Impound or Animal Control

AK - Dogs - Title 3. Agriculture and Animals. Chapter 55. Dogs.

Summary: This collection reflects Alaska's dog laws. The primary dog laws give permission to kill dangerous dogs that are running at large or those that are chasing livestock. It also defines a dangerous dog - "Any dog which when unprovoked has ever bitten or attacked a human being is considered vicious . . ." Notably, "[a]ny person may lawfully kill any vicious or mad dog running at large." This section also allows a village council of an unincorporated village to destroy loose dogs in the village or otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. Other laws concern the state dog and harming police dogs.

This collection reflects Alaska's dog laws. The primary dog laws give permission to kill dangerous dogs that are running at large or those that are chasing livestock. It also defines a dangerous dog - "Any dog which when unprovoked has ever bitten or attacked a human being is considered vicious . . ." Notably, "[a]ny person may lawfully kill any vicious or mad dog running at large." This section also allows a village council of an unincorporated village to destroy loose dogs in the village or otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. Other laws concern the state dog and harming police dogs.

AK - Ordinances - § 03.55.070. Power of village council to control dogs

Summary: This Alaska statute enables a village council the power to destroy loose dogs in the village and otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. The council may impose and enforce the provisions of a dog control ordinance in the total area within 20 miles of the village.

This Alaska statute enables a village council the power to destroy loose dogs in the village and otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. The council may impose and enforce the provisions of a dog control ordinance in the total area within 20 miles of the village.

Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 96: Sections 1879-1886

Summary:

Sections 1879-1886 of Chapter 96 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers in general the Humane Society for Connecticut.  Specifically, the sections cover the following topics: the powers of an agent from the society, the definition of an animal, and funding of the society.

Sections 1879-1886 of Chapter 96 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers in general the Humane Society for Connecticut.  Specifically, the sections cover the following topics: the powers of an agent from the society, the definition of an animal, and funding of the society.

In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon

Summary: This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order."

This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order."

Animal Legal Defense Fund, Wake County, A North Carolina Body Politic and Kelli Ferris, D.V.M., Plaintiffs v. Janie Conyers, Def

Summary: Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Wake County Animal Care, Control, and Adoption Center and the local chapter of the ALDF. They seek preliminary and permanent injunctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Secs. 19A-1 through 19A-4 against Defendant Janie Conyers, who was found to have 106 animals living in her house under deplorable conditions. Specifically, plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant from acquiring any animals for 10 years after entry of judgment in this action. Plaintiffs also moved for an order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 19A-4 terminating all possessory interests in the animals seized and awarding custody and possessory rights to the ALDF. Most of the animals suffer from severe chronic oral and skin conditions due to neglect. Included in the documents are affidavits from veterinary professionals and the director of Wake County Animal, Care, Control, and Adoption Center concerning both the conditions of the animals seized and the estimated costs of care for those animals during the pendency of the litigation.

Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Wake County Animal Care, Control, and Adoption Center and the local chapter of the ALDF. They seek preliminary and permanent injunctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Secs. 19A-1 through 19A-4 against Defendant Janie Conyers, who was found to have 106 animals living in her house under deplorable conditions. Specifically, plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant from acquiring any animals for 10 years after entry of judgment in this action. Plaintiffs also moved for an order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 19A-4 terminating all possessory interests in the animals seized and awarding custody and possessory rights to the ALDF. Most of the animals suffer from severe chronic oral and skin conditions due to neglect. Included in the documents are affidavits from veterinary professionals and the director of Wake County Animal, Care, Control, and Adoption Center concerning both the conditions of the animals seized and the estimated costs of care for those animals during the pendency of the litigation.

Malane Wilson v. City of St. Louis; Dian K. Sharma, Health Commissioner, City of St. Louis Department of Health and Hospitals; R

Summary: This action concerns the release of a dog who was impounded and classified as “dangerous” without a chance for his owner to argue against the action. Plaintiff Malane Wilson filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction, a petition for declaratory judgment, and a petition for replevin against the City of St. Louis and the Animal Regulation Center, among others. The subject of the petitions concerned her American Pit Bull Terrier named Max who was seized by agents of the Animal Regulation Center as an apparent “dangerous dog.” Plaintiff contends that Max’s alleged actions in killing the neighbor’s dog did not qualify under the St. Louis City Ordinance as a “dangerous dog.” Further, plaintiff was not given any legal or administrative hearing once her dog was seized, contrary to due process requirements. She also sought in her declaratory petition to have the ordinance declared illegal, void, and unconstitutional for its failure to adequately define “dangerous dog” and “potentially dangerous dog.” The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction was not granted. Thus, the City was enjoined from killing or otherwise harming Max. They were also ordered to release Max, remove his “dangerous” designation, and have him instead classified as “potentially dangerous.” The plaintiff was required to comply with enclosure and other safety requirements for Max.

This action concerns the release of a dog who was impounded and classified as “dangerous” without a chance for his owner to argue against the action. Plaintiff Malane Wilson filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction, a petition for declaratory judgment, and a petition for replevin against the City of St. Louis and the Animal Regulation Center, among others. The subject of the petitions concerned her American Pit Bull Terrier named Max who was seized by agents of the Animal Regulation Center as an apparent “dangerous dog.” Plaintiff contends that Max’s alleged actions in killing the neighbor’s dog did not qualify under the St. Louis City Ordinance as a “dangerous dog.” Further, plaintiff was not given any legal or administrative hearing once her dog was seized, contrary to due process requirements. She also sought in her declaratory petition to have the ordinance declared illegal, void, and unconstitutional for its failure to adequately define “dangerous dog” and “potentially dangerous dog.” The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction was not granted. Thus, the City was enjoined from killing or otherwise harming Max. They were also ordered to release Max, remove his “dangerous” designation, and have him instead classified as “potentially dangerous.” The plaintiff was required to comply with enclosure and other safety requirements for Max.

Putnam County Humane Society v. Marjorie Duso d/b/a/ Oakwood Kennels, Putnam County Florida

Summary:

The Putnam County (Florida) Humane Society brought an action seeking permanent custody of 41 dogs from Marjorie Duso, the operator of a kennel. The PCHS is a not-for-profit corporation that is devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals pursuant to Florida law. Under that authority, the PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The Putnam County Court granted the PCHS custody of the dogs (except for Ms. Duso’s personal pet dog, which the PCHS was given the right to check on at least once a month). Further, the court enjoined Ms. Duso from owning, possessing, or breeding dogs except those kept as personal pets.

The Putnam County (Florida) Humane Society brought an action seeking permanent custody of 41 dogs from Marjorie Duso, the operator of a kennel. The PCHS is a not-for-profit corporation that is devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals pursuant to Florida law. Under that authority, the PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The Putnam County Court granted the PCHS custody of the dogs (except for Ms. Duso’s personal pet dog, which the PCHS was given the right to check on at least once a month). Further, the court enjoined Ms. Duso from owning, possessing, or breeding dogs except those kept as personal pets.

Larry Ciaccio, Appellant v. City of Port St. Lucie Animal Control Department, Appellee

Summary:

The following documents concern the appellant's request to release his dog from the Port St. Lucie, Florida Humane Society. At the time of the petition, the dog was kept in a "quarantine" area of the shelter and had not been let out of his cage for exercise or socialization since he was seized 8 months prior. Appellant asks the court to either let him securely confine the dog at his home or board him at the Safe Harbor Animal Sanctuary until the dangerous dog determination is resolved.

The following documents concern the appellant's request to release his dog from the Port St. Lucie, Florida Humane Society. At the time of the petition, the dog was kept in a "quarantine" area of the shelter and had not been let out of his cage for exercise or socialization since he was seized 8 months prior. Appellant asks the court to either let him securely confine the dog at his home or board him at the Safe Harbor Animal Sanctuary until the dangerous dog determination is resolved.

Maldonado v. Fontanes

Summary:

This case was initially brought after two successive raids on public housing complexes, within ten days of the Municipality of Barceloneta assuming control of the public housing complexes from the Puerto Rico Public Housing Administration on October 1, 2007. Prior to the raid, the residents, mostly Spanish-speakers, were given notice of the new "no pet policy," which were written in English. During the raids, plaintiffs' pets were seized and then killed by either being slammed against the side of a van or thrown off a 50-foot bridge. This First Circuit affirmed the denial of the Mayor's motion for qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. However, it reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the Mayor as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims and ordered those claims dismissed. Included in the pleading documents are plaintiffs' second amended complaint filed in 2007 and plaintiffs' brief filed in December 2008.

This case was initially brought after two successive raids on public housing complexes, within ten days of the Municipality of Barceloneta assuming control of the public housing complexes from the Puerto Rico Public Housing Administration on October 1, 2007. Prior to the raid, the residents, mostly Spanish-speakers, were given notice of the new "no pet policy," which were written in English. During the raids, plaintiffs' pets were seized and then killed by either being slammed against the side of a van or thrown off a 50-foot bridge. This First Circuit affirmed the denial of the Mayor's motion for qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. However, it reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the Mayor as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims and ordered those claims dismissed. Included in the pleading documents are plaintiffs' second amended complaint filed in 2007 and plaintiffs' brief filed in December 2008.