Pet Damages

Resolución N° 10, 2022 - Peru

Summary: In this case, the plaintiff's mixed breed dog, named Munay, was attacked and seriously injured by the defendant's two unleashed and unmuzzled rottweilers. The defendant knew her rottweilers were considered a "potentially dangerous breed" and had documentation confirming her responsibility for them. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for her emotional suffering and related expenses, recognizing that the attack impacted her emotionally because her dog is considered part of her family under the concept of a multispecies family. The court noted that pets should not be viewed merely as property but as beings with meaningful bonds to their owners.

In this case, the plaintiff's mixed breed dog, named Munay, was attacked and seriously injured by the defendant's two unleashed and unmuzzled rottweilers. The defendant knew her rottweilers were considered a "potentially dangerous breed" and had documentation confirming her responsibility for them. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for her emotional suffering and related expenses, recognizing that the attack impacted her emotionally because her dog is considered part of her family under the concept of a multispecies family. The court noted that pets should not be viewed merely as property but as beings with meaningful bonds to their owners.

Mathis v. Crawford

Summary: Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs.

Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs.

Interlocutory Appeal No. 0059204-56.2020.8.16.0000 - Paraná, Brazil

Summary: In this case, the Justice Tribunal in Paraná, Brazil, unanimously overturned the lower court decision and ruled that two dogs, Rambo and Spike (appellants), had the legal capacity to be legal persons and, therefore, had standing to sue their owners, Pedro Rafael de Barros Escher and Elizabeth Merida Devai (Appellees) in a damages claim. Upon thorough examination of the validity of Decree-Law 24,645/1934, granting the Public Prosecutor's Office and animal protection entities the authority to act as legal representatives for animals, the court determined that the decree is an ordinary law (higher hierarchy than other laws), and was still in full force. As a result, animals in Brazil are explicitly endowed with the legal capacity to participate as parties in judicial proceedings by law. The judge referenced the 2005 case Suíça v. Gavazza, a groundbreaking decision where the chimpanzee, the subject of a Habeas Corpus, had passed away before the final judgment. The judge concluded that there is a discernible judicial trend towards accepting animals as legal persons with the ability to be a party in legal proceedings. Furthermore, the court stated that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the principle of unobstructed access to justice, which means that every holder of substantive rights can be a party in a judicial proceeding; without this ability, such principle is ineffective and pointless. The appeal was granted, and the court ordered that Rambo and Spike maintain their role as the focal points of the lawsuit, acting as plaintiffs represented by the NGO.

In this case, the Justice Tribunal in Paraná, Brazil, unanimously overturned the lower court decision and ruled that two dogs, Rambo and Spike (appellants), had the legal capacity to be legal persons and, therefore, had standing to sue their owners, Pedro Rafael de Barros Escher and Elizabeth Merida Devai (Appellees) in a damages claim. Upon thorough examination of the validity of Decree-Law 24,645/1934, granting the Public Prosecutor's Office and animal protection entities the authority to act as legal representatives for animals, the court determined that the decree is an ordinary law (higher hierarchy than other laws), and was still in full force. As a result, animals in Brazil are explicitly endowed with the legal capacity to participate as parties in judicial proceedings by law. The judge referenced the 2005 case Suíça v. Gavazza, a groundbreaking decision where the chimpanzee, the subject of a Habeas Corpus, had passed away before the final judgment. The judge concluded that there is a discernible judicial trend towards accepting animals as legal persons with the ability to be a party in legal proceedings. Furthermore, the court stated that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the principle of unobstructed access to justice, which means that every holder of substantive rights can be a party in a judicial proceeding; without this ability, such principle is ineffective and pointless. The appeal was granted, and the court ordered that Rambo and Spike maintain their role as the focal points of the lawsuit, acting as plaintiffs represented by the NGO.

Williams v. Reynolds

Summary: This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of a horse against a veterinarian that performed the castration surgery that led to the death of the horse. The trial court refused to allow a veterinarian with experience practicing in the same area and with a similar background to testify about whether he was familiar the accepted standards or to answer questions to elicit his opinion about whether defendant's treatment of the horse was unacceptable for practicing veterinarians in the area. The trial court then granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and this appeal followed. The court held that the judge erred in excluding the testimony, and reversed and remanded the case.

This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of a horse against a veterinarian that performed the castration surgery that led to the death of the horse. The trial court refused to allow a veterinarian with experience practicing in the same area and with a similar background to testify about whether he was familiar the accepted standards or to answer questions to elicit his opinion about whether defendant's treatment of the horse was unacceptable for practicing veterinarians in the area. The trial court then granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and this appeal followed. The court held that the judge erred in excluding the testimony, and reversed and remanded the case.

Milke v. Ratcliff Animal Hospital, Inc.

Summary: This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic, as well as an action for improper delay and bad faith dealing against the insurer of the veterinary clinic. Plaintiff brought this case after their 6-month old puppy died in the post-operative period following neutering surgery. Defendant veterinarian and clinic could not provide an exact cause of death, and the malpractice insurer that plaintiff was referred to denied plaintiff's malpractice claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court found that the veterinarian and clinic did not commit malpractice and the insurer did not act in bad faith, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic, as well as an action for improper delay and bad faith dealing against the insurer of the veterinary clinic. Plaintiff brought this case after their 6-month old puppy died in the post-operative period following neutering surgery. Defendant veterinarian and clinic could not provide an exact cause of death, and the malpractice insurer that plaintiff was referred to denied plaintiff's malpractice claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court found that the veterinarian and clinic did not commit malpractice and the insurer did not act in bad faith, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc.

Summary: This case was brought by the owners of two dogs that were cremated by a private pet cremation company, who allege the cremation service sent them the ashes of random dogs instead of those of their dogs. Plaintiffs allege breach of contract and several tort claims, including trespass to chattel and negligence. On this appeal, the judgement of the lower court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The plaintiffs failed to establish an implied contract between them and the pet cremation company, were granted leave to amend their breach of contract complaint against the company, the other actions for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were dismissed, and the court found that the plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for negligence.

This case was brought by the owners of two dogs that were cremated by a private pet cremation company, who allege the cremation service sent them the ashes of random dogs instead of those of their dogs. Plaintiffs allege breach of contract and several tort claims, including trespass to chattel and negligence. On this appeal, the judgement of the lower court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The plaintiffs failed to establish an implied contract between them and the pet cremation company, were granted leave to amend their breach of contract complaint against the company, the other actions for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were dismissed, and the court found that the plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for negligence.

Cardenas v. Swanson

Summary: The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case.

The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case.

Berry v. Frazier

Summary: Ryan Berry sued veterinarian Jeffery R. Frazier for damages related to the euthanasia of her cat. Berry alleged that Frazier performed the euthanasia without her informed consent, using an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection that caused a painful death for her cat and emotional distress for her. In 2019, plaintiff hired "Vetted," a service that provides home euthanasia for pets, to put down their dying cat. Vetted sent Dr. Frazier, who failed to sedate the cat with a catheter and suggested using an intracardiac injection (injecting fluid directly into the heart), claiming it was a quick and painless method. The owners agreed, but later learned that this method is generally considered inhumane and illegal in some circumstances. Plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) raised the following: (1) fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation (third cause of action); (2) breach of fiduciary duty (fourth cause of action); (3) conversion/trespass to chattels (fifth cause of action); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth cause of action); and (5) violation of section 3340 (eighth cause of action). The prayer for relief for each cause of action sought nominal damages of $1, restitution of $600 (cost of euthanasia), and punitive damages. The trial court granted Frazier's demurrer and dismissed the causes of action for fraud, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Code section 3340. Berry voluntarily dismissed the remaining cause of action, resulting in a final judgment. On the instant appeal, the appellate court looked at the fraud claim finding that the defendant intentionally misled the plaintiff about the method of euthanasia and manipulated her into giving consent for the intracardiac injection, which turned out to be an inhumane and painful procedure. The plaintiff provided specific allegations of the defendant's representations, including statements about the procedure being quick and painless. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to support a claim of fraud, and the defendant's argument that the plaintiff failed to allege legally cognizable damages was rejected. With respect to the conversion/trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, a veterinarian, obtained her consent for euthanizing her cat through fraudulent means. The plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally misled her about the procedure, resulting in the cat experiencing extreme pain. As to plaintiffs' claims of conversion/trespass to chattels and IIED, the court found that the allegations support these claims, as the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's property rights and caused severe emotional distress. The court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal of these claims and concludes that the demurrer should have been overruled. Finally, on the violation of Section 3340 (the exemplary damages statute), the court agreed with the trial court's ruling that no separate cause of action can be alleged for a violation of Section 3340. The court notes that while the statute provides for exemplary damages, it does not define "wrongful injuries" or indicate an intent to create a separate cause of action. While there is no independent cause of action under Section 3340, it can serve as a basis for seeking exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action so the plaintiff should have pleaded the request for Section 3340, providing sufficient facts to support the allegation of willful and inhumane conduct. The court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to include the request for Section 3340 exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action. Notably, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Section 3340 does not apply to veterinarians or that the plaintiff's claim only involves professional negligence. Section 3340 is broadly worded and can apply to any defendant, including veterinarians, for willful or grossly negligent conduct causing wrongful injuries to animals. The court found no basis to exclude veterinarians from the statute's coverage and notes that the defendant's argument is unsupported by relevant case law. The court has dismissed the appeals from the October 7, 2021 demurrer order, the October 7, 2021 motion to strike order, and the October 26, 2021 order dismissing the fourth cause of action without prejudice. The court has also reversed the judgment of dismissal and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court was directed to vacate the dismissal of the first amended complaint and modify the demurrer order. The plaintiff is allowed to file a second amended complaint, and the defendant is allowed to file a demurrer and motion to strike to any new amended pleading.

Ryan Berry sued veterinarian Jeffery R. Frazier for damages related to the euthanasia of her cat. Berry alleged that Frazier performed the euthanasia without her informed consent, using an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection that caused a painful death for her cat and emotional distress for her. In 2019, plaintiff hired "Vetted," a service that provides home euthanasia for pets, to put down their dying cat. Vetted sent Dr. Frazier, who failed to sedate the cat with a catheter and suggested using an intracardiac injection (injecting fluid directly into the heart), claiming it was a quick and painless method. The owners agreed, but later learned that this method is generally considered inhumane and illegal in some circumstances. Plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) raised the following: (1) fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation (third cause of action); (2) breach of fiduciary duty (fourth cause of action); (3) conversion/trespass to chattels (fifth cause of action); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth cause of action); and (5) violation of section 3340 (eighth cause of action). The prayer for relief for each cause of action sought nominal damages of $1, restitution of $600 (cost of euthanasia), and punitive damages. The trial court granted Frazier's demurrer and dismissed the causes of action for fraud, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Code section 3340. Berry voluntarily dismissed the remaining cause of action, resulting in a final judgment. On the instant appeal, the appellate court looked at the fraud claim finding that the defendant intentionally misled the plaintiff about the method of euthanasia and manipulated her into giving consent for the intracardiac injection, which turned out to be an inhumane and painful procedure. The plaintiff provided specific allegations of the defendant's representations, including statements about the procedure being quick and painless. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to support a claim of fraud, and the defendant's argument that the plaintiff failed to allege legally cognizable damages was rejected. With respect to the conversion/trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, a veterinarian, obtained her consent for euthanizing her cat through fraudulent means. The plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally misled her about the procedure, resulting in the cat experiencing extreme pain. As to plaintiffs' claims of conversion/trespass to chattels and IIED, the court found that the allegations support these claims, as the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's property rights and caused severe emotional distress. The court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal of these claims and concludes that the demurrer should have been overruled. Finally, on the violation of Section 3340 (the exemplary damages statute), the court agreed with the trial court's ruling that no separate cause of action can be alleged for a violation of Section 3340. The court notes that while the statute provides for exemplary damages, it does not define "wrongful injuries" or indicate an intent to create a separate cause of action. While there is no independent cause of action under Section 3340, it can serve as a basis for seeking exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action so the plaintiff should have pleaded the request for Section 3340, providing sufficient facts to support the allegation of willful and inhumane conduct. The court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to include the request for Section 3340 exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action. Notably, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Section 3340 does not apply to veterinarians or that the plaintiff's claim only involves professional negligence. Section 3340 is broadly worded and can apply to any defendant, including veterinarians, for willful or grossly negligent conduct causing wrongful injuries to animals. The court found no basis to exclude veterinarians from the statute's coverage and notes that the defendant's argument is unsupported by relevant case law. The court has dismissed the appeals from the October 7, 2021 demurrer order, the October 7, 2021 motion to strike order, and the October 26, 2021 order dismissing the fourth cause of action without prejudice. The court has also reversed the judgment of dismissal and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court was directed to vacate the dismissal of the first amended complaint and modify the demurrer order. The plaintiff is allowed to file a second amended complaint, and the defendant is allowed to file a demurrer and motion to strike to any new amended pleading.

Brisson v. These Guys New York Deli Corp.

Summary: The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted.

The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted.

Sentencia T-034/13

Summary: Plaintiff filed a tutela against the homeowner’s association, who changed change the apartment complex rules to prohibit pets from using the elevator. In this decision, the court held that It is not viable for homeowners’ associations to prohibit pets from using the elevators. This is because the right to free development of personality and the right to personal and family intimacy encompass the right to have a pet. Horizontal property rules may not go against current laws or violate the resident’s fundamental rights. However, there can be limitations and parameters to these rights so long as they are established to guarantee respect for the rights of others, a peaceful coexistence, and the regulations are reasonable and proportionate.

Plaintiff filed a tutela against the homeowner’s association, who changed change the apartment complex rules to prohibit pets from using the elevator. In this decision, the court held that It is not viable for homeowners’ associations to prohibit pets from using the elevators. This is because the right to free development of personality and the right to personal and family intimacy encompass the right to have a pet. Horizontal property rules may not go against current laws or violate the resident’s fundamental rights. However, there can be limitations and parameters to these rights so long as they are established to guarantee respect for the rights of others, a peaceful coexistence, and the regulations are reasonable and proportionate.