Humane Slaughter

Summary: Several non-profit organizations, including Farm Sanctuary and Animal Legal Defense Fund, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) challenging their actions related to the slaughtering of pigs under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs alleged three causes of action related to the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of downed pigs, violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, and arbitrary and capricious denial of a Petition for Rulemaking. The plaintiffs in this case filed two causes of action against the defendants. The first cause of action claimed a violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failing to investigate and report on downed pigs to Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs submitted a petition to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory pigs, which was denied by the defendants who claimed that their existing regulations and inspection procedures are sufficient in ensuring humane treatment and preventing diseased animals from entering the food supply. The plaintiffs requested the court to issue a declaration finding the violation and to compel the defendants to conduct an investigation and report to Congress. The second cause of action alleged a violation of the HMSA and APA for failing to assess the need for regulations regarding the humane treatment of downed pigs and to promulgate such regulations. The plaintiffs requested similar relief as in the first cause of action. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Complete the Administrative Record, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing at the summary judgment stage, despite a previous ruling during the motion to dismiss stage. Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's actions, and (3) the likelihood that the injury can be remedied. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue both causes of action because they had not been injured by the defendants' alleged failures, and any relief ordered by the court would not redress their injuries. Regarding the informational injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that it was sufficiently concrete to meet the requirements of Article III. The court also stated that seeking to ensure compliance with regulatory law was not sufficient grounds for standing. The potential availability of a report through the Freedom of Information Act was considered too attenuated to establish a concrete informational injury. Regarding the organizational injury, the court referred to a recent Second Circuit decision that rejected an expansive concept of organizational injury for standing purposes. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been forced to spend resources investigating and reporting on downed pigs, which they argue was the responsibility of the USDA. However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to engage in these activities and had not been required to do so by the USDA. The court explained that an organization must show an involuntary material burden on its established core activities, and the challenged law or regulation must impose a cost that adversely affects the organization's regular activities pursued in its organizational mission. Expenditures or activities undertaken by the organization's own initiative, without being reasonably necessary to continue established core activities, were insufficient to establish injury for standing purposes. The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a perceptible impairment to their activities caused by the defendants' actions, and the expenditures incurred by the plaintiffs were not reasonably necessary to continue their established core activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact for standing purposes based on organizational injury. Even assuming the plaintiffs had standing, they failed to establish that defendants violated the HMSA and the APA by failing to investigate and report to Congress on downed pigs. The defendants argue that they complied with Congress's mandates and that some obligations are not judicially reviewable, to which the court agreed. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendants violated the FMSA by failing to investigate and report on downed pigs as required by Section 1907(a). However, the court found that Section 1907 does not mandate that the Secretary investigate each and every species of livestock, and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting that reading of the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the sufficiency of the reports was not enough to succeed on an APA claim because they did not establish that the defendants failed to take a discrete agency action that they were required to take. As a result, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action. Additionally, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment because the relevant statute does not require them to regulate the slaughter of downed pigs, and therefore, the decision is discretionary. The plaintiffs did not provide a response to this argument, and their failure to advocate for their second cause of action is likely due to the absence of any statutory requirement that Defendants ban the slaughter of downed pigs. The court examined the relevant statute, which provides that the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment of non-ambulatory livestock if necessary. The court concluded that the statute grants discretion to the Secretary to determine whether to promulgate such regulations and that agency decisions not to take enforcement action are unreviewable. Thus, the court concluded that the defendants' actions were not arbitrary or capricious. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Complete the Administrative Record was granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice and their Motion for Summary Judgment were denied; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Summary: This law regulates the humane slaughter or anesthesia of farm, domestic, and wildlife animals. It contains detailed guidelines about methods allowed depending on the species and how to handle animals prior to slaughter or euthanasia procedures. For instance, this law mandates that all farm animals and wild animals slaughtered for human consumption are stunned, while companion animals must be sedated before euthanasia. It also contains provisions on emergency killing protocols for all species. Some prohibited methods include the use of substances that induce muscular paralysis without causing loss of consciousness and that cause death by suffocation, and the use of potassium chloride in any form to cause the death of animals since its administration causes severe pain and anxiety, followed by diastolic cardiac arrest in the conscious individual. However, its use is allowed on mega vertebrates, as long as the animal is under anesthesia and a veterinarian verifies this. Inducing hypothermia or using electricity for stunning, anesthesia, killing, and euthanasia of all reptiles is also prohibited. In addition, it is prohibited to kill rodents, lagomorphs, and small mammals by hypothermia and/or freezing, chest compression, strangulation, drowning, or other mechanical suffocation methods. Finally, it is prohibited to use trapping methods to kill wildlife.

Summary: The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, 1960, regulates slaughterhouses where ten or more animals are slaughtered in a single day. Animals may not be slaughtered in slaughterhouses that are not recognized or licensed. Animals that are pregnant, or have offspring less than three months old, or are less than three years months old, or which have not been certified by a veterinary doctor as being in a fit condition, may not be slaughtered. The Rules prescribe conditions for welfare of animals that shall be slaughtered, as well as standards of hygiene that are to be followed by the slaughterhouse.

Summary: Animals raised for food or food production in the United States are, in large part, excluded from legal protection against cruelty. This article describes the minimal state and federal laws relating to such animals and documents numerous recent amendments to state anticruelty statutes that have placed the definition of cruelty to farm animals in the hands of the farming community. Mr. Wolfson argues that these amendments contradict the historical purpose of anticruelty statutes originally enacted to protect farm animals. The article also contrasts this regressive legal development with progressive European legislation. Finally, Mr. Wolfson outlines a path for reform.

Summary: Modern industrial animal agriculture and consumer purchasing patterns do not match consumers' moral preferences regarding animal welfare. Current production methods inflict a great deal of harm on animals despite widespread consumer preference for meat, dairy, and eggs that come from humanely treated animals. Judging by the premium pricing and market shares of food products with moral or special labels (e.g., 'cage-free," 'free range,' and 'organic'), many consumers are willing to pay more for less harmful products, but they are unable to determine which products match this preference. The labels placed on animal products, and the insufficient government oversight of these labels, are significant factors in consumer ignorance because producers are allowed to use misleading labels and thwart consumers from aligning their preferences with their purchases. Producers are allowed to label their goods as friendly to animals or the environment without taking action to conform to those claims. Meanwhile, producers who do invest resources into more humane or environmentally-conscious production methods are competing with companies that do not make similar expenditures. Those companies can sell their products at a lower price without sacrificing profits, which prices-out producers who do invest resources. This Article proposes a new labeling regime in which animal products feature labels that adequately inform consumers of agricultural practices so that consumers can match their purchases with their moral preferences. In this proposed scheme, animal products would contain a label that concisely and objectively informs consumers what practices went into the making of that item. Such a scheme would enable consumers who wish to pay more for humane or environmentally-friendly products to do so, while rewarding those companies who actually do engage in better production methods. While the legal literature discussing food labeling and animal welfare is growing, most of the literature proposes legal definitions of terms like 'humane,' expansion of consumer protection law, or labeling systems in which third-parties provide grading or ranking systems for producers of animal products. This Article rejects those proposals as inadequate to sufficiently inform consumers and instead suggests providing consumers with a list of select practices producers engage in.

Summary: Decreto 206/2001 created the The National Program of Organic Production (PRONAO), which is under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing and Food of the Ministry of Economy. The purpose of this program is to promote the production and trade of organic production in Argentina. Specifically, Chapter VII of this decreto regulates animal production. Article 13. Reads: “Organic livestock should develop a harmonious relationship between land, plants and livestock, and respect the physiological and behavioral needs of animals." Animals produced under these organic standards must meet animal welfare guidelines. This program advises to use alternative practices to mutilations such as tail-docking, debeaking, tooth and wing trimming. It specifically states that this practices are not recommended as a concurrent practice.

Summary: This law contains the provisions for the procedures for the slaughter of animals. More specifically the slaughter of animals of the bovine, equine, ovine, porcine and caprine species. However, Article 2 establishes that executive power may extend these provisions to the slaughter of birds, rabbits, and other minor species. Slaughterhouses and meat packing plants in Argentina must comply with the desensitization requirements and procedures established by the executive power. This law prohibits the use of the clubs in slaughtering. The veterinary inspection services of the national and of the provincial or municipal administrations are the control entities for the compliance of this law. The Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock is the entity that imposes sanctions to establishments subject to national veterinary inspection and those that violate these provisions.

Summary: This decreto establishes the technical rules that frame the system of inspections, supervision and controls over meat processed for human consumption. These health requirements must be met at every step of the chain, from primary production to marketplaces. Article 31, lays out the requirements for the antemortem and postmortem inspection of animals in slaughterhouses. Numeral 3 of this article establishes that slaughter methods must be humane. According to this article, animals must be slaughtered through non-cruel methods. Animals have to be appropriately stunned before being slaughtered. Slaughter must be done following correct techniques, avoiding unnecessary risks for the operator and suffering of the animal. The methods utilized must be authorized by the National Institute for Drug and Food Supervision (INVIMA). This article establishes ritual religions as the only exception to humane slaughter. This process must be supervised and approved by the Invima.

Summary: Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. These exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regard to this law.

Summary: This law lays out the general rules that are the basis for “the provisions and regulations necessary to preserve, restore and improve sanitary conditions in relation to human health. It also contains the procedures and measures that must be adopted for the regulation, legalization and control of the discharges of waste and materials that affect or may affect the sanitary conditions of the Environment.” In its Article 307, Ley 9 establishes that the slaughter of animals for human consumption can only be done in authorized slaughterhouses.