Marine Mammals

Summary: These federal statutes describe the Whaling Convention Act which granted authority to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce for regulation. The Act makes it unlawful for any person in the United States to engage in whaling, transporting, or selling any whale or whale products, that are taken or processed in violation of the Act. The Act also prohibits other unlawful conduct such as whaling without a license and failing to keep required returns, records, and reports. Finally, the Act provide penalties for violations including a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. In addition the court may prohibit such person from whaling for a period of time.

Summary: These statutes extended federal authority and responsibility over the conservation and protection of all mammals including certain species of whales. The statutes also granted the Secretary of Commerce with authority to complete a comprehensive study of all whales in an effort to conserve and protect them effectively.

Summary: On its face, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the conditions and practices of slavery and involuntary servitude wherever they may exist in this country—irrespective of the victim’s race, creed, sex, or species. In 2011, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, on behalf of five wild-captured orcas, sued SeaWorld for enslaving the orcas in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The case presented, for the first time, the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections can extend to nonhuman animals. This Article examines the lawsuit’s factual, theoretical, and strategic underpinnings, and argues that the district court’s opinion ultimately dismissing the suit failed to address the critical issues that animated this case of first impression: Who “counts” as a legal person for the purposes of law? Is it time to recognize nonhuman animals as legal persons, based on progressing scientific and normative views? What principles underlie the Thirteenth Amendment? When and how does the application of the Constitution expand? Can the meaning of the Constitution evolve to encompass the interests of nonhuman animals? Drawing on the United States Supreme Court’s long history of evolving constitutional interpretation, this Article presents four theories of constitutional change, under which the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” are expansive enough to include nonhuman animals. Despite the district court’s decision, the case can be properly viewed as the first step toward the legal recognition that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the rights of nonhuman animals to be free from bondage.

Summary: Pacific Ranger, LLC, a deep-sea commercial fishing vessel, filed suit arguing that a decision made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should be set aside by the court. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) filed an action against Pacific Ranger for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) after the vessel set its fishing net on whales during five tuna-fishing expeditions. After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Pacific Ranger had violated the MMPA and was liable for $127,000 in civil penalties. Pacific Ranger argued that these penalties should be set aside because the MMPA was unconstitutionally vague about what was considered an “incidental” taking and the ALJ’s findings could not be supported by substantial evidence. Ultimately, the court reviewed the arguments made by Pacific Ranger and found them to be without merit. First, the court determined that the MMPA was not vague with regard to incidental takings. The court held that incidental takings under the MMPA were restricted to takings that occurred without any knowledge and that this provision needed to be read narrowly in order to give effect to Congress’ intent that maintaining the “healthy populations of marine animals comes first.” The court found that because Pacific Ranger had knowledge that whales were in the area at the time that they were fishing, the taking that occurred could not be considered incidental. Lastly, the court reviewed Pacific Ranger’s argument that the ALJ’s decision could not be supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected this argument, pointing to expert testimony that said that there was no possible way for the Pacific Ranger not to have seen that whales were in the area at the time the takings occurred. As a result, the court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

Summary: Defendant was found guilty by a jury of illegally importing narwhal tusks under several federal laws, including the Lacey Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, among others. On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred by allowing and failing to cure statements by the prosecutor that allegedly violated defendant's Fifth Amendment protections. Prior to being charged, defendant met with FWS and Canadian agents where he did not proclaim his innocence when questioned on the tusks. In the process of showing inconsistency in defendant's statements, the prosecutor pointed out defendant's failure to state his innocence with the federal agents, which defendant claimed improperly burdened him at trial. Other arguments by defendant also pointed to error by the prosecution during direct examination and rebuttal argument with respect to defendant's silence during interviews with agents. The appellate court found the errors to be harmless or in response to defendant's attorney's statements. Finally, as a matter of first impression, the court found that Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) reports logging date, time, and location of border crossing and license plate of the vehicle were admissible hearsay. The convictions were affirmed.

Summary: In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the Georgia Aquarium’s application for a permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to import 18 beluga whales from Russia’s Sea of Okhotsk for public display. The Aquarium challenged the defendant National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) decision to deny a permit to import the beluga whales as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court found that defendant National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was correct in following the statutory mandate of the MMPA after it found that the Sakhalin-Amur stock of the whales is likely declining and is experiencing adverse impacts in addition to Russian live-capture operations. Further, some of the beluga whales destined for the import were potentially young enough to still be nursing and dependent upon their mothers.

Summary: The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) is the main regulatory vehicle that protects marine mammal species and their habitats in an effort to main sustainable populations. In doing so, the statute outlines prohibitions, required permits, criminal and civil penalties, and international aspects in addressing marine mammals. Included in the MMPA are provisions to protect dolphins from ocean vessels that harvest tuna with purse seine nets; provisions to protect polar bear; provisions that establish the Marine Mammal Commission and that agency's duties; and provisions for the Marine Mammal Health and Stranding Response Program, including funding for standing response and unusual mortality events. The Act's 1972 Legislative History is also included.

Summary: Under § 1383 of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq., the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI), Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC), Cetacean Society International, and Earth Island Institute hereby petition the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce, through the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), to designate Sakhalin Bay-Amur River beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas) in the Sea of Okhotsk as a “depleted” stock. As described herein, the best scientific information available indicates that these beluga whales constitute a stock that is well below its optimum sustainable population (OSP) and, under the MMPA, qualify for such designation. The evidence also suggests that the stock continues to decline and faces a number of risk factors, providing additional impetus for such designation.

Summary: Utilizing a research exception granted under the international moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission, Japanese whalers have been harvesting endangered whales in the Southern Ocean. The anti-whaling activist group, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, also operates in the Southern Ocean by locating Japanese whaling vessels in order to bring an immediate halt to all whaling activities, often employing violent tactics designed to injure whaling vessels and property. Sea Shepherd operates under an apparent mandate of the United Nations World Charter for Nature allowing individuals to “[i]mplement the applicable international legal provisions for the conservation of nature and the protection of the environment.” The multitude of vague international conventions and treaties governing the Southern Ocean have therefore created a tangled and confusing web of authority where both Japanese whalers and Sea Shepherd have arguable claims of operating under legitimate legal mandates. In this note, Alana Preston argues that individual countries should enforce their domestic laws to prevent the Japanese from whaling, so private entities, like Sea Shepherd, will not.

Summary: After the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Sea Shepherd moved to dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling regarding Sea Shepherd’s own actions in the Antarctic. Sea Shepherd claimed that because the Institute had announced that it would not engage in whaling in the 2014-15 season, its claim was moot. This argument, though, ignored the fact the Institute also stated that it plans to resume whaling in the future, leading the Court to dismiss the motion.