United States

Summary: The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted.

Summary: The plaintiff (“Whiteaker”) filed this action against Defendant, the City of Southgate, Michigan for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PDCRA”). Specifically, Whiteaker contends that the City violated the FHA by denying Whiteaker's request for an exemption from City Ordinance 610.13, which prohibits City residents from maintaining chickens (or other typical farm animals) on their property. The events underlying this action began after Whiteaker moved to Southgate in early March 2021. On March 24, 2021, Whiteaker was issued a citation by the City for a violation of Ordinance 610.13. Whiteaker appeared in district court to defend himself, claiming he had a right to keep the chickens under Michigan's Right to Farm Act. However, it turned out the Right to Farm law was inapplicable because Whiteaker's chicken coop was within 250 feet of a dwelling. Thus, Whiteaker was issued a second citation in May and was denied a permit to keep the chickens by the city. Since Whiteaker was a longtime sufferer of depression and anxiety, he sought a waiver from the ordinance as a reasonable accommodation for his disability and presented a letter from his mental health provider as support. Again, his request was denied by the City. In the instant motion for summary judgement by the City, the court examined the "reasonableness" of Whiteaker's request for a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court found that the balancing test required under the FHA, to wit, weighing Whiteaker's disability-related need to keep the chickens as a source of comfort and support against the City's claims that the chickens pose a threat to public health, is a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the court observed that the City's citation of documentation from the CDC only lists the "potential dangers" chickens can pose to public health without sufficient evidence to supports its claim that the chickens will burden the City financially and administratively. In contrast, Whiteaker claims a disability and has provided evidence of his disability. Likewise, as to the remaining elements of necessity and equal opportunity for a reasonable accommodation claim, the court again cites Whiteaker's evidentiary support for his claim of disability and need for the chickens to alleviate those symptoms against the fact the City has not presented any testimony, affidavits, or "evidence of any kind" to support its claim. Thus, the court denied the motion for summary judgment.

Summary: This New Mexico regulation appears to allow permissive reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians. Subsection (T) states: "The reporting of cruelty or illegal action is not a violation of confidentiality."

Summary: This Alaska regulation appears to allow permissive reporting of suspected animal abuse by veterinarians.

Summary: This Vermont chapter, enacted in 2022, relates to the trade in certain animal products. Under the law, a person shall not purchase, sell, offer for sale, or possess with intent to sell any item that the person knows or should know is a covered animal part or product. A covered animal part includes certain big cat species, elephants, giraffes, hippopotamuses, mammoths, mastodons, pangolins, endangered rays, rhinoceroses, sea turtles, endangered sharks, certain whales, and certain ape species. Exceptions exist for activities authorized under federal law, parts with "antique status" as defined, among others. For a first offense, a person shall be assessed an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000.00 nor less than $400.00.

Summary: This New Jersey statute states that no county or municipality shall hereafter pay any premium or bounty for the killing of any fox or woodchuck.

Summary: This Arizona law from 2022 requires an animal shelter to thoroughly scan for the presence of a microchip in the dog or cat and make a reasonable effort to contact the owner after taking possession of a dog or cat.

Summary: This Nevada law, enacted in 2020, states that a manufacturer shall not import for profit, sell or offer for sale in this State any cosmetic for which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer if the animal testing was conducted on or after January 1, 2020. Limited exceptions exist. A violation of this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive.

Summary: This New York law from 2022 states that it shall be unlawful for a manufacturer to import for profit, sell or offer for sale in the state, any cosmetic which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer if the animal testing was conducted after the effective date of this section (January 2023). Exemptions include cosmetics where an ingredient testing method cannot be replaced, cosmetics from foreign jurisdictions where there is no evidence testing relied upon animal testing, and products tested on animals before the effective date of the law.

Summary: This Maryland law, effective in 2022, states that a manufacturer may not sell or offer for sale in the State a cosmetic if the manufacturer knows or reasonably should have known that the final product or any individual component of the final product was developed or manufactured using animal testing that was conducted or contracted by or for the manufacturer or any entity that supplies, directly or through a third party, any ingredient used by a manufacturer in the formulation of a cosmetic on or after January 1, 2022. Limited exceptions exist. A person who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty up to a $5,000 penalty for the first offense and up to $1,000 for each subsequent offense.