Endangered Species

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Austin

Summary: Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims.

Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell

Summary: In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency.

In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency.

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y

Summary: After the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Sea Shepherd moved to dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling regarding Sea Shepherd’s own actions in the Antarctic. Sea Shepherd claimed that because the Institute had announced that it would not engage in whaling in the 2014-15 season, its claim was moot. This argument, though, ignored the fact the Institute also stated that it plans to resume whaling in the future, leading the Court to dismiss the motion.

After the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Sea Shepherd moved to dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling regarding Sea Shepherd’s own actions in the Antarctic. Sea Shepherd claimed that because the Institute had announced that it would not engage in whaling in the 2014-15 season, its claim was moot. This argument, though, ignored the fact the Institute also stated that it plans to resume whaling in the future, leading the Court to dismiss the motion.

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc.

Summary: After the Institute was denied an injunction in the trial court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction preventing Sea Shepherd from attacking any of the Institute’s vessels in any way and from coming within 500 yards of any Institute vessel operating in the open sea.

After the Institute was denied an injunction in the trial court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction preventing Sea Shepherd from attacking any of the Institute’s vessels in any way and from coming within 500 yards of any Institute vessel operating in the open sea.

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc.

Summary: The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission.

The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission.

Detailed Discussion on Whaling

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Summary: Much of today's discussions about whaling are centered on Japan's program in the Antarctic. While some organizations like Sea Shepherd have taken a direct action approach to ending Japan's hunt, some organizations and countries have pursued legal approaches to doing so. Both approaches have seen some success, but the future of whaling remains uncertain.

Much of today's discussions about whaling are centered on Japan's program in the Antarctic. While some organizations like Sea Shepherd have taken a direct action approach to ending Japan's hunt, some organizations and countries have pursued legal approaches to doing so. Both approaches have seen some success, but the future of whaling remains uncertain.

Overview of Whaling

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Summary: In 2010, Australia sued Japan at the International Court of Justice in an effort to force Japan to end its whaling program in the Antarctic. Though commercial whaling was banned in the 1980s, Japan claimed that its program was for scientific purposes and therefore legal. The ICJ sided with Australia, but its ruling left open the possibility that Japan could resume whaling in the future.

In 2010, Australia sued Japan at the International Court of Justice in an effort to force Japan to end its whaling program in the Antarctic. Though commercial whaling was banned in the 1980s, Japan claimed that its program was for scientific purposes and therefore legal. The ICJ sided with Australia, but its ruling left open the possibility that Japan could resume whaling in the future.

AU - Wildlife Protection- Queensland Nature Conservation Act 1992

Summary: The object of this Act is the conservation of nature.The conservation of nature is to be achieved by an integrated and comprehensive conservation strategy for the whole of Queensland that involves, among other things, the following— (a) Gathering of information and community education; (b) Dedication and declaration of protected areas; (c) Management of protected areas;(d) Protection of native wildlife and its habitat; (e) Use of protected wildlife and areas to be ecologically sustainable; (f) Recognition of interest of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in nature and their cooperative involvement in its conservation; and (g) Cooperative involvement of land-holders.This Act is to be administered, as far as practicable, in consultation with, and having regard to the views and interests of, land-holders and interested groups and persons, including Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.

The object of this Act is the conservation of nature.The conservation of nature is to be achieved by an integrated and comprehensive conservation strategy for the whole of Queensland that involves, among other things, the following— (a) Gathering of information and community education; (b) Dedication and declaration of protected areas; (c) Management of protected areas;(d) Protection of native wildlife and its habitat; (e) Use of protected wildlife and areas to be ecologically sustainable; (f) Recognition of interest of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in nature and their cooperative involvement in its conservation; and (g) Cooperative involvement of land-holders.This Act is to be administered, as far as practicable, in consultation with, and having regard to the views and interests of, land-holders and interested groups and persons, including Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.

Animal Welfare Institute v. BP America, INC

Summary: This complaint is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2)(A), to bring an immediate halt to defendants’ actions that are killing endangered and threatened sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico as part of defendants’ efforts to contain the catastrophic oil spill that has occurred at defendants’ Deepwater Horizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico. In this complaint, several animal rights organizations allege, in an effort to contain the oil spill by burning the oil, defendants are also corralling and burning alive endangered and threatened sea turtles without a permit from the Department of Commerce, in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). A motion for temporary restraining order is also included.

This complaint is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2)(A), to bring an immediate halt to defendants’ actions that are killing endangered and threatened sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico as part of defendants’ efforts to contain the catastrophic oil spill that has occurred at defendants’ Deepwater Horizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico. In this complaint, several animal rights organizations allege, in an effort to contain the oil spill by burning the oil, defendants are also corralling and burning alive endangered and threatened sea turtles without a permit from the Department of Commerce, in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). A motion for temporary restraining order is also included.