Standing

Summary:

Respondents filed suit challenging the new regulation under the ESA that limited the jurisdiction to the U.S. and the high seas.  While the case, was remanded the central issue to this case was whether respondents had standing to challenge the ruling.

Summary:

Concerned citizens and animal conservation groups brought an action against United States government, challenging the government's approval of quota for whale hunting by Makah Indian Tribe located in Washington state.  On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the government to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before approving a whale quota for the Makah Tribe violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The court also found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) applied to tribe's proposed whale hunt, as the proposed whale takings were not excluded by the treaty with the tribe.

Summary:

This case involves a conspiracy charge to defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Mitchell referred to this Supreme Court case when it found that the nature of the MMPA does not compel its application to foreign territories.

Summary:

These appeals arise from a complaint filed in the District Court challenging a decision by the Government appellees to waive the moratorium imposed by the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) [FN1] so as to permit importation into the United States from South Africa of baby fur sealskins.  We reverse, holding that appellants do have standing and that the Government's decision to waive the ban on importing baby fur sealskins violates the Marine Mammal Protection Act.

Summary:

Animal welfare group and individual plaintiffs brought action against, inter alia, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), challenging its regulations concerning treatment of nonhuman primates on grounds that they violated USDA's statutory mandate under Animal Welfare Act (AWA).

Summary:

Animals are property, not persons. And yet, at the same time, they are treated differently than other forms of property such as cars, toasters, and crops. Professor Francione discusses the legal status of animals and argues that, given the law as it now stands, before any real gains can be made in animal rights, either theory or in practice, the legal classification of animals must change from that of good to something more closely resembling personhood.

Summary:

Ms. Campbell analyzes the federal witness competency standards and applies them to the current scientific knowledge of chimpanzees and bonobos. Such comparisons indicate that chimpanzees and bonobos could potentially meet these standards and therefore be legally competent witnesses in certain circumstances. The federal competency standards for witnesses testifying on the stand are fairly liberal. Witnesses must be able to distinguish right from wrong, understand the concept of punishment, perceive events, and remember those events to communicate them in the future. Chimpanzees and bonobos are able to do all of these things to some degree, and therefore, arguably satisfy the federal competency standards. In some situations, this indicates that these nonhuman apes should be allowed to testify in court, subject to the federal competency and interpreter rules.

Summary:

It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing.

Summary:

Mr. Taylor writes about the Great Ape Project's campaign to win fundamental rights for all hominids with New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. While the Act was a significant step in the struggle for hominids' rights, larger steps, including a Nonhuman Hominid Protection Bill, will soon follow.

Summary:

This Article explores competitive injury as a basis for challenging the USDA's failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. Part I.A provides background on claims that the Acts are both underenforced. Part I.B then introduces the problem of standing in the context of animal welfare lawsuits. Part II.A analyzes Article III standing requirements as applied to a competitively injured plaintiff. Part II.B then analyzes what the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires for an injured competitor to bring suit against the USDA for failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. This Article concludes by suggesting that the HMSA provides the best vehicle for a competitive injury suit against the USDA because Congress has made abundantly clear its desire to see the HMSA fully enforced.