Genetic Engineering

Summary: Selective breeding and genetic engineering of domestic animals represent two of science's most manipulative advancements of the last century. One of the many questions raised by these procedures is whether the suffering produced violates state anti-cruelty laws. California's animal anti-cruelty statute is one of the most comprehensive and progressive in the country. This article examines whether selective breeding and genetic engineering violate California's anti-cruelty statute, highlighting recent California case law interpreting these statutes and outlining the standard to determine when a violation has occurred. Furthermore, the article seeks to articulate policy suggestions to further the protection afforded these animals affected by science.

Summary: Mr. McGovern discusses the reasoning behind the leap from patentability of non-living things to the living things within the last twenty years. He concludes that neither the Supreme Court or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has offered a convincing rationale for the inclusion of living things within 35 U.S.C. Section 101.

Summary: Mr. McGovern discusses the reasoning behind the leap from patentability of non-living things to the living things within the last twenty years. He concludes that neither the Supreme Court or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has offered a convincing rationale for the inclusion of living things within 35 U.S.C. Section 101.

Summary: This article discusses federal policy towards animal patenting, including the Senator's introduction of legislation to establish a National Ethics Advisory Board, and current issues in bioethics.

Summary:

One year ago, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed approval of the first genetically engineered (GE or transgenic) animal for food production—a salmon engineered to grow much faster than normal using genetic material from an ocean pout. Faced with concerns from scientists and the public that these “super” salmon will escape into the wild and be the final blow to wild salmon, proponents crafted a scheme that is half Michael Crichton, half Kurt Vonnegut: The engineered salmon eggs will begin life in a lab on a frozen Canadian island, then be airlifted to a guarded Panamanian fortress, where they will grow in inland tanks. After the fish reach maturity, the company will ship them back to the U.S. and sell them in grocery stores, likely without any labeling. Unfortunately, this is not a bad science fiction novel. How did we get to this juncture, the brink of this approval? This Essay is a snapshot of GE animals through the lens of the first one proposed for commercial approval.

Summary: What makes each of us, as individuals, human to one another, or, more generally, what makes an individual creature human? We have not often had to ask the question because of the species line based on reproductive capacity and incapacity, although “degrees of humanness” were explored in the various eugenic programs of the last century. Now the biotechnological possibility of fusing human and other forms of life is presenting the question in a new and serious way. If the traditional biological means of defining species are no longer reliable, what other criteria might determine what is “human” and what is “nonhuman”? The issue is not just how to conceive of an individual hybrid presented to us, but how to act toward the creature, at the most basic level. Drawing on animal law and theory as well as the history of human eugenics in law and policy, Vining identifies criteria that may one day be used to gauge relative humanness, qualitative and quantitative. He observes that ultimately the difficulty of deciding or agreeing upon what identifies us as human will make even more problematic the current treatment of creatures deemed purely “animal.” In the end he suggests that what the human distinctively brings to the sentient world is general responsibility itself, and that wider contemplation of the real possibility of human-animal hybridization may lead to new ways of thinking about animals, in law and beyond. Human Identity was presented recently as a talk to a longstanding interdisciplinary faculty seminar at the University of Michigan. It is presented largely in its original form here, with footnotes added.

Summary: The following Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act sections lists which transgenic and non-native organisms are either restricted or prohibited in the state of Michigan. In addition to listing a species as prohibited or restricted, the statute also grants authority to the Commission of Natural Resources (for all species except insects or plants) and to the Commission of Agriculture (for insect and plant species only) to add or delete an organism from either list. The statute also provides exceptions—with qualifications—to possessing a restricted or prohibited species; provisions in which a person can introduce a prohibited or restricted species; and circumstances in which a person is not considered to be in possession of a restricted or prohibited species.

Summary: The Patent Act governs the law of patents in the United States. Currently, the Patent and Trademark Office functions to issue patents, for which genetically engineered animal species may legally be patented in the United States.

Summary: This case establishes the relative inability of third parties to challenge the veracity of an existing patent for genetically engineered animals.  Judicial review is rare in such cases because third party plaintiffs, under the Administrative Procedures Act, lack standing to challenge the Patent and Trademark Office's interpretation of existing law.