United States

Summary: This Virginia law states that, beginning July 1, 2022, no manufacturer shall sell or offer for sale within the Commonwealth any cosmetic, if the cosmetics manufacturer knows or reasonably should know that the cosmetic or any component thereof was developed or manufactured using cosmetic animal testing that was conducted on or after January 1, 2022. Limited exceptions exist. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter is subject to a civil penalty of $5,000 and an additional $1,000 for each day the violation continues. Such penalty shall be collected by the Attorney General and the proceeds shall be deposited into the Literary Fund.

Summary: This Maine law, enacted in 2021, provides that a manufacturer may not sell or offer to sell in the State a cosmetic if the cosmetic was developed or manufactured using cosmetic animal testing that was conducted or contracted for by the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer on or after November 1, 2021. A "cosmetic" is defined as "[a]n article intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled or sprayed on, introduced into or otherwise applied to the human body or any part of the body for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance," excluding soap. Exemptions include non-US based cosmetics with evidence that the product was not derived from testing, products or ingredients regulated under the FDA, and those products where there is nonanimal alternative method or strategy recognized by any federal or state agency.

Summary: This Hawaii law from 2021 makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to import for profit, sell, or offer for sale in the State any cosmetic for which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that an animal test was conducted or contracted, by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer, on or after January 1, 2022, in a cruel manner, as identified in section 711-1108.5(1)(a). A violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of $5,000 and an additional $1,000 for each day the violation continues. Certain exceptions to the testing ban exist under this act.

Summary: This Louisiana set of laws, enacted in 2022, makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to sell or offer for sale in this state a cosmetic that utilized cosmetic animal testing during the development or manufacture of the cosmetic, if the cosmetic animal testing was conducted by the manufacturer, any supplier of the manufacturer, or any person or business hired or contracted by the manufacturer. Limited exemptions exist. A manufacturer that sells or offers for sale a cosmetic in violation commits a civil violation punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 for the first day of each violation and an additional fine of $500 for each day that each violation continues.

Summary: This set of Indiana laws was enacted in 2022. A person that owns or possesses a specified animal may not allow a member of the public to (1) come into direct contact with; or (2) enter into a proximity that allows for or permits direct contact with the specified animal, regardless of the age of the specified animal. Essentially, public contact with certain animals that include lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, and mountain lions (or their hybrids) is prohibited.

Summary: Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded.

Summary: The background of the case involves buyers who sued alleged sellers of dogs for falsely advertising their pets as healthy when they were actually sick and died soon after. The buyers claimed that this violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The Superior Court in Los Angeles County granted the buyers' motion for a preliminary injunction, which prevented the sellers from selling or advertising dogs. However, the sellers appealed this decision. The sellers' main issue at the the Court of Appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to support the claim that the buyers purchased the puppies in question from the sellers. The court found relying on the buyers' declarations to establish the sellers' identities did not result in any harm. In addition, the buyers had provided adequate evidence to support their allegations that the puppies had been dyed brown. The court found the objections raised by the sellers regarding the evidentiary foundations for allegations relating to the dogs' ages, vaccinations, and causes of death were not relevant to the preliminary injunction. Substantial evidence existed to suggest that the buyers would likely succeed in their claim against the sellers and the balance of harms favored granting the preliminary injunction. Lastly, the sellers' persistence in their routine indicated that the public interest favored the grant of the preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.

Summary: The plaintiff, the Village of Orion (Village), sued defendants, Patricia A. Hardi and Michael Larson, to enjoin them from keeping more than three cats in violation of a Village ordinance. After a dismissal and amended complaint by the Village, the trial court granted defendants' amended motion to dismiss, finding that the Village had previously voted to allow defendants to keep more than three cats. Here, the Village appeals this decision. By way of background, the defendants lived together in the Village since 1998, and one defendant served as the animal control officer for about 15 years. In 2013, the Village enacted an ordinance making it unlawful to keep more than three dogs or cats over the age of six months (except for licensed kennels or veterinarian clinics). At a Village board meeting in 2014, the minutes revealed that members of the board agreed to allow defendants to keep the dogs ad cats to live out their natural lifetimes. However, in 2017, the Board served a "notice to abate nuisance" for keeping more than three cats or dogs. This was followed by a complaint filed by the Village against defendants. In 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging the three-cat limit was arbitrary and was "superseded" by a criminal action where one defendant pleaded guilty to animal cruelty, but was allowed to keep 10 cats. The trial court's order found that the Board's language at the 2014 meeting revealed "unambiguous" language that defendants could keep the cats in their possession. After remand, the Village filed its second amended complaint in 2022 and defendants against filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing with testimony from Board members and others, the trial court found there was a motion to allow the keeping of the excess cats and this negated the ability of the Village to proceed with an ordinance violation. On appeal here, this court finds the 2014 board minutes are insufficient to support a motion to dismiss. The submission of the board minutes together with and a defense witness, followed by the Village's presentation of another board member's testimony to refute that, amounted to the court "improperly allow[ing] the parties to conduct a mini-trial on the veracity of the essential allegations of the complaint." The motion was used to attack the factual basis of the claim. Thus, the trial court's order granting the dismissal was reversed and the matter was remanded.

Summary: Plaintiff animal welfare advocates sued the National Institute of Health (NIH) for failing to transfer all chimpanzees housed at the Alamogordo Primate Facility to a retirement sanctuary known as “Chimp Haven." According to plaintiffs, transfer is required under the federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection Act (“CHIMP Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 283m, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In 2015, NIH officially announced that it would cease biomedical research on chimpanzees and establish a working group to transfer all 288 surplus chimpanzees owned by NIH to Chimp Haven. In 2019, the NIH announced that not all chimpanzees would be transferred to Chimp Haven because 44 of those individuals were too frail for transfer due to medical conditions. After cross-motions for summary judgment, this court considers whether transfer is legally required. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the CHIMP Act requires the transfer of all chimps and the court owes no deference to agency interpretation. In contrast, the Government argues that the decision is consistent with the CHIMP Act because the plain language of the act only requires that surplus chimpanzees offered by NIH be "accepted" into CHIMP Haven. The court found that the plain and unambiguous language, and use of the word "shall," in the CHIMP Act requires the NIH to transfer ALL chimpanzees to the federal sanctuary system. In addition, the legislative history of the CHIMP Act reinforces that reading of the statute. While the court recognized NIH's concern toward the frailest chimpanzees, the proper avenue is within the legislative branch. Notably, the court was unsure as to the proper remedy in this particular matter (e.g., whether a remand or vacatur is more appropriate). As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was granted and the Government's cross motion was denied as was the motion to dismiss. The court directed the parties to file a joint status report report with views on the relief Plaintiff seeks and how the matter should proceed in light of the instant opinion.

Summary: The “Homes for Animal Heroes Act" adopted in 2020 states that an institution of higher education that uses cats or dogs for educational, research, or scientific purposes, or a research institution that contracts with an institution of higher education for the use of cats or dogs for educational, research, or scientific purposes, shall require the assessment of the health of a cat or dog and determine whether it is suitable for adoption after the completion of any testing or research involving the cat or dog. If the institution determines that the cat or dog is suitable for adoption, the institution shall offer the cat or dog to an animal rescue organization or private individual for adoption.