United States

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Lowry v. City of San Diego

Summary: Plaintiff in this case filed suit against the City of San Diego after she was attacked and bit by one of the police dogs. Lowry alleged that the City’s policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. The court remanded the case back to the lower court, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the use of the police dog against Lowry was an intrusion on her Fourth Amendment rights. The court maintained that the officers had reason to believe that letting the dog into Lowry’s office “off-lead” had the potential of creating severe harm. The court also noted that Lowry was not attempting to evade or resist arrest and therefore letting the dog “off-lead” may not have been reasonable. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff in this case filed suit against the City of San Diego after she was attacked and bit by one of the police dogs. Lowry alleged that the City’s policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. The court remanded the case back to the lower court, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the use of the police dog against Lowry was an intrusion on her Fourth Amendment rights. The court maintained that the officers had reason to believe that letting the dog into Lowry’s office “off-lead” had the potential of creating severe harm. The court also noted that Lowry was not attempting to evade or resist arrest and therefore letting the dog “off-lead” may not have been reasonable. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Eldorado Community Improvement Association Inc. v. Billings

Summary: In this case, Eldorado Subdivision sued some residents who kept hens as pets at their homes. The subdivision had a covenant (Section 11) that disallowed “animals, birds, or poultry” on residents' lots unless kept as “recognized household pets." The defendant-residents claimed that their hens were pets and thus met the household pet exception in the covenant. The lower court agreed with the subdivision and ordered the owners to remove the hens. On appeal, this court looked at the actual language of the covenant, which the court did find to be "unclear and ambiguous." However, the court found that if the residents did not want poultry as household pets, it is reasonable to assume the residents would have removed language that anticipates poultry as household pets. The court here found that the lower court applied the wrong precedent and should have applied a case that favored free use of the land because the covenant is ambiguous. The ruling should not be based on what the developer of the subdivision may have had in mind in writing Section 11 or how community members would interpret its meaning. Instead, the court found that the Section 11 does not disallow hens as pets and rebuffed plaintiffs' "Chicken Little-esque view" that "the sky will fall" if chickens were permitted as pets. In fact, the court observed that if the lot owners want a different result, they must change Section 11 through the election process set out in the covenants. The judgment of the lower court was reversed.

In this case, Eldorado Subdivision sued some residents who kept hens as pets at their homes. The subdivision had a covenant (Section 11) that disallowed “animals, birds, or poultry” on residents' lots unless kept as “recognized household pets." The defendant-residents claimed that their hens were pets and thus met the household pet exception in the covenant. The lower court agreed with the subdivision and ordered the owners to remove the hens. On appeal, this court looked at the actual language of the covenant, which the court did find to be "unclear and ambiguous." However, the court found that if the residents did not want poultry as household pets, it is reasonable to assume the residents would have removed language that anticipates poultry as household pets. The court here found that the lower court applied the wrong precedent and should have applied a case that favored free use of the land because the covenant is ambiguous. The ruling should not be based on what the developer of the subdivision may have had in mind in writing Section 11 or how community members would interpret its meaning. Instead, the court found that the Section 11 does not disallow hens as pets and rebuffed plaintiffs' "Chicken Little-esque view" that "the sky will fall" if chickens were permitted as pets. In fact, the court observed that if the lot owners want a different result, they must change Section 11 through the election process set out in the covenants. The judgment of the lower court was reversed.

Robinson v. Pezzat

Summary: Plaintiff filed suit against two police officers and the District of Columbia after the officers shot and killed her dog while executing a warrant to search her home. She brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers seized her property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling for summary judgment, holding that a jury could find in favor of the plaintiff based on her witness testimony that the dog was lying down when it was first shot. Additionally, the court maintained summary judgment for the second police officer, McLeod, who shot and killed the dog after it bit Officer Pezzat and charged forward.

Plaintiff filed suit against two police officers and the District of Columbia after the officers shot and killed her dog while executing a warrant to search her home. She brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers seized her property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling for summary judgment, holding that a jury could find in favor of the plaintiff based on her witness testimony that the dog was lying down when it was first shot. Additionally, the court maintained summary judgment for the second police officer, McLeod, who shot and killed the dog after it bit Officer Pezzat and charged forward.

OK - Liens - § 193 to 201.11. Liens for Feeding, Grazing, Herding and Breeding.

Summary: This Oklahoma statute provides the requirements for obtaining a lien when employed in the feeding, grazing, or herding of any domestic animals within the state. The statute also describes both lawful and unlawful ways to use the lien once it is obtained.

This Oklahoma statute provides the requirements for obtaining a lien when employed in the feeding, grazing, or herding of any domestic animals within the state. The statute also describes both lawful and unlawful ways to use the lien once it is obtained.

OR - Hunting - 635-064-0010. Privately Held Exotic and Game Mammals

Summary: Under this Oregon regulation, it is unlawful to hunt, kill, or attempt to hunt or kill, exotic mammals or game mammals held or obtained by private parties. Exceptions under the statute include the slaughter of such an animal for meat, leather, or fur production, euthanization of such an animal for scientific, health, safety or other valid husbandry concerns, or the department's Wildlife Division Director may authorize any person to hunt or kill such an animal if the Division Director determines it would be in the best interest of sound wildlife management.

Under this Oregon regulation, it is unlawful to hunt, kill, or attempt to hunt or kill, exotic mammals or game mammals held or obtained by private parties. Exceptions under the statute include the slaughter of such an animal for meat, leather, or fur production, euthanization of such an animal for scientific, health, safety or other valid husbandry concerns, or the department's Wildlife Division Director may authorize any person to hunt or kill such an animal if the Division Director determines it would be in the best interest of sound wildlife management.

Take It to the Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting the Take of Any Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act

Summary: Part II of this article will provide a brief background on the adoption of the Endangered Species Act. Part III will explain that the statute does not authorize the agencies to extend the take prohibition to all threatened species. Part IV will argue that returning to the statutory scheme would result in a fairer distribution of the costs of species protection by imposing the costs of prophylactic protection on agencies and the public generally. Burdening individuals would be a last resort, as Congress intended. Finally, Part V will identify how Congress' policy is a reasonable way to align private incentives with species protection. The statute's approach would encourage property owners to stop a threatened species' further slide, to avoid imposition of the take prohibition, and to recover endangered species to the point where they can be downlisted and the take prohibition lifted. This would make the statute more effective at accomplishing its primary goal - recovering species to the point that they no longer require protection.

Part II of this article will provide a brief background on the adoption of the Endangered Species Act. Part III will explain that the statute does not authorize the agencies to extend the take prohibition to all threatened species. Part IV will argue that returning to the statutory scheme would result in a fairer distribution of the costs of species protection by imposing the costs of prophylactic protection on agencies and the public generally. Burdening individuals would be a last resort, as Congress intended. Finally, Part V will identify how Congress' policy is a reasonable way to align private incentives with species protection. The statute's approach would encourage property owners to stop a threatened species' further slide, to avoid imposition of the take prohibition, and to recover endangered species to the point where they can be downlisted and the take prohibition lifted. This would make the statute more effective at accomplishing its primary goal - recovering species to the point that they no longer require protection.

WV - Hunting, Internet - § 20-2-5. Unlawful methods of hunting and fishing and other unlawful acts.

Summary: This statute prohibits unlawful hunting in the state of West Virginia. Subsection (a)(27) effectively serves as the remote hunting ban. It is unlawful for any person to "[h]unt or conduct hunts for a fee when the person is not physically present in the same location as the wildlife being hunted within West Virginia." The statute (subsection (5)) also prohibits hunting by airplane or other airborne conveyance or by "a drone or other unmanned aircraft." Subsection (12) prohibits hunting by use of a ferret.

This statute prohibits unlawful hunting in the state of West Virginia. Subsection (a)(27) effectively serves as the remote hunting ban. It is unlawful for any person to "[h]unt or conduct hunts for a fee when the person is not physically present in the same location as the wildlife being hunted within West Virginia." The statute (subsection (5)) also prohibits hunting by airplane or other airborne conveyance or by "a drone or other unmanned aircraft." Subsection (12) prohibits hunting by use of a ferret.

CA - Hunting, Internet - § 3003. Internet hunting and associated activities.

Summary: This statute prohibits Internet hunting in the State of California. Under the law, it is unlawful to own or operate a shooting range or site for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of an animal. It is also unlawful to create, maintain, or utilize an Internet Web site, or other service or business in this state, for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of a bird or mammal.

This statute prohibits Internet hunting in the State of California. Under the law, it is unlawful to own or operate a shooting range or site for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of an animal. It is also unlawful to create, maintain, or utilize an Internet Web site, or other service or business in this state, for the purpose of online shooting or spearing of a bird or mammal.

Lira v. Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue, Inc.

Summary: In this case, plaintiff’s family dog, a German Shepherd named Monte, ran away and was rescued by Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue (GHGSDR). The organization refused to return the dog to plaintiff, so plaintiff filed suit against GHGSDR. The court found that there is no common law that states that a dog owner loses property rights to its dog if it runs away and is found by someone else. The court also looked to whether or not there was a city ordinance that would determine the proper ownership of the dog. Ultimately, the court found that the city ordinance regarding stray dogs did not strip the plaintiff of ownership rights because the dog had run away. The court also held that if there were any doubts as to the meaning of the ordinance, it should always be read “against a forfeiture of property.” The Supreme Court of Texas reversed judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment reinstating the trial court's judgment that Monte belonged to the Liras and the court properly enjoined GHGSDR to return him to his owners. 

In this case, plaintiff’s family dog, a German Shepherd named Monte, ran away and was rescued by Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue (GHGSDR). The organization refused to return the dog to plaintiff, so plaintiff filed suit against GHGSDR. The court found that there is no common law that states that a dog owner loses property rights to its dog if it runs away and is found by someone else. The court also looked to whether or not there was a city ordinance that would determine the proper ownership of the dog. Ultimately, the court found that the city ordinance regarding stray dogs did not strip the plaintiff of ownership rights because the dog had run away. The court also held that if there were any doubts as to the meaning of the ordinance, it should always be read “against a forfeiture of property.” The Supreme Court of Texas reversed judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment reinstating the trial court's judgment that Monte belonged to the Liras and the court properly enjoined GHGSDR to return him to his owners. 
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