Farming or Food Production

Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross

Summary: This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim.

This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture

Summary: Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied.

Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied.

From Factory Farming to A Sustainable Food System: A Legislative Approach

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Summary: This Article explores the true costs of widespread industrialized agricultural practices in the United States (“U.S.”), particularly the most egregious of those practices—concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”). For nearly a hundred years, the United States has used federal policy and taxpayer dollars to support agricultural practices focused on high yields and cheap animal-based protein. As a result, the United States is reaping a harvest of toxicity: drinking water contaminated with cancer-causing nitrates and cyanobacteria, untreated animal sewage flooding across watersheds and adulterating crops, and dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico and the Chesapeake Bay that cost state fishing and tourism industries hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenues. Society picks up the true cost of “cheap meat” while industrialized agriculture thrives in a seemingly endless stream of federal support. It is long past time for a change. This Article proposes legislation that would leverage the power of the federal government to promote sustainable agricultural practices to reduce and eventually reverse the devastating health, economic, and environmental impacts of industrialized agricultural production.

This Article explores the true costs of widespread industrialized agricultural practices in the United States (“U.S.”), particularly the most egregious of those practices—concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”). For nearly a hundred years, the United States has used federal policy and taxpayer dollars to support agricultural practices focused on high yields and cheap animal-based protein. As a result, the United States is reaping a harvest of toxicity: drinking water contaminated with cancer-causing nitrates and cyanobacteria, untreated animal sewage flooding across watersheds and adulterating crops, and dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico and the Chesapeake Bay that cost state fishing and tourism industries hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenues. Society picks up the true cost of “cheap meat” while industrialized agriculture thrives in a seemingly endless stream of federal support. It is long past time for a change. This Article proposes legislation that would leverage the power of the federal government to promote sustainable agricultural practices to reduce and eventually reverse the devastating health, economic, and environmental impacts of industrialized agricultural production.

Brief Summary of Wildlife Services

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Summary: This summary describes the role and function of Wildlife Services within the USDA. It describes management practices, both lethal and non-lethal as well as the concerns that have been raised with respect to WS methods.

This summary describes the role and function of Wildlife Services within the USDA. It describes management practices, both lethal and non-lethal as well as the concerns that have been raised with respect to WS methods.

Overview of Wildlife Services

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Summary: This overview describes the role and function of Wildlife Services within the USDA. It briefly outlines the creation of the agency as the body that administers the Animal Damage Act of 1931. The document then outlines the methods of control of livestock, including lethal and non-lethal methods. Concern over two particular methods of wildlife control - "denning" and use of M-44 cyanide capsules - are included and how animal welfare organizations have responded to the controversy. Finally, the paper concludes with a description of the progress several counties in California have made to control damage by wildlife without resorting to WS policy and control methods.

This overview describes the role and function of Wildlife Services within the USDA. It briefly outlines the creation of the agency as the body that administers the Animal Damage Act of 1931. The document then outlines the methods of control of livestock, including lethal and non-lethal methods. Concern over two particular methods of wildlife control - "denning" and use of M-44 cyanide capsules - are included and how animal welfare organizations have responded to the controversy. Finally, the paper concludes with a description of the progress several counties in California have made to control damage by wildlife without resorting to WS policy and control methods.

Farm Sanctuary v. USDA

Summary: Seven organizations dedicated to protecting the animals, people, and environments that suffer due to industrial animal agriculture filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging its decision to reduce oversight at pig slaughterhouses and eliminate limits on the slaughter speeds.

Seven organizations dedicated to protecting the animals, people, and environments that suffer due to industrial animal agriculture filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging its decision to reduce oversight at pig slaughterhouses and eliminate limits on the slaughter speeds.

Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y et. al. v. USDA et. al.

Summary: Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) in 1966 to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities, for exhibition purposes, or for use as pets were provided humane care and treatment. Initially the definition of the word “animal” excluded birds according to the USDA. In 2002, Congress amended the AWA to make it known that birds were to be protected as well. The USDA promised to publish a proposed rule for public comment once it determined how to best regulate birds and adopt appropriate standards. Eighteen years later, the USDA has yet to issue any standards regarding birds. The American Anti-Vivisection Society and the Avian Welfare Coalition sued to compel the USDA to either issue bird-specific standards or to apply its general standards to birds. These animal-rights groups argued that the USDA’s utter failure to promulgate any bird specific standards amounted to arbitrary and capricious agency action. Their second argument was that USDA unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed action. The district court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim to which the animal-rights groups appealed. The Court of Appeals found that the AWA, when it was amended in 2002, required the USDA to issue standards governing the humane treatment, not of animals generally, but of animals as a defined category of creatures including birds not bred for use in research. The USDA failed to take “discrete action” issuing standards to protect birds that the AWA requires it to take. The Court ultimately affirmed the district court as to the arbitrary and capricious claim but reversed and remanded as to the unreasonable delay claim to determine whether the issuance of bird-specific standards has been unreasonably delayed.

Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) in 1966 to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities, for exhibition purposes, or for use as pets were provided humane care and treatment. Initially the definition of the word “animal” excluded birds according to the USDA. In 2002, Congress amended the AWA to make it known that birds were to be protected as well. The USDA promised to publish a proposed rule for public comment once it determined how to best regulate birds and adopt appropriate standards. Eighteen years later, the USDA has yet to issue any standards regarding birds. The American Anti-Vivisection Society and the Avian Welfare Coalition sued to compel the USDA to either issue bird-specific standards or to apply its general standards to birds. These animal-rights groups argued that the USDA’s utter failure to promulgate any bird specific standards amounted to arbitrary and capricious agency action. Their second argument was that USDA unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed action. The district court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim to which the animal-rights groups appealed. The Court of Appeals found that the AWA, when it was amended in 2002, required the USDA to issue standards governing the humane treatment, not of animals generally, but of animals as a defined category of creatures including birds not bred for use in research. The USDA failed to take “discrete action” issuing standards to protect birds that the AWA requires it to take. The Court ultimately affirmed the district court as to the arbitrary and capricious claim but reversed and remanded as to the unreasonable delay claim to determine whether the issuance of bird-specific standards has been unreasonably delayed.

CA - Food service - § 114259.4 Food service employees handling or caring for animals on premises

Summary: California's Health Code specifies that employees working in the food industry are only allowed to handle or care for their service animals or fish/shellfish/crustaceans in display tanks if they wash their hands. Outside of this they are not to handle other animals that may be present.

California's Health Code specifies that employees working in the food industry are only allowed to handle or care for their service animals or fish/shellfish/crustaceans in display tanks if they wash their hands. Outside of this they are not to handle other animals that may be present.

FEEDLOTS—RURAL AMERICA’S SEWER

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Summary: Over one billion tons of animal waste is produced each year in the United States by animal feedlot operations (AFOs). In 1995 alone, 63.5 million gallons of manure spilled from AFOs. Manure spills poison rivers, lakes, and ponds, seep into groundwater, causing fishkills, human disease, and death. The United States Environmental Protection Agency, reports that AFOs are a primary factor in the impairment of forty percent of the nation's waterways. Despite these conditions, there are no federal standards for the storage, application, or management of animal waste. This Comment evaluates the existing regulation of AFOs under the Clean Water Act and proposes that new regulations and stricter enforcement of the current NPDES program are necessary to protect public and environmental health from manure contamination.

Over one billion tons of animal waste is produced each year in the United States by animal feedlot operations (AFOs). In 1995 alone, 63.5 million gallons of manure spilled from AFOs. Manure spills poison rivers, lakes, and ponds, seep into groundwater, causing fishkills, human disease, and death. The United States Environmental Protection Agency, reports that AFOs are a primary factor in the impairment of forty percent of the nation's waterways. Despite these conditions, there are no federal standards for the storage, application, or management of animal waste. This Comment evaluates the existing regulation of AFOs under the Clean Water Act and proposes that new regulations and stricter enforcement of the current NPDES program are necessary to protect public and environmental health from manure contamination.