United States

Summary: African elephants are poached for their ivory at alarming rates. If the current level of poaching continues, it is projected they will be extinct from the wild in the year 2025. Preserving the African elephant species is important from an animal rights, conservation, ecological, economical, and crime prevention perspective. The current penalties and fines for the illegal trade in ivory are not enough of a deterrent. One method of deterrence that has not yet been explored is the imposition of tax consequences on the illegal ivory trade. This Article proposes a number of ways to use the tax system to further deter participation in the illegal ivory trade. For tax purposes, illegal ivory should be treated similarly to other activities that have both legal and illegal operations, such as marijuana, gambling, and prostitution. Congress could impose an excise tax on ivory and an occupational tax on those who make or sell ivory products. In addition, there are several tax crimes in the Internal Revenue Code that are applicable to those who sell illegal ivory and do not report the income on their tax returns. For example, tax evasion is one of the related criminal activities associated with wildlife trafficking. Tax consequences will hopefully provide a further disincentive to those participating in the illegal ivory trade.

Summary: The iconic status of the horse in Kentucky belies the bitter reality faced by the vast majority of horses in that state. This Article explains how multiple aspects of the current law enforcement system in the state permit the persistent failure to protect horses against gross neglect and abuse, as exemplified in particular by two case studies. The Kentucky Equine Health and Welfare Council, a legislative construct promoted by its backers as a unique safeguard for Kentucky horses, was in fact ill-suited ab initio for this role and has proved uninterested in it. Although there is no legislative cure for indifference on the part of those charged with enforcing laws against neglect and abuse, there are a number of legislative changes that would improve the now lamentable odds faced by Kentucky's horses. These changes, discussed in Part IV of this Article, are designed to increase the likelihood of action being taken against an offender, including through civil as well as criminal proceedings; secure immediate care for horses which have been victimized and prevent recidivism by offenders; increase the severity of the offense; dampen the current robust market for slaughter horses, and fund the costs inherent in creating a more effective enforcement system. All of the changes proposed are already law in at least some other states-in some instances in many other states--and these existing laws offer a ready model for Kentucky to follow if it so chooses. Although the focus of this Article is on Kentucky, all the legislative recommendations made are more broadly applicable to any state which does not yet have a statute as proposed in place.

Summary: Though bison are iconically associated with the United States, their historical fortunes have often been opposite those of the U.S. As the nation expanded westward, government policy, demand for bison products, and changing land use perilously reduced bison numbers. Efforts to restore bison have been complicated by overlapping legal concerns: state, federal, tribal, and constitutional. This Article examines the legal context surrounding bison restoration, focusing particularly on the critical herd connected with Yellowstone National Park. Former members of the Yellowstone herd, in turn, are the subjects of the Montana Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier, which this Article examines closely, arguing it will significantly improve the legal landscape in which Native American bison restoration efforts function. Finally, this Article ends on a hopeful note: suggesting that federal and tribal efforts, combined with economic and environmental interests may presage the resurgence of bison herds.

Summary: Addressing a taboo rarely discussed in scholarly works, this Article analyzes frequently advanced arguments supporting prohibitions on bestiality. Though on a superficial level the arguments seem appealing, upon closer inspection the standard justifications break down under internal inconsistencies. A differently constructed theory may not only provide a rationalized, consistent basis for regulating bestiality, but also lend greater coherence to laws regulating sexuality in general. Part II of this Article explores arguments related to consent; Part III discusses bestiality impermissibly using animals as a means; Part IV examines public health arguments, largely relating to those diseases that can spread easily from humans to animals and vice versa; Part V explores arguments analogizing zoophilia to either pedophilia or homosexuality; and Part VI offers a new rationale for justifying prohibitions on bestiality.

Summary: In this Article, I contend that a belief in animal liberation qualifies as religion under the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence of the United States Constitution. Thus, every time a prison warden, public school teacher or administrator, or government employer refuses to accommodate the ethical belief of an animal liberationist, they are infringing on that person’s religious freedom, and they should have to satisfy the same constitutional or statutory requirements that would adhere were the asserted interest based on more traditional religious exercise. One possible solution to the widespread violations of the First Amendment rights of animal liberationists would be the incorporation of a ‘Church of Animal Liberation’ under the Internal Revenue Code (as a proper church or as a religious organization). This would help to protect the free exercise rights of those who believe in animal rights because it would give them a religious organization to reference—with articles of incorporation that align with the jurisprudential definition of religion—in making their requests for religious accommodation. First, this Article discusses the constitutional definition of religion, what it means to believe in animal liberation, and animal liberation beliefs that circuit court precedent already recognizes as religious. Then, it discusses how animal liberation-based free exercise conflicts would play out in practice (e.g., identifying when infringing on the rights of animal liberationists would require strict scrutiny and when it would not). Lastly, this Article suggests that incorporating a group (e.g., a ‘Church of Animal Liberation’) as a religious organization under the Internal Revenue Code might help to secure constitutional rights for animal liberationists, and explains what would be required to incorporate such an organization.

Summary: Feral dogs occupy an ambiguous position, challenging standard categories of domestication, wildness, and property ownership. This ambiguity, in turn, complicates the legal status of feral dogs. Feral dogs’ property status is particularly critical, as whether a feral dog is owned by someone, or no one at all, hold implications not only for civil and criminal liability in incidents involving feral dogs, but also the legal ability of animal rescue organizations to intervene in the lives of feral dogs. Part II of this Article summarizes the application of property law to animals, particularly highlighting the role played by an animal’s status as wild or domestic; Part III explores the factors distinguishing feral dogs from other canines, determining that feral dogs should properly be situated as domestic animals; Part IV discusses the legal landscape relevant to feral dogs, focusing particularly on ownership and liability; and Part V examines the ways in which the property status of feral dogs may impact an animal rescue organization’s ability to care for those animals.

Summary: An animal rights activist named Joseph Cuviello appealed the entry of a permanent injunction in a trespass action that prohibited him from demonstrating outside of Six Flags Discovery Kingdom ("The Park") in California. The superior court rejected Cuviello’s federal and state constitutional claims that he had a right to picket there peacefully and his common law defense based on a claimed prescriptive easement. The Park was originally municipally owned and privately operated until 2007 when the Park's management acquired the park from the City of Vallejo. After that acquisition, the Park began to limit free speech until it ultimately banned all expressive activity on the property. Cuviello was one of the many people that protested at the park advocating for animals and he had done so many times in the past. The Park filed a single cause of action for private trespass against several animal advocacy groups. Cuviello argued that he had a First Amendment right to protest there because the park had been dedicated to public use, the park was a public forum under state constitutional law, and given the amount of times he had protested at the park in the past, he had acquired a common law prescriptive easement right to protest there. The trial court denied Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the Park. It ruled that the First Amendment does not apply to private property and that the property was not a public forum under California’s constitution. It also rejected the prescriptive easement claims. Although the Park was zoned as a public and quasi-public property, the Appeals Court grappled with whether to classify the Park as a private or public forum. The Court applied a balancing test which balanced society’s interest in free expression against the Park’s interests as a private property owner. The Court concluded that the unticketed, exterior portions of the Park was a public forum. Ultimately the Court held that the trial court erred in granting the Park’s summary judgment and in denying Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that on the undisputed facts here, the Park may not ban expressive activity in the non-ticketed, exterior areas of Six Flags.

Summary: The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge.

Summary: Defendant was cited for allowing a dog controlled or owned by her to cause injury or death to a service dog in violation of California’s Penal Code. The offense was an infraction. The defendant pled no contest and was fined $157. The service dog’s owner requested a restitution hearing, but the trial court denied the request stating that since the offense was an infraction, a restitution hearing was not permissible. The service dog owner appealed the decision of the trial court. The Court ultimately found that the trial court incorrectly stated that a victim of an infraction is not entitled to restitution. Both the California Constitution and the California Penal Code (the very statute that the Defendant was convicted of violating) entitle the victim to restitution. The California Constitution specifically states that restitution shall be ordered in every case regardless of the sentence or disposition of a crime in which a victim suffers a loss. The Court stated that an infraction is a crime, therefore, a restitution hearing is mandatory. The statute that the Defendant violated (section 600.2 of California’s Penal Code) also stated that a defendant shall be ordered to make restitution. The trial court abused its discretion in erroneously concluding that a crime victim is not entitled to restitution if the offense committed is an infraction and ultimately denying the victim restitution. The Defendant argued that an order for payment of restitution would be improper because she was never advised that victim restitution would be a consequence of her plea and that such an order would violate her plea agreement. She also argued that the trial court found, in good faith, that restitution was unnecessary. The Court, however, found the Defendant’s arguments unpersuasive. The Court reversed the order denying victim restitution and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a restitution hearing.

Summary: The Humane Society submitted two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. One was for site-inspection reports and the other was for inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitors. The Service released nine pages of inspection records in full but redacted information from the other 127 pages citing FOIA exemptions 6 and 7 that deal with privacy concerns. The Humane Society alleged that the redactions were improper and both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court found that the bulk of the Service’s redactions were improper under exemption 6 because the information did not implicate a licensee’s personal privacy interests. Exemption 6 was meant to protect individuals from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives. Details about a business’ compliance with regulations and statutes does not relate to intimate personal details. It only relates to business activities. Information about business judgments and relationships do not qualify for redaction. However, a substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimus privacy interest and the licensees and third-parties had more than a de minimus privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information. The licensees were also homestead businesses meaning that the location of their business also served as their residence. The Court weighed the privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in the release of the records and ultimately found that although the licensees and third parties had a substantial privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information, they only had a de minimus privacy interest in the other information that they withheld from the reports. If no significant privacy interest is implicated, FOIA demands disclosure. The service was required to disclose all reasonably segregable portions of the records that do not include identifying information. The Court found the Humane Society’s argument unpersuasive that releasing the addresses of the licensees would serve the public interest. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and names of third-party veterinarians. Exemption 7 allows for agencies to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of those law enforcement records could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Humane Society argued that inspection reports are not compiled for law enforcement purposes because the existence of such a report does not, on its face, reveal that there is any particular enforcement or investigatory action occurring. The Court found that the inspection records relate to the Service’s responsibility to enforce the AWA and ensure that licensees are in compliance, therefore, there was a nexus between the reports and the Service’s law enforcement duties. The Court also conducted the same balancing test that they did with exemption 6 and held that the Service releasing information other than the licensees’ addresses and third parties’ names could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and contact information and despite the Service’s improper withholding of dates, inspection narratives, animal inventories, etc., the Court found that they had otherwise met their burden of releasing all reasonably segregable information. Both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in part and denied in part.