Disability and Animals

Summary: Living with a disability can make finding a home a difficult task. Discrimination against the use of a service or assistive animal in lease agreements is a hurdle to finding a home for persons with disabilities. This discrimination is particularly pronounced when the individual suffers from a mental or emotional disability, because these disabilities are “invisible.” Because these disabilities are invisible, landlords are often reluctant to make reasonable accommodations in lease agreements to further the use of service and assistive animals in the treatment of mental illnesses or other disabilities, as required by the Fair Housing Act. This Article considers the requirements the Fair Housing Act imposes on landlords to make reasonable accommodations to their no-pets policies in order to facilitate the use of service and assistive animals. This Article begins with a look at the history of the Fair Housing Act and then analyzes different courts’ approaches to interpreting the Fair Housing Act in relation to maintaining a service or assistive animal. This Article concludes with suggested model legislation that would further the policy considerations behind the Fair Housing Act and make finding a home easier for people with disabilities.

Summary: This Minnesota statute describes the level of care required for pets who live in institutional facilities with their owners.

Summary: This Minnesota statute states that animal nursing homes must be "reasonable" in their care, type, and maintenance of pets.

Summary:

In this case, the United States Government brought an action against Kent State University alleging that the University’s failure to have any policy in place that would allow for the University to consider emotional support animals violated the Fair Housing Act. The parties resolved their differences in the form of a consent decree and asked the court to approve the decree. The court approved the consent decree but suggested that the parties make a few additions to the decree. The first suggestion that the court made was to specify what type of qualifications were necessary to make someone a “qualified third-party” for the purpose of making a statement to the University about an individuals need for an emotional support animal. Secondly, the court suggested that the University begin reviewing the logistics of how the University would manage having animals in its housing and how the animals would be properly cared for. Lastly, the court urged the University to look at whether or not the University offered sufficient break times between classes so that a student would have enough time to check on the animal and ensure that the animal was not neglected on a routine basis.

Summary:

In this case, Kennedy House appealed the lower court’s decision in finding that it had violated Section 9–1108 of the Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance when it denied Jan Rubin’s request for a housing accommodation in the form of a waiver of its no-dog policy. Rubin applied for a housing accommodation at Kennedy House because she suffered from multiple physical aliments. In a meeting with Kennedy House, Rubin did state that her dog was not a trained service animal that helped with her physical and mobility issues but rather helped with reminding her to take medication and getting out of bed. The lower court determined that Rubin had satisfied her burden of proving that her dog was necessary in helping with her medical issues. After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that the lower court had erred in its decisions. Ultimately, the court found that because Ms. Rubin's physician described a disability related to her mobility, and there was no evidence establishing a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal, Ms. Rubin did not meet her burden necessary for Kennedy House to waive its no-dog policy. As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s decision.

Summary: This statute allows any party at a judicial proceeding to protect a victim or witness under the age of 18 from severe emotional or mental harm due to the presence of the defendant. With respect to facility dogs, the law states that the court may set any other conditions it finds just and appropriate, including the use of a service or therapy animal that has been evaluated and registered according to national standards, in any proceeding involving a sexual offense. When deciding whether to permit a child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness to testify with the assistance of a registered service or therapy animal, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the age of the child victim or witness; (2) the age of the sexual offense victim or witness at the time the sexual offense occurred; (3) the interests of the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness; (4) the rights of the parties to the litigation; and (5) any other relevant factor that would facilitate the testimony by the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness.

Summary: This statute deals with the use of certified facility dogs for child witnesses and vulnerable witnesses (a person testifying in a criminal hearing or trial who has an intellectual and developmental disability or has a significant impairment in cognitive functioning acquired as a direct consequence of a brain injury or resulting from a progressively deteriorating neurological condition, including without limitation Alzheimer's disease or dementia). In order to qualify as a certified facility dog, a dog must graduate from an assistance dog organization after receiving at least 2 years of training and passing the same public service access test as a service dog.

Summary: Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court.

Summary: The defendant, Michael Jacobs, was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and corrupting another minor with drugs, receiving a prison sentence of four years. The victim testified with a “companion dog” at her feet. Among other assignments of error, Jacobs argued that he was denied his right to a fair trial because of the presence of the companion dog during the victim’s testimony. The child was under 15 at the time of the alleged abuse, but 17 years old when she testified. The Ohio appellate court concluded that the use of a companion dog in such a case was a matter of first impression in the state, though other comfort items, such as teddy bears had previously been used in similar situations in Ohio courts. To the defense’s objection that the witness was no longer under 15 at the time of her testimony, the appellate court stated that the defense had “failed to offer any authority to support the proposition that there is a certain age cut-off for the use of special procedures on behalf of alleged sexual abuse victims.” The court concluded that Ohio Evidence Rule 611(A), which provides that a trial court is to exercise “reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses…” and to “protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment,” was sufficiently flexible to allow the use of the dog during the trial. Having overruled all of Jacobs' assignments of error, the court affirmed the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.

Summary: This Illinois law allows a "facility dog" - a dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization that is a member of Assistance Dogs International - to be present during the testimony of a victim who is a child or a moderately, severely, or profoundly intellectually disabled person or a person affected by a developmental disability. This occurs in the prosecution of criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse. When deciding whether to permit the child or person to testify with the assistance of a facility dog, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child or person, the rights of the parties to the litigation, and any other relevant factor that would facilitate the testimony by the child or the person.