Impound or Animal Control

Wolff v. State

Summary: This Indiana case addresses the status of animals seized in conjunction with a criminal animal cruelty case. Specifically, the appeal addresses whether the trial court erred in granting a local animal rescue the authority to determine disposition of the seized animals. The animals were seized after county authorities received complaints of animal cruelty and neglect on defendant's property in late 2016. As a result of the charges, five horses, two mules, and two miniature donkeys were impounded and placed with a local animal rescue. Following this, the state filed a notice with the court that estimated costs of continuing care for the impounded animals. About a month later, the state filed an Amended Motion to Determine Forfeiture/Disposition of Animals, requesting the trial court issue an order terminating defendant's ownership rights in the animals. Alternatively, the state requested that defendant could seek to have his posted bond money apportioned to cover the costs associated with the animals' care. The court ultimately entered an order that allowed the rescue agency full authority to determine disposition of the animals after defendant failed to respond. In his current appeal of this order, defendant first claims that the trial court erred in giving the animal rescue such authority because defendant paid $20,000 in bail. The appellate court found that this money was used to secure defendant's release from jail and he did not request that the jail bond be used for the care of the animals. The court found that the legislature clearly intended the bail and bond funds are used for "separate and distinct purposes," so there was no way for the trial court to automatically apply this money to the animal care costs. Defendant had to affirmatively exercise his rights concerning the disposition of the animals pending trial, which he failed to do. As to defendant's other issue concerning an investigation and report by a state veterinarian, the appellate court found defendant waived this issue prior to appeal. The decision was affirmed.

This Indiana case addresses the status of animals seized in conjunction with a criminal animal cruelty case. Specifically, the appeal addresses whether the trial court erred in granting a local animal rescue the authority to determine disposition of the seized animals. The animals were seized after county authorities received complaints of animal cruelty and neglect on defendant's property in late 2016. As a result of the charges, five horses, two mules, and two miniature donkeys were impounded and placed with a local animal rescue. Following this, the state filed a notice with the court that estimated costs of continuing care for the impounded animals. About a month later, the state filed an Amended Motion to Determine Forfeiture/Disposition of Animals, requesting the trial court issue an order terminating defendant's ownership rights in the animals. Alternatively, the state requested that defendant could seek to have his posted bond money apportioned to cover the costs associated with the animals' care. The court ultimately entered an order that allowed the rescue agency full authority to determine disposition of the animals after defendant failed to respond. In his current appeal of this order, defendant first claims that the trial court erred in giving the animal rescue such authority because defendant paid $20,000 in bail. The appellate court found that this money was used to secure defendant's release from jail and he did not request that the jail bond be used for the care of the animals. The court found that the legislature clearly intended the bail and bond funds are used for "separate and distinct purposes," so there was no way for the trial court to automatically apply this money to the animal care costs. Defendant had to affirmatively exercise his rights concerning the disposition of the animals pending trial, which he failed to do. As to defendant's other issue concerning an investigation and report by a state veterinarian, the appellate court found defendant waived this issue prior to appeal. The decision was affirmed.

Haggblom v. City of Dillingham

Summary: This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order.

This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order.

AL - Animal Shelters - § 3-10-1 to § 3-10-5

Summary: This statute defines an animal shelter and describes a monthly report that each animal shelter must compile. Among other things, contents of the report include number of strays, adoptions, health-related issues, and costs incurred by the shelter. This report must be made available to the public, though a reasonable fee is appropriate. There is no cause of action created by this statute.

This statute defines an animal shelter and describes a monthly report that each animal shelter must compile. Among other things, contents of the report include number of strays, adoptions, health-related issues, and costs incurred by the shelter. This report must be made available to the public, though a reasonable fee is appropriate. There is no cause of action created by this statute.

Looking for a Good Home: Balancing Interests in the Disposition of Impounded Animals to Owners and Rescues

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Summary: This Article explores the scope of governmental authority to interfere with or terminate the property rights of pet owners in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness. Part I sets out the regulatory framework for local animal control programs, describing the process for handling and disposing of stray animals and the provisions designed to help reunite owners with their pets. Part II then turns to the issue of post-redemption ownership, discussing the recognized reach of the law and its limitations as well as the cases that have contemplated termination of an owner’s rights to a pet. Part III explores the policy reasons that support a clear demarcation of when ownership of an unclaimed, impounded animal should be established in the government, making possible a clear transfer of title from a public shelter to an adopter or transferee, and Part IV suggests means by which a local government might increase the possibility of reuniting an owner with a pet within the appropriate timeframe to avoid the conflicts created by late-redeeming owners.

This Article explores the scope of governmental authority to interfere with or terminate the property rights of pet owners in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness. Part I sets out the regulatory framework for local animal control programs, describing the process for handling and disposing of stray animals and the provisions designed to help reunite owners with their pets. Part II then turns to the issue of post-redemption ownership, discussing the recognized reach of the law and its limitations as well as the cases that have contemplated termination of an owner’s rights to a pet. Part III explores the policy reasons that support a clear demarcation of when ownership of an unclaimed, impounded animal should be established in the government, making possible a clear transfer of title from a public shelter to an adopter or transferee, and Part IV suggests means by which a local government might increase the possibility of reuniting an owner with a pet within the appropriate timeframe to avoid the conflicts created by late-redeeming owners.

State Holding Period Laws for Impounded Animals

Summary:

Holding period laws are state requirements that determine how long an impounded animal must be “held” before it is able to be released or euthanized. Typically, these laws give owners anywhere between three and ten days to redeem the animal before the animal can be placed for adoption, sold, or euthanized. The majority of states require a holding period of three to five days. In all of the states with holding laws, the decision of what happens to the animal after the holding period has passed is left solely up to the animal shelter or organization that has impounded the animal.

Holding period laws are state requirements that determine how long an impounded animal must be “held” before it is able to be released or euthanized. Typically, these laws give owners anywhere between three and ten days to redeem the animal before the animal can be placed for adoption, sold, or euthanized. The majority of states require a holding period of three to five days. In all of the states with holding laws, the decision of what happens to the animal after the holding period has passed is left solely up to the animal shelter or organization that has impounded the animal.

NC - Animal Shelters - § 153A-442. Animal shelters

Summary: This North Carolina statute authorizes counties within the state to establish, maintain, and appropriate available funding for animal shelters. The statute also describes the standards that animal shelters in the county should meet.

This North Carolina statute authorizes counties within the state to establish, maintain, and appropriate available funding for animal shelters. The statute also describes the standards that animal shelters in the county should meet.

Mouton v. State

Summary:

San Antonio Animal Care Services (ACS) responded to a call about 36 pit bull terriers that were chained, significantly underweight, and dehydrated. The dogs also had scarring consistent with fighting. Police obtained a search warrant and coordinated with ACS to seize the dogs. While the dogs were being secured, Appellant Terrence Mouton arrived at the residence. He told the officers that he had been living at the residence for a couple of weeks, but that he did not own all of the dogs and was holding them for someone else. Mouton was convicted in the County Court of cruelty to non livestock animals. On appeal, Mouton argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the Appellee, the State of Texas, failed to prove that the animals were in his custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mouton was responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs on his property and that the dogs were subject to his care and control, regardless of whether he was the actual owner of each animal. A reasonable jury could have also found that Mouton was “aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that he failed to provide proper nutrition, water, or shelter for the dogs.

San Antonio Animal Care Services (ACS) responded to a call about 36 pit bull terriers that were chained, significantly underweight, and dehydrated. The dogs also had scarring consistent with fighting. Police obtained a search warrant and coordinated with ACS to seize the dogs. While the dogs were being secured, Appellant Terrence Mouton arrived at the residence. He told the officers that he had been living at the residence for a couple of weeks, but that he did not own all of the dogs and was holding them for someone else. Mouton was convicted in the County Court of cruelty to non livestock animals. On appeal, Mouton argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the Appellee, the State of Texas, failed to prove that the animals were in his custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mouton was responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs on his property and that the dogs were subject to his care and control, regardless of whether he was the actual owner of each animal. A reasonable jury could have also found that Mouton was “aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that he failed to provide proper nutrition, water, or shelter for the dogs.

People v. Meadows

Summary:

Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied.

Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied.

MD - Animal Shelters - Subtitle 17. Animal Shelters

Summary: This chapter effective October 1, 2016 states that the intent is to enhance animal shelter services by promoting humane animal sheltering policies and strengthening community safety. Before January 1, 2017, an animal shelter shall establish a written veterinary care protocol for dogs and cats that is consistent with guidelines set forth in the most recent Association of Shelter Veterinarians' Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters. That same date, an animal shelter must post on the animal shelter's Web site or in a conspicuous location within the animal shelter's facility a written protocol for reclaiming animals from the animal shelter that includes the minimum holding period for stray animals, the hours of operation, the fees for reclaiming an animal, and the documentation/identification required for reclaiming. Violation of this subtitle results in a civil penalty of $500.

This chapter effective October 1, 2016 states that the intent is to enhance animal shelter services by promoting humane animal sheltering policies and strengthening community safety. Before January 1, 2017, an animal shelter shall establish a written veterinary care protocol for dogs and cats that is consistent with guidelines set forth in the most recent Association of Shelter Veterinarians' Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters. That same date, an animal shelter must post on the animal shelter's Web site or in a conspicuous location within the animal shelter's facility a written protocol for reclaiming animals from the animal shelter that includes the minimum holding period for stray animals, the hours of operation, the fees for reclaiming an animal, and the documentation/identification required for reclaiming. Violation of this subtitle results in a civil penalty of $500.

Hardrick v. City of Detroit

Summary: In January of 2005, the Detroit City Council passed an ordinance granting special police powers to officers working in the Animal Control Division (ACD). The ordinance allowed ACD officers to have “the right of entry without a warrant” for the purpose of capturing or restraining any animal. Detroit residents filed a petition arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the court granted a petition for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment. Following the injunction a number of residents filed suit seeking damages against the City of Detroit arguing that the City improperly seized their pets and failed to provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Lastly, the residents argued that the City operated its animal shelter in a “grossly negligent manner” after numerous dogs suffered severe illnesses after having been taken to the shelter for quarantine by the ACD. The court reviewed the testimonies of the individual residents who claimed that their pets had been improperly seized and determined that the seizures of the pets were “objectionably reasonable.” In order to determine whether the seizures were “objectionably reasonable” the court stated that it “must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake by analyzing the totality of the circumstances.” Ultimately, the court found that it was reasonable for the officers to have seize the pets in each situation based on the facts presented and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit. Finally, the court reviewed the residents’ arguments pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment and held that because the vast majority of the pets were found “unrestrained, unlicensed, abandoned by their owner, or accused of biting another animal or human,” the City’s interest in protecting the public was far greater than any “pre-seizure due process owed to the plaintiffs.” As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. With regard to the residents’ claim about the state of the City’s animal shelter, the court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the claim.

In January of 2005, the Detroit City Council passed an ordinance granting special police powers to officers working in the Animal Control Division (ACD). The ordinance allowed ACD officers to have “the right of entry without a warrant” for the purpose of capturing or restraining any animal. Detroit residents filed a petition arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the court granted a petition for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment. Following the injunction a number of residents filed suit seeking damages against the City of Detroit arguing that the City improperly seized their pets and failed to provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Lastly, the residents argued that the City operated its animal shelter in a “grossly negligent manner” after numerous dogs suffered severe illnesses after having been taken to the shelter for quarantine by the ACD. The court reviewed the testimonies of the individual residents who claimed that their pets had been improperly seized and determined that the seizures of the pets were “objectionably reasonable.” In order to determine whether the seizures were “objectionably reasonable” the court stated that it “must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake by analyzing the totality of the circumstances.” Ultimately, the court found that it was reasonable for the officers to have seize the pets in each situation based on the facts presented and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit. Finally, the court reviewed the residents’ arguments pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment and held that because the vast majority of the pets were found “unrestrained, unlicensed, abandoned by their owner, or accused of biting another animal or human,” the City’s interest in protecting the public was far greater than any “pre-seizure due process owed to the plaintiffs.” As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. With regard to the residents’ claim about the state of the City’s animal shelter, the court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the claim.