Dangerous Dog

Summary:

This table covers state laws that address dangerous dogs. These laws typically define when a dog is dangerous, the legal procedure that determines whether a dog is dangerous, conditions for owning a dangerous dog, euthanasia provisions, and penalties for the owner (and the dog). Currently, 42 states have dangerous dog codes.

Summary: The following District of Columbia statute prohibits dogs that the owner knows to be fierce or dangerous, to the danger or annoyance of the inhabitants, from running at large; it also prohibits female dogs in heat to run at large.

Summary: Plaintiff agreed to watch a couple’s dog while they were out of town. While plaintiff was caring for the dog, the animal bit her on her lower lip. Plaintiff filed a claim with the couple's insurance company. The insurance company rejected the claim because the plaintiff was also "insured," defined to include “any person ... legally responsible” for covered animals, and the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries to "insureds." Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment against the insurance company, seeking a determination that the policy covered her claim. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, and the district court sustained the insurance company's motion, reasoning that plaintiff was “legally responsible” for the dog because she fed and watered the animal and let it out of the house while the couple was away. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed and held the insurance company was entitled to summary judgment.

Summary: A woman filed a complaint with the Bonney Lake animal control authority after her neighbor’s dog killed her cat. The animal control officer served plaintiff with paperwork stating that his dog satisfied the definition of a dangerous dog under the Bonney Lake Municipal Code because the dog had killed a domestic animal without provocation while off his owner's property. Plaintiff appealed the designation to the police chief, the city hearing examiner, and the superior court; all of which affirmed the designation. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, held that the hearing examiner's finding that the owner's dog killed the neighbor's cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold a dangerous dog designation, even though the “location” element of the dangerous dog designation was satisfied. The dangerous dog designation was therefore reversed.

Summary: This document provides of summary of the "Responsible Dog Ownership Law" (RDOA) of Georgia, signed into law by Governor Deal in 2012.

Summary: An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents.

Summary: The following article provides a general overview of the most common parts of a Dangerous Dog Statute, including common points of litigation, criticism, and emerging trends.

Summary: After a dog bite incident, the village of Glenview declared plaintiff's dog "vicious." Plaintiff's dog escaped from his mandated enclosure and was impounded by animal control. Plaintiff moved the Circuit Court of Cook County to enter an order transferring ownership of the dog and limiting impoundment fees. The order also asks the court to void the vicious dog determination and to declare section 365 of the Animal Control Act unconstitutional. This document also includes defendant's answer.

Summary: In their reply brief, Appellants argue respondents' reliance on Simpson v. City of Los Angeles is misplaced. They also argued due process protection applies to all property and that respondents' claims are unsubstantiated.

Summary: In this petition for a rehearing, respondents argued that the appellate court's decision (Phillips v. Department, 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986)) misstates crucial facts concerning the operation of the subject ordinance; that hearings required under the Atascadero ordinances apply to all dogs, not just strays; and that the appellate court may have been misled in its decision to conclude that no notice had been required.