exact weather conditions, and issues of the size of dogs left in vehicles. The court noted that most statutes deal with "unforeseen circumstances" and do not spell out details with "scientific precision." In fact, the court noted "[t]he danger of leaving an animal locked in a sealed vehicle in hot and humid conditions is well-known." Additionally, the court did not find the law to be overbroad, as defendant's right to travel was not infringed by the law. Finally, defendant contends that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In rejecting this argument, the court found Graves acted recklessly under the law based on the hot and humid weather conditions and the fact that humans outside the van were experiencing the effects of extreme heat. Thus, the lower court's judgment was affirmed.

In re Clinton Cty.

Summary: Synopsis from the court: County filed notice of claim, directed toward estate of cattle farmer who had passed away after he was charged with animal cruelty, seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with care of seized cattle. The Surrogate's Court, Clinton County, Timothy J. Lawliss, J., held that: (1 ) county failed to establish that it was entitled to any relief based upon a theory of quantum meruit, and (2) even assuming that service providers, and thus county upon payment of service providers' bills, enriched farmer, county was not entitled to recover based upon a theory of unjust enrichment because criminal charges against farmer were dismissed upon his death. Notice of claim denied and dismissed.

Synopsis from the court: County filed notice of claim, directed toward estate of cattle farmer who had passed away after he was charged with animal cruelty, seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with care of seized cattle. The Surrogate's Court, Clinton County, Timothy J. Lawliss, J., held that: (1 ) county failed to establish that it was entitled to any relief based upon a theory of quantum meruit, and (2) even assuming that service providers, and thus county upon payment of service providers' bills, enriched farmer, county was not entitled to recover based upon a theory of unjust enrichment because criminal charges against farmer were dismissed upon his death. Notice of claim denied and dismissed.
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