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Overview of of Non-Therapeutic Procedures for Companion Animals

Summary: This overview details "cosmetic" and "convenience" surgeries in cats and dogs. The four unnecessary medical surgeries discussed include tail docking, ear cropping, devocalization, and declawing. It briefly explores arguments against the procedures and how breed registries might still require certain cosmetic procedures. Finally, it touches upon recent efforts to regulate or ban these types of surgeries both at the city and state level.

This overview details "cosmetic" and "convenience" surgeries in cats and dogs. The four unnecessary medical surgeries discussed include tail docking, ear cropping, devocalization, and declawing. It briefly explores arguments against the procedures and how breed registries might still require certain cosmetic procedures. Finally, it touches upon recent efforts to regulate or ban these types of surgeries both at the city and state level.

Farm Fisheries: An Analysis of the Animal Welfare Concerns

Summary: This paper outlines the lack of animal welfare standards in the farm fishery industry and argue the need to expand basic rights to these fish. The unethical treatment has flown under the radar of most animal activist groups. With the food market expanding, the conditions these fish are farmed in ways that lack any care for the welfare of the fish. Commercial fishing has been moved from the ocean into concrete holes across the country. Where there are a number or environmental and financial benefits to fish farms, the treatment of these fish certainly raise a number of ethical concerns. This paper will identify the conditions these fish are bred in, arguing for the development of regulations to control the housing of the fish and the slaughter process. Where the Animal Welfare Act is still trying to incorporate agricultural animals, including beef, swine, and chickens to its protections, very little attention is afforded to this sector of agriculture. New legislation has been put in place to regulate offshore farms, but it has yet to reach the fish farms found in places like Michigan and Ohio. This paper will argue that fish can experience pain and suffering, and legislation should be enacted to regulate the current conditions of these fishery farms.

This paper outlines the lack of animal welfare standards in the farm fishery industry and argue the need to expand basic rights to these fish. The unethical treatment has flown under the radar of most animal activist groups. With the food market expanding, the conditions these fish are farmed in ways that lack any care for the welfare of the fish. Commercial fishing has been moved from the ocean into concrete holes across the country. Where there are a number or environmental and financial benefits to fish farms, the treatment of these fish certainly raise a number of ethical concerns. This paper will identify the conditions these fish are bred in, arguing for the development of regulations to control the housing of the fish and the slaughter process. Where the Animal Welfare Act is still trying to incorporate agricultural animals, including beef, swine, and chickens to its protections, very little attention is afforded to this sector of agriculture. New legislation has been put in place to regulate offshore farms, but it has yet to reach the fish farms found in places like Michigan and Ohio. This paper will argue that fish can experience pain and suffering, and legislation should be enacted to regulate the current conditions of these fishery farms.

Detailed Discussion of the Ethical Treatment of Invasive Species

Summary: This paper broadly defines what an invasive species is and why they pose a threat to indigenous ecological communities. The first section will examine the legislation aimed at protecting native ecologies from invasives and how these laws are often silent on the animal welfare component. The paper then examines the threat invasive species pose through four species case studies. It concludes with suggestions on how current laws and conservation policies inadequately evaluate animal welfare in the US and how future proposals should include a cost-benefit analysis for native and invasive species.

This paper broadly defines what an invasive species is and why they pose a threat to indigenous ecological communities. The first section will examine the legislation aimed at protecting native ecologies from invasives and how these laws are often silent on the animal welfare component. The paper then examines the threat invasive species pose through four species case studies. It concludes with suggestions on how current laws and conservation policies inadequately evaluate animal welfare in the US and how future proposals should include a cost-benefit analysis for native and invasive species.

Detailed Discussion of Non-Therapeutic Procedures for Companion Animals

Summary: A discussion on four specific unnecessary medical surgeries in companion animals, including tail docking, ear cropping, devocalization, and declawing. This paper will examine the justifications and legal arguments both for and against the procedures. Finally, it will discuss recent efforts to ban these types of surgeries both at the city and state level, with a brief comparison of tail docking and ear cropping bans in the European Union.

A discussion on four specific unnecessary medical surgeries in companion animals, including tail docking, ear cropping, devocalization, and declawing. This paper will examine the justifications and legal arguments both for and against the procedures. Finally, it will discuss recent efforts to ban these types of surgeries both at the city and state level, with a brief comparison of tail docking and ear cropping bans in the European Union.

Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Breheny

Summary: This New York case centers on a petition of habeas corpus for an elephant named "Happy" who is housed at the Bronx Zoo. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project is a not-for-profit corporation with a mission of seeking to establish that “at least some nonhuman animals” are “legal persons” entitled to fundamental rights, including “bodily integrity and bodily liberty.” In 2018, petitioner commenced this habeas proceeding in Supreme Court against respondents James J. Breheny, Director of the Bronx Zoo, and the Wildlife Conservation Society, the organization that operates the Zoo. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of Happy,” an Asian elephant that petitioner claimed was unlawfully confined at the Zoo in violation of her right to bodily liberty. Happy has resided at the Bronx Zoo for the last 45 years and has been held in captivity since she was approximately one year old. Petitioners request that she be transferred to an “appropriate sanctuary" where she could potentially be integrated with other elephants. To support its request, petitioner proffered affidavits from several experts specializing in elephant study and care attesting to the general characteristics of elephants. The Zoo respondents opposed petitioner's application and requested dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action. Specifically, respondents argued that there was no legal basis for habeas relief and that Happy's living conditions comply with all relevant laws and accepted standards of care. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground “that animals are not ‘persons’ entitled to rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus” and that habeas relief is not available for an animal. On petitioner's appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, reasoning that “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to human beings.” While the court acknowledged that the law recognizes that animals are not mere "things," and existing animal protection laws underscore this conclusion, the scope of habeas corpus does not include animals. The court lastly noted that " this case has garnered extraordinary interest from amici curiae and the public . . . Though beyond the purview of the courts, we appreciate that the desire and ability of our community to engage in a continuing dialogue regarding the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals is an essential characteristic of our humanity. Such dialogue, however, should be directed to the legislature." As such, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed

This New York case centers on a petition of habeas corpus for an elephant named "Happy" who is housed at the Bronx Zoo. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project is a not-for-profit corporation with a mission of seeking to establish that “at least some nonhuman animals” are “legal persons” entitled to fundamental rights, including “bodily integrity and bodily liberty.” In 2018, petitioner commenced this habeas proceeding in Supreme Court against respondents James J. Breheny, Director of the Bronx Zoo, and the Wildlife Conservation Society, the organization that operates the Zoo. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of Happy,” an Asian elephant that petitioner claimed was unlawfully confined at the Zoo in violation of her right to bodily liberty. Happy has resided at the Bronx Zoo for the last 45 years and has been held in captivity since she was approximately one year old. Petitioners request that she be transferred to an “appropriate sanctuary" where she could potentially be integrated with other elephants. To support its request, petitioner proffered affidavits from several experts specializing in elephant study and care attesting to the general characteristics of elephants. The Zoo respondents opposed petitioner's application and requested dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action. Specifically, respondents argued that there was no legal basis for habeas relief and that Happy's living conditions comply with all relevant laws and accepted standards of care. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground “that animals are not ‘persons’ entitled to rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus” and that habeas relief is not available for an animal. On petitioner's appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, reasoning that “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to human beings.” While the court acknowledged that the law recognizes that animals are not mere "things," and existing animal protection laws underscore this conclusion, the scope of habeas corpus does not include animals. The court lastly noted that " this case has garnered extraordinary interest from amici curiae and the public . . . Though beyond the purview of the courts, we appreciate that the desire and ability of our community to engage in a continuing dialogue regarding the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals is an essential characteristic of our humanity. Such dialogue, however, should be directed to the legislature." As such, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed

Andrade v. Westlo Mgmt. LLC

Summary: The defendants, Westlo Management LLC (Westlo) seek review of a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment on several counts in favor of the plaintiffs, Curtis W. Andrade and The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the commission). The defendants assert that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded partial summary judgment and that the commission did not have standing to intervene in this matter. The matter stems from a denial of plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation at Westlo's property. Prior to moving in to Westlo's low-income property, plaintiff was told by a leasing agent that he was not permitted to have his dog, Enzo, because the dog (a pit bull) was on the complex' restricted breed list. Andrade then informed the leasing manager that the dog was his support animal (although he could not recall at deposition whether he filled out paperwork for an assistance animal). After moving in, he left the dog mostly at his mother's residence, but did bring the dog to his residence in December of 2011. While the dog was there, an incident occurred with another resident in a hallway near the elevators. Andrade testified that his dog never made physical contact with the resident, while the other resident claims the dog charged at him and pinned him to a wall. This resulted in a report being made to the building manager who then informed Andrade the dog was not allowed on the premises. Andrade then discussed the need for a support animal with his doctor who agreed and wrote a note stating that Andrade “would benefit in having a dog due to his medical condition[.]” The building manager rejected this request in a letter citing the breed ban and the recent incident with the dog. After a subsequent refusal by the building manager, Andrade filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. After unsuccessful settlement discussions with the parties, Westlo initiated eviction proceedings against Andrade for non-payment of rent and the commission issued a right-to-sue letter. Andrade then filed the instant lawsuit and a hearing justice granted the commission's right to intervene. The complaint against Westlo raised the unlawful denial of full and equal access to housing and public accommodations based on Andrade's disability and unlawful retaliation by eviction, among other things. After cross-motions for summary judgment by both parties, the hearing justice granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment finding that Westlo had discriminated against Andrade. However, she found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog had requisite training. Further, she refused to interfere with the order granting the commission's motion to intervene. The justice also acknowledged that she had misstated that the request for the reasonable accommodation had occurred before the elevator incident with the other resident. As a result, she declined to make a finding of fact on that issue. On defendants' appeal of summary judgment, defendants argue that the issue of whether an accommodation is reasonable under the FHA is a factual one and thus it was error for the hearing justice to make those determinations. The Supreme Court looked at the similar language of both the federal FHA and the state FHPA. While the court found that plaintiff met the definition for disability under the laws and that defendant was made aware of plaintiff's need for reasonable accommodation, it was troubled by the "direct threat" posed by the dog. Specifically, the court found issue with the date mix-up in the initial hearing for the incident with the dog an other resident. Therefore, due to the highly fact-specific nature of the assessment of an assistance animal as well as the conflicting evidence presented, this court disagreed with the hearing justice and concluded summary judgment was not appropriate. Further, the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog was "necessary" to fully enjoy his dwelling since benefit of dog as it relates to plaintiff's disability was not fully described and the dog lived away from plaintiff for a year. As to the challenge to the motion to intervene, the court found Westlo failed to obtain the transcripts necessary to review the issue. Thus, this court quashed that portion of the Superior Court order that grants the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment “as to the [l]iability of Westlo Management, on [c]ounts 1, 2, 3, and 7[.]” The record was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The defendants, Westlo Management LLC (Westlo) seek review of a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment on several counts in favor of the plaintiffs, Curtis W. Andrade and The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the commission). The defendants assert that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded partial summary judgment and that the commission did not have standing to intervene in this matter. The matter stems from a denial of plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation at Westlo's property. Prior to moving in to Westlo's low-income property, plaintiff was told by a leasing agent that he was not permitted to have his dog, Enzo, because the dog (a pit bull) was on the complex' restricted breed list. Andrade then informed the leasing manager that the dog was his support animal (although he could not recall at deposition whether he filled out paperwork for an assistance animal). After moving in, he left the dog mostly at his mother's residence, but did bring the dog to his residence in December of 2011. While the dog was there, an incident occurred with another resident in a hallway near the elevators. Andrade testified that his dog never made physical contact with the resident, while the other resident claims the dog charged at him and pinned him to a wall. This resulted in a report being made to the building manager who then informed Andrade the dog was not allowed on the premises. Andrade then discussed the need for a support animal with his doctor who agreed and wrote a note stating that Andrade “would benefit in having a dog due to his medical condition[.]” The building manager rejected this request in a letter citing the breed ban and the recent incident with the dog. After a subsequent refusal by the building manager, Andrade filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. After unsuccessful settlement discussions with the parties, Westlo initiated eviction proceedings against Andrade for non-payment of rent and the commission issued a right-to-sue letter. Andrade then filed the instant lawsuit and a hearing justice granted the commission's right to intervene. The complaint against Westlo raised the unlawful denial of full and equal access to housing and public accommodations based on Andrade's disability and unlawful retaliation by eviction, among other things. After cross-motions for summary judgment by both parties, the hearing justice granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment finding that Westlo had discriminated against Andrade. However, she found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog had requisite training. Further, she refused to interfere with the order granting the commission's motion to intervene. The justice also acknowledged that she had misstated that the request for the reasonable accommodation had occurred before the elevator incident with the other resident. As a result, she declined to make a finding of fact on that issue. On defendants' appeal of summary judgment, defendants argue that the issue of whether an accommodation is reasonable under the FHA is a factual one and thus it was error for the hearing justice to make those determinations. The Supreme Court looked at the similar language of both the federal FHA and the state FHPA. While the court found that plaintiff met the definition for disability under the laws and that defendant was made aware of plaintiff's need for reasonable accommodation, it was troubled by the "direct threat" posed by the dog. Specifically, the court found issue with the date mix-up in the initial hearing for the incident with the dog an other resident. Therefore, due to the highly fact-specific nature of the assessment of an assistance animal as well as the conflicting evidence presented, this court disagreed with the hearing justice and concluded summary judgment was not appropriate. Further, the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog was "necessary" to fully enjoy his dwelling since benefit of dog as it relates to plaintiff's disability was not fully described and the dog lived away from plaintiff for a year. As to the challenge to the motion to intervene, the court found Westlo failed to obtain the transcripts necessary to review the issue. Thus, this court quashed that portion of the Superior Court order that grants the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment “as to the [l]iability of Westlo Management, on [c]ounts 1, 2, 3, and 7[.]” The record was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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