Equine Issues

Summary: This suit was filed after Grey and Johansson entered into a disagreement about who was the rightful owner of Johansson’s late wife’s horse, Navy. Grey was Johansson’s lawyer and was left responsible for caring for and handling all sales regarding her horses after her death. Grey filed suit for fraud and defamation against Johansson after he publicly referred to Grey as a “horse stealer.” Ultimately, the court held that Grey did not produce enough to evidence to establish a case for either fraud or defamation against Johanasson. Although Johanasson did call Grey a “horse stealer,” the court found that this comment was protected by judicial privilege.

Summary: This Nevada law prohibits any unauthorized person from doing certain acts with regard to wild horses such as removing them from public lands, harassing wild horses, or using aircraft or a motor vehicle to hunt wild horses (among other listed actions). Violation is a gross misdemeanor. A person who willfully and maliciously kills a wild horse is guilty of a category C felony.

Summary: Defendant was convicted of convicted of two counts of mistreatment of a livestock animal in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 54–903(2) (Reissue 2010) and four counts of neglect of a livestock animal in violation of § 54–903(1). Defendant owned and maintained a herd of over 100 horses in Burt County, Nebraska. After receiving complaints, the local sheriff's office investigated the herd. An expert veterinarian witness at trial testified that approximately 30% of the herd scored very low on the scale measuring a horse's condition and there were several deceased horses found with the herd. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support several of his convictions. Specifically, defendant challenged whether the state proved causation and intent under the statute. The court found that the prosecution proved through testimony that defendant caused the death of the horses subject to two of the convictions. With regard to intent, the court found that the evidence showed it would have taken weeks or month for a horse to reach to the low levels on the scale. The court found that defendant was aware of the declining condition of the herd over a significant amount of time, and failed to adequately feed, water, or provide necessary care to his horses. The convictions were affirmed.

Summary: The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot.

Summary: Finding the number of horses too high to maintain ecological balance and sustain multipurpose land use in Colorado's White River Resource Area, the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) invoked its authority under the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”), to declare those horses to be “excess animals” and scheduled to remove them from the land. Plaintiffs—organizations challenged BLM's “excess” determinations and its decision to remove these horses. They asked the district court to enjoin BLM's planned gather. Because the Wild Horses Act authorized BLM's excess determination and BLM appeared to have used reasonable methods to estimate the total wild-horse population, the Court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their Wild Horses Act claims. And because the record reflected that BLM considered the cumulative effects of the proposed gather and permissibly relied on the Environmental Assessment written for a previous East Douglas HMA gather, the Court found that Plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail on their National Environmental Policy Act claims. The Court further found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the gather and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of BLM. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

Summary: Plaintiff Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (Association) appealed the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Association claimed that Defendant New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) had unlawfully treated a group of undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses near Placitas, New Mexico as “livestock” and “estray,” rather than as “wild horses” under the Livestock Code. The Appeals Court concluded that “livestock” did not include undomesticated, unowned animals, including undomesticated and unowned horses; therefore, undomesticated, unowned horses could not be “estray.” The court also concluded that the Board had to DNA test and relocate the Placitas horses, and that the Association pleaded sufficient facts in its complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Summary: Horseracing industry participants must be held accountable for the wellbeing of retired racehorses. In Part I of this article, I explore the historic role of the horse in American society, and explain how “unwanted horses” become neglected, abused, abandoned, or shipped across U.S. borders to be slaughtered. In Part II, I address the unique susceptibility of thoroughbred racehorses to becoming unwanted horses, and how the wealth and glamour associated with horseracing serves to mask the problem. In Part III, I outline the legislation pertaining to horseracing, arguing that it does not adequately ensure the welfare of ex-racehorses. In Part IV, I explain that the burden for caring for these horses falls to under-funded private horse Rescue/Adoption/Retraining facilities (hereinafter “RAR facilities”). In Parts V and VI, I employ a loss-spreading rationale and the reasoning behind the “special relationship” doctrine, contending that the cost of providing adequate funds to RAR facilities should be imposed on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries (hereinafter “PFBs”) of the horseracing industry. In Part VII, I argue that this financial burden should be placed on PFBs in the form of “Participation Fees” proportional to the PFB’s level of investment in the industry. In Part VIII, I contend that this mandate could be carried out by either private state racing associations, the National Thoroughbred Racing Association, state governments, or the federal government. In Part IX, I further explore the logistics of implementing such a scheme.

Summary: This New Jersey law relates to liens on those who keep horses. The law states that every keeper of a livery stable or boarding and exchange stable shall have a lien on all animals left in livery, for board, sale or exchange (and upon all carriages, wagons, sleighs and harness left for storage, sale or exchange) for the amount due for the board and keep of such animal. The keeper has the right, without process of law, to retain the same until the amount of such indebtedness is discharged. Note that the law states “keeper of a livery stable” shall include, but need not be limited to, a proprietor of a stable, a trainer, a veterinarian, a farrier, or any other person who has a financial relationship with the owner of the horse.

Summary: This Louisiana law comprises the state's veterinary lien law, which relates only to services provided on horses. Any person who furnishes feed or medicines for a horse or horses, or any licensed veterinarian who furnishes medical services for a horse or horses, to or upon the order of the owner, has a privilege for the unpaid portion of the price thereof upon the horse or horses of the owner, which received the feed, medicine, or medical services.

Summary: This California law allows an officer or employee of a local animal control agency to remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto private land at the request of the landowner. Such officer can also remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto a public roadway to ensure public safety.