Pet Damages

Summary: This unpublished Tennessee case concerns a veterinary negligence action. The owners of a cat filed a wrongful death complaint against the cat's veterinarian and animal hospital after the cat was killed when the veterinarian wrongly placing a feeding tube into the cat's trachea rather than her esophagus, causing the cat to aspirate and die when she was fed through the tube. The trial court held that the defendants were not liable because the cat was so ill she was likely to die anyway, and thus dismissed the complaint. The cat was 10-years old when she was brought in because she was acting a "little slow" and had not eaten in a couple days. Through discovery and at trial, it was observed that the cat had a septic abscess on her liver with a 79% mortality rate. On appeal here, this court first took issue with the trial court's finding for causation in the negligence analysis. This court found that the evidence was "undisputed" that the cat died as a result of the improperly placed feeding tube, which was further supported by x-rays showing the feeding tube in the trachea rather than the esophagus. Because the trial court did not find causation, damages were not addressed. Here, the court noted that domestic pets are considered private property in Tennessee. The law is settled that a pet owner can recover for the wrongful death of his or her pet in the state. Further, Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 provides that a dog or cat owner is entitled to recover up to $5,000 in noneconomic damages for "the unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another or the animal of another . . ." but that no award of noneconomic damages is permitted in “an action for professional negligence against a licensed veterinarian.” While Mr. DeLany testified he considered the cat's fair market value at $5,000, another veterinarian joined as a defendant testified that a healthy cat has a value of around $75 and a sick cat has a value of $0.40. The appellate court stated that the calculation of damages is a matter for the fact-finder, and the case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of economic damages. This would include, but not be limited to, the medical bills incurred for Callie's treatment and the cost of replacing Callie, said the court.

Summary: This Oregon law provides that the owner of a search and rescue animal or a therapy animal may bring an action for economic and noneconomic damages against any person who steals or, without provocation, attacks the search and rescue animal or therapy animal. The owner may also bring an action for such damages against the owner of any animal that, without provocation, attacks a search and rescue animal or therapy animal. If the animal dies as a result of the injuries sustained or the incident prevents the animal from returning to service, the measure of economic damages shall include, but need not be limited to, the replacement value of an equally trained animal, without any differentiation for the age or the experience of the animal. If the animal recovers and returns to service, the measure of economic damages shall include, but need not be limited to, the costs of temporary replacement services, veterinary medical expenses and any other costs and expenses incurred by the owner as a result of the theft of or injury to the animal.

Summary: This brief summary explores the recent changes with respect to dog auctions and the role of rescues. The limited federal and state oversight is discussed as well as new retail pet store bans that have inadvertently fueled "retail rescue" phenomenon.

Summary: This Texas appeals presents the unique question of whether companion animals, specifically "pet dogs," can be considered "stock" for awarding attorney fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001(6) in lawsuits concerning their injury or death. The facts stem from an incident at appellees' dog boarding business where Palfreyman's two dogs died. In Palfreyman's original petition, she sought damages based on claims of negligence and gross negligence. She additionally requested reasonable attorney fee's under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001(6) for "killed or injured stock." Appellees countered that Palfreyman could not recover attorney fees because the dogs were not "stock" as used in the statute. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court refused to consider the award of attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first notes that Texas law does not allow recovery of attorney fees unless they are authorized by statute or contract. Here, the court examined the word "stock" as used in the cited law. While there is no definition in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the word "stock" is rarely used in Texas statutes, the term "livestock" is defined in several instances. In particular, the Penal Code distinguishes "livestock" from "nonlivestock animals" that include domesticated dogs. Further, the ordinary dictionary definition for stock would not include pets like dogs. The court was not persuaded by Palfreyman's argument that the Code should be liberally construed to promote its underlying purpose as well as her other examples of definitions for "stock." Thus, the court concluded the term “stock” in section 38.001(6) does not include pet dogs and appellant was not entitled to attorney fees under Section 38.001(6).5. Finally, Palfreyman contended in her reply brief that attorney fees may be awarded in bailment actions. However, the court declined this argument because she did not raise this in her initial brief so the court is not required to consider this new argument. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Summary: This article will show that sufficient relational interest can exist between a human and companion animal and that this interest is widely accepted in our culture; therefore, financial recovery for the disruption of this relationship is a fair burden to place upon actors in today's world. This proposal does not seek to give any legal rights to companion animals; instead, this is a proposal to allow the law to acknowledge the depth and reality of the bond between humans and animals that exists in millions of families across the country. First, this article sets out the existing categories of damage for recovery when a defendant's tortious actions result in the death of a companion animal. Integral to this discussion is the reality that companion animals are considered property. Courts most often are unwilling to extend financial recovery to include the emotional loss of the owner of an animal. Second, this article will examine the history of the concept of consortium to show how the legal system has come to accept that the compensable harm is not limited to economic consequences, nor is it limited to husband and wife relationships. Third, this article will present information to support the position that companion animals are emotionally and psychologically important to the human members of many families. Fourth, this article will show that animals have already jumped out of the property box in a number of fact patterns, and therefore, it is appropriate to raise their status in this context as well. Fifth, this article will consider the application of the concept of animal consortium in detail as an extension of the common law cause of action. Finally, acknowledging some of the difficulties that courts may have in implementing this proposal, a legislative draft is proposed to accomplish the recovery sought by this article.

Summary: In this case, appellee's dog attacked appellant's dog while on appellee's property. Veterinary bills were over $10,000, and the municipal court capped compensatory damages at the fair market value of animal of $400, reasoning that animals are considered personal property. On appeal, this court discusses situations where veterinary costs are appropriate as damages, such as veterinary malpractice suits or where the animal had special characteristics like pedigree, training, or breeding income. Though this case does not fit into those categories, the court recognizes a ‘semi-property’ or 'companion property' classification of animals, and reverse the municipal court and remand for a damages hearing.

Summary: In this case, Degtiarov's unleashed dog attacked Irwin's dog without provocation. Though Irwin's dog survived, there were significant veterinary costs. Irwin brought this suit for damages in the form of veterinary costs, which were granted by the district court and affirmed by the appellate court. The sole issue on appeal considers whether damages should be capped at the market value of the dog, despite the reasonableness of the veterinary costs necessary to treat the dog's injuries. The appellate court affirms the damages for reasonable veterinary costs that were incurred for damage caused by a dog, even if these costs exceed the market or replacement value of the animal injured by the dog.

Summary:

Folks come to law smithies with tort troubles. Those troubles follow this general scenario: Allegedly, someone has breached a duty owed that damaged another’s right, thus calling for a duty of smithies to fix it. In this nation’s separation of government powers, that scenario initiates a job for the judicial branch, where courts are the shop smithies. Within their job description and among its many work orders lies the issue of pet loss remedy. That remedy will be the focus of this Essay; but first, all remedy of any kind must be put in context.

Summary:

This Article presents a theory of the economic value of companion animal life. Under the existing United States torts regime, the standard damages award available to an owner for an action arising from a companion animal death is its fair market value. This approach implicitly assumes that pet owners are irrational, given that they generally invest more in their pets than the animal’s fair market value. This Article suggests that, based on an economic model that conceptualizes companion animals as an employee-investment hybrid, the value of a companion animal is higher than its fair market value. This model has implications for economic damages calculations in wrongful death lawsuits and for companion animal welfare.

Summary:

Many scholars have argued for and against the recovery of noneconomic damages in cases of veterinary malpractice involving companion animals. However, scholarship has not focused on the results that allowing noneconomic damages may have on the structure of companion animal veterinary practices. This Article uses the human medical field as a predictive model to explore the potential effects of granting noneconomic damages in veterinary malpractice cases. The author argues that awarding damages substantial enough to encourage increased litigation will result in significant changes in the field of veterinary medicine. Allowing for recovery of noneconomic damages will make veterinary care more expensive and will not significantly deter negligent malpractice. Individuals will pay more for veterinary care or companion animals will receive less care if high noneconomic damage awards become the norm in veterinary malpractice cases. Although these changes will affect all veterinary facilities, ironically, high quality veterinary facilities may be more likely to be sued than their lower quality counterparts. The author concludes by discussing alternatives to malpractice litigation, the human-animal bond, and the possible factors contributing to the high cost of human medicine in the United States.