United States

In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health

Summary: <p> This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (&ldquo;IDA&rdquo;) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (&ldquo;APF&rdquo;) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's&nbsp;Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH&rsquo;s arguments that the records are not &ldquo;agency records&rdquo; because they belong to NIH's contractor,&nbsp;Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (&ldquo;CRL&rdquo;), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is &ldquo;essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,&rdquo; and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. <strong> This Order was Superseded by <a href="/cases/causfd543fsupp3d70.htm"> <em> In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health </em> , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008). </a> </strong> </p>

This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. This Order was Superseded by In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008).

Ing v. American Airlines

Summary: <p> A man shipped his dog on an American Airlines airplane, and the dog died shortly after landing. The court found that the contract signed prior to take-off limited the liability of the airline. However,&nbsp;the airline could be liable because&nbsp;after landing, the man had asked for his dog back, to give it veterinary care, but the airline took more than four hours to give&nbsp;it back. Also, the airline could be liable if the plane temperature had been higher than for which the&nbsp;contract called. </p>

A man shipped his dog on an American Airlines airplane, and the dog died shortly after landing. The court found that the contract signed prior to take-off limited the liability of the airline. However, the airline could be liable because after landing, the man had asked for his dog back, to give it veterinary care, but the airline took more than four hours to give it back. Also, the airline could be liable if the plane temperature had been higher than for which the contract called.

Humane Society v. Merriam

Summary: <p> Minnesota allowed trapping and snaring activities. Plaintiffs sued the state, arguing that this policy&nbsp;was causing the death of some endangered Canada lynx, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs and defendants had the case dismissed after they agreed that Minnesota would seek a permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and that conservation measures would be taken for the protection of the lynx. </p>

Minnesota allowed trapping and snaring activities. Plaintiffs sued the state, arguing that this policy was causing the death of some endangered Canada lynx, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs and defendants had the case dismissed after they agreed that Minnesota would seek a permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and that conservation measures would be taken for the protection of the lynx.

Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. A.S.P.C.A.

Summary: <p> Pending before the Court is Defendant American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.'s (&ldquo;ASPCA&rdquo;) Motion to Temporarily Stay All Proceedings.&nbsp;The suit arises from Feld Entertainment, Inc. (&ldquo;FEI&rdquo;) claim against the ASPCA and other defendants, including Tom Rider, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (&ldquo;RICO&rdquo;). The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Tom Rider has been bribed by the organizational defendants to participate in the ESA Action against FEI in violation of federal law. The court agreed that the public interest in the ESA claim weighs in favor of granting the temporary stay. </p>

Pending before the Court is Defendant American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.'s (“ASPCA”) Motion to Temporarily Stay All Proceedings. The suit arises from Feld Entertainment, Inc. (“FEI”) claim against the ASPCA and other defendants, including Tom Rider, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Tom Rider has been bribed by the organizational defendants to participate in the ESA Action against FEI in violation of federal law. The court agreed that the public interest in the ESA claim weighs in favor of granting the temporary stay.

Stephens v. City of Spokane

Summary: <p> Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which&nbsp;they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the&nbsp;ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the&nbsp;ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by &ldquo;habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.&rdquo; </p>

Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by “habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.”

American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus

Summary: <p> In this case, the court considered&nbsp;the parties&rsquo; respective motions for reconsideration. On August 23, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment to defendant as to elephants subject to a captive-bred wildlife (&ldquo;CBW&rdquo;) permit and denied summary judgment as to elephants for which defendant claimed a &ldquo;pre-Act&rdquo; exemption. Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the &ldquo;pre-Act&rdquo; elephants and plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the CBW permit elephants. Defendant&rsquo;s motion was granted in part as to the standing of plaintiff, Tom Rider. The court held that Rider&rsquo;s standing is now limited to those six elephants to which he became &ldquo;emotionally attached.&rdquo; Notably, the court ended its opinion with a &ldquo;hint to the wise&rdquo; that the court will not tolerate any further filings inconsistent with FRCP. </p>

In this case, the court considered the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration. On August 23, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment to defendant as to elephants subject to a captive-bred wildlife (“CBW”) permit and denied summary judgment as to elephants for which defendant claimed a “pre-Act” exemption. Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the “pre-Act” elephants and plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court's decision regarding the CBW permit elephants. Defendant’s motion was granted in part as to the standing of plaintiff, Tom Rider. The court held that Rider’s standing is now limited to those six elephants to which he became “emotionally attached.” Notably, the court ended its opinion with a “hint to the wise” that the court will not tolerate any further filings inconsistent with FRCP.

Donald HENDRICK and Concerned Citizens for True Horse Protection, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (“USDA”), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“Aphis”), Defendants.

Summary: <p> This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of &ldquo;soring&rdquo; (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define &ldquo;sore&rdquo; and &ldquo;scar&rdquo; beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the &ldquo;scar rule&rdquo;). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact. </p>

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant United States Department of Agriculture's Motion to Dismiss. The Horse Protection Act (HPA) is federal legislation which outlaws the practice of “soring” (harm to the feet or limbs of horses in order to enhance the attractiveness of a light-stepped or high-stepping gait during horse-show performances), which is a particular concern for the breed of Tennessee Walking Horses. Plaintiffs seek to have the Court define “sore” and “scar” beyond the definitions provided in the regulations (specifically the “scar rule”). The court found, however, that any alleged or threatened injury based on the HPA or the Scar Rule has not yet occurred. Mere uncertainty about the HPA and Scar Rule alone does not create an injury in fact.

Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Summary: <p> The Endangered Species Act protects not just species, but also "distinct population segments" of species. The Fish and Wildlife Service refused to list the Western Gray Squirrel as endangered in Washington State, even though its numbers are low there, because it determined that the squirrels in Washington are not significant to the species as a whole. The court upheld this decision. </p>

The Endangered Species Act protects not just species, but also "distinct population segments" of species. The Fish and Wildlife Service refused to list the Western Gray Squirrel as endangered in Washington State, even though its numbers are low there, because it determined that the squirrels in Washington are not significant to the species as a whole. The court upheld this decision.

Dilorenzo v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

Summary: <p> Plaintiff is a disabled individual who suffers from a variety of ailments arising after her service in the armed forces. Plaintiff's claims arise from interactions with Costco store employees on two separate shopping trips with her service dog. Store employees&nbsp;inquired as to what task the dog performed and objected to the dog being carried in plaintiff's arms around the store. Plaintiff brings her claims under&nbsp;the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that Defendant's employees did not exceed the boundaries of a permissible inquiry under the ADA with regard to her service dog, where they never asked Plaintiff to state her disability or demanded&nbsp;proof of special training. </p>

Plaintiff is a disabled individual who suffers from a variety of ailments arising after her service in the armed forces. Plaintiff's claims arise from interactions with Costco store employees on two separate shopping trips with her service dog. Store employees inquired as to what task the dog performed and objected to the dog being carried in plaintiff's arms around the store. Plaintiff brings her claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that Defendant's employees did not exceed the boundaries of a permissible inquiry under the ADA with regard to her service dog, where they never asked Plaintiff to state her disability or demanded proof of special training.

Western Watersheds Project v. Hall

Summary: <p> Plaintiff Western Watersheds Project filed the instant action challenging the &ldquo;90-Day Finding&rdquo; issued by the Defendants United States Fish and Wildlife Service that denied protection of the Interior Mountain Quail as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act. The Service determined that the Petition had failed to provide information demonstrating that the Interior Mountain Quail population is discrete under the ESA. The District Court stated that, in order to qualify as a DPS, a population must &ldquo;be both discrete and significant.&rdquo; The court found that the Service's conclusion appropriately determined that this discreteness standard was not met and it provided a rational basis for concluding the Petition had failed to provide evidence of a marked separation between the populations of the same taxon. </p>

Plaintiff Western Watersheds Project filed the instant action challenging the “90-Day Finding” issued by the Defendants United States Fish and Wildlife Service that denied protection of the Interior Mountain Quail as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act. The Service determined that the Petition had failed to provide information demonstrating that the Interior Mountain Quail population is discrete under the ESA. The District Court stated that, in order to qualify as a DPS, a population must “be both discrete and significant.” The court found that the Service's conclusion appropriately determined that this discreteness standard was not met and it provided a rational basis for concluding the Petition had failed to provide evidence of a marked separation between the populations of the same taxon.