Historical

In re Kulka's Estate

Summary:

This action relates to a court order in an estate case.  The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals."  The executor refused to pay the legacy.  This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands.  The court affirmed the payment of the legacy.

This action relates to a court order in an estate case.  The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals."  The executor refused to pay the legacy.  This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands.  The court affirmed the payment of the legacy.

State v. Goodall

Summary:

This case involved an appeal from this conviction. The trial court found that the defendant rode the animal while it had a deep ulcerated cut on its back, and supplied it with insufficient food. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

This case involved an appeal from this conviction. The trial court found that the defendant rode the animal while it had a deep ulcerated cut on its back, and supplied it with insufficient food. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

Balch v. Newberry

Summary:

In this Oklahoma case, plaintiff purchased a pointer dog for a payment of $800 cash, whom he purchased for breeding purposes. Plaintiff alleged, that for several years prior to March 24, 1947, defendant was engaged in the business of breeding and selling thoroughbred pointer bird dogs at Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that plaintiff had for many years been engaged in the business of operating kennels. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff, the court held that the purchase of a dog with the knowledge of the seller that it is bought exclusively for breeding purposes gives rise to a warranty of fitness for such purpose where the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment that the dog is fit for such purpose. Where a sale of highly bred stud dog for breeding purposes is rescinded for breach of an implied warranty, because of sterility, the purchaser can recover what he paid under the contract and expenses necessarily incident to caring for the dog but he cannot, in addition, recover damages for the breach of the implied warranty of the dog's usefulness for breeding purposes.

In this Oklahoma case, plaintiff purchased a pointer dog for a payment of $800 cash, whom he purchased for breeding purposes. Plaintiff alleged, that for several years prior to March 24, 1947, defendant was engaged in the business of breeding and selling thoroughbred pointer bird dogs at Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that plaintiff had for many years been engaged in the business of operating kennels. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff, the court held that the purchase of a dog with the knowledge of the seller that it is bought exclusively for breeding purposes gives rise to a warranty of fitness for such purpose where the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment that the dog is fit for such purpose. Where a sale of highly bred stud dog for breeding purposes is rescinded for breach of an implied warranty, because of sterility, the purchaser can recover what he paid under the contract and expenses necessarily incident to caring for the dog but he cannot, in addition, recover damages for the breach of the implied warranty of the dog's usefulness for breeding purposes.

State v. Weekly

Summary:

The court affirmed a conviction for stealing a dog by holding that it was a "thing of value" despite the traditional common law rule to the contrary and even though it was not taxable property.

The court affirmed a conviction for stealing a dog by holding that it was a "thing of value" despite the traditional common law rule to the contrary and even though it was not taxable property.

People v. Bootman

Summary:

This is one of the first cases to construe the issue of interstate commerce with regard to state game laws and the Lacey Act.  Defendant purchased game birds that were killed outside of New York and brought them into the state when it was lawful to possess them.  The court stated it was required by the rule of stare decisis to hold that the Legislature did not intend to make criminal the possession during the closed season of game killed and brought here during the open season.  The court notes that the passage of the New York legislation occurred three months before the passage of the Lacey, thus having no effect.  The court does go on to note the Legislature has now made it clear that it is well within state police power to regulate wildlife.

This is one of the first cases to construe the issue of interstate commerce with regard to state game laws and the Lacey Act.  Defendant purchased game birds that were killed outside of New York and brought them into the state when it was lawful to possess them.  The court stated it was required by the rule of stare decisis to hold that the Legislature did not intend to make criminal the possession during the closed season of game killed and brought here during the open season.  The court notes that the passage of the New York legislation occurred three months before the passage of the Lacey, thus having no effect.  The court does go on to note the Legislature has now made it clear that it is well within state police power to regulate wildlife.

People v. Koogan

Summary:

Defendant was guilty of cruelty to animals for allowing a horse to be worked he knew was in poor condition.

Defendant was guilty of cruelty to animals for allowing a horse to be worked he knew was in poor condition.

Barrett v. State

Summary:

This case concerns a New York law that protected beavers and their habitat in New York by stating that no one "shall molest or disturb any wild beaver or the dams, houses, homes or abiding places of same."  The claimants owned land that endured considerable commercial destruction due to the beavers that were present.  Claimants were initially awarded damages and alleged on appeal that the law represented an unconstitutional exercise of police power and, that, since the beavers were "owned" by the state at the time of the destruction, the state is liable for the damage.  The Court disagreed, finding the ownership of wildlife is in the state in its sovereign capacity, for the benefit of all the people.  As a result, the state was acting in its proper police power authority and is not liable for the damage that ensued from "liberating" the beaver.

This case concerns a New York law that protected beavers and their habitat in New York by stating that no one "shall molest or disturb any wild beaver or the dams, houses, homes or abiding places of same."  The claimants owned land that endured considerable commercial destruction due to the beavers that were present.  Claimants were initially awarded damages and alleged on appeal that the law represented an unconstitutional exercise of police power and, that, since the beavers were "owned" by the state at the time of the destruction, the state is liable for the damage.  The Court disagreed, finding the ownership of wildlife is in the state in its sovereign capacity, for the benefit of all the people.  As a result, the state was acting in its proper police power authority and is not liable for the damage that ensued from "liberating" the beaver.

Missouri v. Holland

Summary:

This was a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.  While the court recognized the states' province to act in traditional matters of fish and game, the migratory nature of wild birds makes them the proper subject of treaty.  As noted by the Court, "[t]he subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein."  The Court found the treaty was a proper exercise of constitutional authority where a national interest was implicated (i.e., "the protectors of our forests and our crops") and could only be protected by national action in concert with another power.

This was a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.  While the court recognized the states' province to act in traditional matters of fish and game, the migratory nature of wild birds makes them the proper subject of treaty.  As noted by the Court, "[t]he subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein."  The Court found the treaty was a proper exercise of constitutional authority where a national interest was implicated (i.e., "the protectors of our forests and our crops") and could only be protected by national action in concert with another power.