Fur or Trapping

Center for Biological Diversity v. Little

Summary: This case was brought by plaintiffs to challenge an Idaho law that authorizes wolf trapping and snaring in grizzly bear habitat. Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of this trapping activity will lead to the unlawful taking of grizzly bears, in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the state's authorization of trapping in these areas until the state obtains an incidental take permit from the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The court found that there was ample evidence to show that that lawfully set wolf traps and snares are reasonably likely to take grizzly bears in Idaho. However, the court did not find sufficient evidence to show that trapping needs to be banned year round to protect grizzly bears in the state. Accordingly the court granted the injunction, but limited it to the period when grizzly bears are reasonably certain to be out of their dens.

This case was brought by plaintiffs to challenge an Idaho law that authorizes wolf trapping and snaring in grizzly bear habitat. Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of this trapping activity will lead to the unlawful taking of grizzly bears, in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the state's authorization of trapping in these areas until the state obtains an incidental take permit from the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The court found that there was ample evidence to show that that lawfully set wolf traps and snares are reasonably likely to take grizzly bears in Idaho. However, the court did not find sufficient evidence to show that trapping needs to be banned year round to protect grizzly bears in the state. Accordingly the court granted the injunction, but limited it to the period when grizzly bears are reasonably certain to be out of their dens.

Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana

Summary: This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, and raised questions on the merits and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, slthough defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring.

This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, and raised questions on the merits and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, slthough defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring.

Liddle v. Clark

Summary: In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

UK - Wildlife - The Humane Trapping Standards Regulations 2019

Summary: These Regulations amend the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 in order to implement requirements contained in the agreement on international humane trapping standards concluded between the European Community, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation. They introduce a prohibition on using or setting in position any trap or snare for the purpose of killing or taking the Stoat or the European Beaver. The prohibitions in section 11(2)(a) and (b) (as revised) (relating to using or setting in position a trap or snare) do not apply in relation to any animal specified in Schedule 6ZA where the use or setting of the trap is under and in accordance with a Government issued license.

These Regulations amend the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 in order to implement requirements contained in the agreement on international humane trapping standards concluded between the European Community, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation. They introduce a prohibition on using or setting in position any trap or snare for the purpose of killing or taking the Stoat or the European Beaver. The prohibitions in section 11(2)(a) and (b) (as revised) (relating to using or setting in position a trap or snare) do not apply in relation to any animal specified in Schedule 6ZA where the use or setting of the trap is under and in accordance with a Government issued license.

VT - Trapping - § 4254c. Notice of trapping; dog or cat

Summary: This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat.

This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat.

NC - Foxes- 113-291.4. Regulation of foxes; study of fox and fur-bearer populations

Summary: This statute controls the taking of foxes and the various acceptable methods for doing so. Foxes may be taken with dogs year-round. Foxes are only allowed to be taken by a firearm under certain exceptions and they are not allowed to be taken by any electronic calling device. The statute further states that the Wildlife Resources Commission is directed to study foxes and fur-bearer populations and that subject to the findings from those studies the Commission may open a season if it finds that fox populations in a particular area are adequate to support a harvesting of that population. Lawful methods for taking game animals apply to taking foxes when an open season is declared. The Commission must implement a system of tagging foxes and fox furs with a special tag. No foxes or furs may be sold without a tag. The Commission is also authorized to declare a closed season if it finds that hunting foxes with dogs causes a harmful affect on turkey restoration projects. The Commission also has the authority to establish reasonable population control measures if a contagious animal disease is found in a local fox population.

This statute controls the taking of foxes and the various acceptable methods for doing so. Foxes may be taken with dogs year-round. Foxes are only allowed to be taken by a firearm under certain exceptions and they are not allowed to be taken by any electronic calling device. The statute further states that the Wildlife Resources Commission is directed to study foxes and fur-bearer populations and that subject to the findings from those studies the Commission may open a season if it finds that fox populations in a particular area are adequate to support a harvesting of that population. Lawful methods for taking game animals apply to taking foxes when an open season is declared. The Commission must implement a system of tagging foxes and fox furs with a special tag. No foxes or furs may be sold without a tag. The Commission is also authorized to declare a closed season if it finds that hunting foxes with dogs causes a harmful affect on turkey restoration projects. The Commission also has the authority to establish reasonable population control measures if a contagious animal disease is found in a local fox population.

Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service

Summary: Plaintiffs sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and its related entities on the grounds that they failed to comply with environmental and regulatory procedures in the administration and implementation of a federal export program that allows certain animal pelts and parts to be exported from the United States pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”). Defendant-Intervenors intervened, and now seek to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Plaintiffs have not joined and cannot join as indispensable parties certain states and Native American tribes. The court held that because the states and tribes are not “required” under Rule 19(a), dismissal is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered that that Defendant-Intervenors' motion be DENIED.

Plaintiffs sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and its related entities on the grounds that they failed to comply with environmental and regulatory procedures in the administration and implementation of a federal export program that allows certain animal pelts and parts to be exported from the United States pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”). Defendant-Intervenors intervened, and now seek to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Plaintiffs have not joined and cannot join as indispensable parties certain states and Native American tribes. The court held that because the states and tribes are not “required” under Rule 19(a), dismissal is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered that that Defendant-Intervenors' motion be DENIED.

Eureka Township v. Petter

Summary: In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed.

In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed.

Eastern Band of Cherokee - Natural resources - Sec. 14-10.10- Cutting timber, removing rock, trapping animals

Summary:

This statute is intended to preserve natural resources and protect wild animals from any trapping conducted without the knowledge of a property owner or the Tribe. The language provides for both land owner through a tribal assignment or lease, as well as lands that are reserved and used exclusively by the Tribe. The language also restricts any person, firm, or corporation from engaging in this conduct without consent and knowledge from the land owner and/or the Tribe.

This statute is intended to preserve natural resources and protect wild animals from any trapping conducted without the knowledge of a property owner or the Tribe. The language provides for both land owner through a tribal assignment or lease, as well as lands that are reserved and used exclusively by the Tribe. The language also restricts any person, firm, or corporation from engaging in this conduct without consent and knowledge from the land owner and/or the Tribe.