United States

American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus

Summary: <p> On Plaintiffs&rsquo; motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The United States District Court, District of Columbia, determined that &ldquo;master schedules&rdquo; and &ldquo;performance reports&rdquo; were not documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain audio tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health status of any Asian elephants in Defendants&rsquo; custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants&rsquo; operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without being given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs&rsquo; mere speculation that Defendants hired an outside consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee&rsquo;s efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any further judicial action. </p>

On Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The United States District Court, District of Columbia, determined that “master schedules” and “performance reports” were not documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain audio tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health status of any Asian elephants in Defendants’ custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants’ operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without being given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs’ mere speculation that Defendants hired an outside consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee’s efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any further judicial action.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall

Summary: <p> <span> The case concerns the delisting of the wolf from the Endangered Species list that occurred in March of 2008. Plaintiffs-Defenders of Wildlife&nbsp;moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to reinstate ESA protections for the wolf. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that even though the Fish &amp; Wildlife Service&rsquo;s (&ldquo;Service&rdquo;) original environmental impact statement (EIS) on wolf reintroduction conditioned the delisting on a finding of genetic exchange between populations, and there is no evidence that such exchange has occurred. Further,&nbsp;the Service approved Wyoming's 2007 wolf management plan even though the Wyoming plan still contains provisions that the Service previously found inadequate. On the whole, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and granted plaintiff&rsquo;s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As a result, the Endangered Species Act protections were reinstated for the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf pending final resolution of this matter on the merits. </span> </p>

The case concerns the delisting of the wolf from the Endangered Species list that occurred in March of 2008. Plaintiffs-Defenders of Wildlife moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to reinstate ESA protections for the wolf. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that even though the Fish & Wildlife Service’s (“Service”) original environmental impact statement (EIS) on wolf reintroduction conditioned the delisting on a finding of genetic exchange between populations, and there is no evidence that such exchange has occurred. Further, the Service approved Wyoming's 2007 wolf management plan even though the Wyoming plan still contains provisions that the Service previously found inadequate. On the whole, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and granted plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As a result, the Endangered Species Act protections were reinstated for the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf pending final resolution of this matter on the merits.

Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne

Summary: <span> The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. </span>

The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations.

Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Dirk Kempthorne

Summary: <p> The Humane Society of the United&nbsp;States&nbsp;sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves.&nbsp;The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List.&nbsp; After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the&nbsp;appeal moot.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling. </p>

The Humane Society of the United States sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves. The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List.  After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the appeal moot.  The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling.

Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates

Summary: <p> Plaintiffs sued&nbsp;the Navy&nbsp;over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared&nbsp;that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life.&nbsp; This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material.&nbsp; The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged. </p>

Plaintiffs sued the Navy over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life.  This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material.  The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged.

Lacy v. U.S.

Summary: <p> The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration.&nbsp;Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of&nbsp;its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known.&nbsp;While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of&nbsp; the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that&nbsp;substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness. </p>

The owner of a horse tried to enter his horse into the 64th Annual Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration. Upon closer inspection of the horse, experts determined the horse was "sore," meaning the horse had an injury to or sensitization of its legs that induced a high stepping gait for which Tennessee Walkers are known. While the horse's owner contended that the soreness occurred as a result of  the West Nile Virus, he was eventually convicted with a violation of the Horse Protection Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831). This Court affirmed Lacy's conviction, finding that that substantial evidence supported the JO's conclusion that Lacy failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness.

U.S. v. Friday

Summary: <p> <span> The Defendant, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming, was charged with violating the Eagle Act after he illegally shot a bald eagle for&nbsp;an important religious ritual. The Defendant claimed that prosecution was prevented by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Friday claimed that the government failed to protect eagles killed when they strike power lines. The Court of Appeals held that the permitting process did not facially violate the RFRA and any difference in government's treatment of Native Americans taking eagles for religious purposes and power companies whose power lines killed eagles did not indicate that government failed to protect eagles in least restrictive manner.&nbsp; </span> </p>

The Defendant, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming, was charged with violating the Eagle Act after he illegally shot a bald eagle for an important religious ritual. The Defendant claimed that prosecution was prevented by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Friday claimed that the government failed to protect eagles killed when they strike power lines. The Court of Appeals held that the permitting process did not facially violate the RFRA and any difference in government's treatment of Native Americans taking eagles for religious purposes and power companies whose power lines killed eagles did not indicate that government failed to protect eagles in least restrictive manner. 

Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne

Summary: <p> Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA.&nbsp; Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. &sect; 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there&nbsp;was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court. </p>

Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA.  Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court.

Campbell v. Supervalu

Summary: <span id="mDocumentText_ctl00_mTextDisplay"> North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. </span>

North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA.

Center For Biological Diversity v. Lohn

Summary: <p> In this case, the court is&nbsp;asked to decide whether the federal government's policy for listing killer whales under the Endangered Species Act is invalid. The Center for Biological Diversity, along with eleven co-petitioners not parties to this appeal, petitioned the National Marine Fisheries Service to list the Southern Resident killer whale&nbsp;as an endangered species under the ESA. Initially, the Service issued a proposed ruling based on its DPS policy that concluded listing the Southern Resident was &ldquo;not warranted&rdquo; because the Southern Resident was not &ldquo;significant&rdquo; to its taxon. After the Center challenged this action, the district court set aside the Service's &ldquo;not warranted&rdquo; finding because it failed to utilize the best available scientific data when determining whether the Southern Resident was &ldquo;significant&rdquo; under that policy. Pursuant to the district court's order, the Service reexamined the listing petition and issued a proposed rule that recommended listing the Southern Resident as a threatened species.&nbsp;The Center&nbsp;appealed, and the Service issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as&nbsp;endangered (as opposed to threatened). The Service contends that this case is now moot because it has ultimately issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered species. This court agreed, finding that declaring the DPS Policy unlawful would serve no purpose in this case because the Service has listed the Southern Resident as an endangered species, the Center's ultimate objective. </p>

In this case, the court is asked to decide whether the federal government's policy for listing killer whales under the Endangered Species Act is invalid. The Center for Biological Diversity, along with eleven co-petitioners not parties to this appeal, petitioned the National Marine Fisheries Service to list the Southern Resident killer whale as an endangered species under the ESA. Initially, the Service issued a proposed ruling based on its DPS policy that concluded listing the Southern Resident was “not warranted” because the Southern Resident was not “significant” to its taxon. After the Center challenged this action, the district court set aside the Service's “not warranted” finding because it failed to utilize the best available scientific data when determining whether the Southern Resident was “significant” under that policy. Pursuant to the district court's order, the Service reexamined the listing petition and issued a proposed rule that recommended listing the Southern Resident as a threatened species. The Center appealed, and the Service issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as endangered (as opposed to threatened). The Service contends that this case is now moot because it has ultimately issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered species. This court agreed, finding that declaring the DPS Policy unlawful would serve no purpose in this case because the Service has listed the Southern Resident as an endangered species, the Center's ultimate objective.