Breeding or Puppy Mills

Detailed Discussion of Commercial Breeders and Puppy Mills

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Summary: This paper gives an overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States, beginning with a discussion of the industry’s various market forms, including brick and mortar pet stores, Internet websites, and foreign breeders. The paper then examines the underlying federal law and administrative regulations that provide minimum care standards for certain breeders. What follows is information on various state laws and recent legislation, including an examination of the increasing prevalence of local laws that address the puppy mill industry. The paper then explains the enforcement of puppy mill laws, which is criticized as insufficient to address the problem, and concludes with the observation that local laws and consumer education appear to be the most feasible solutions to combatting the prevalence of commercial breeding.

This paper gives an overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States, beginning with a discussion of the industry’s various market forms, including brick and mortar pet stores, Internet websites, and foreign breeders. The paper then examines the underlying federal law and administrative regulations that provide minimum care standards for certain breeders. What follows is information on various state laws and recent legislation, including an examination of the increasing prevalence of local laws that address the puppy mill industry. The paper then explains the enforcement of puppy mill laws, which is criticized as insufficient to address the problem, and concludes with the observation that local laws and consumer education appear to be the most feasible solutions to combatting the prevalence of commercial breeding.

N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y.

Summary:

In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.

In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.

CA - Pet Boarding Facilities - Chapter 11. Pet Boarding Facilities

Summary: This chapter of statutes deals with the responsibilities that pet boarding facility operators must adhere to in the state of California. “Pet boarding facility” means any lot, building, structure, enclosure, or premises, or a portion thereof, whereupon four or more dogs, cats, or other pets in any combination are boarded at the request of, and in exchange for compensation provided by, their owner. Operators must ensure that the facility is in good repair, there is adequate pest control, an owner is contacted if a pet escapes and reasonable efforts are made to capture the escaped pet, as well as other upkeep requirements. The chapter also provides enclosure standards and animal care requirements including fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Animal control or qualified humane officers enforce violations of the chapter.

This chapter of statutes deals with the responsibilities that pet boarding facility operators must adhere to in the state of California. “Pet boarding facility” means any lot, building, structure, enclosure, or premises, or a portion thereof, whereupon four or more dogs, cats, or other pets in any combination are boarded at the request of, and in exchange for compensation provided by, their owner. Operators must ensure that the facility is in good repair, there is adequate pest control, an owner is contacted if a pet escapes and reasonable efforts are made to capture the escaped pet, as well as other upkeep requirements. The chapter also provides enclosure standards and animal care requirements including fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Animal control or qualified humane officers enforce violations of the chapter.

MD - Swap Meets - § 19-105. Sales or other transfers of dogs or cats at public places

Summary: This 2016 law states that a person may not offer for sale, sell, offer to transfer, transfer, barter, trade, or auction a dog or cat at any public place, including a street, parking lot, carnival, swap meet, or fair, among others. The act does not apply to an animal welfare organization or animal control unit displaying dogs or cats for adoption or a prearranged sale of a dog by a dog breeder if not a recurring event. Violation results in a $500 civil penalty for a first violation, a $1,000 civil penalty for a second violation, and a civil penalty for a $1,500 for a third or subsequent violation.

This 2016 law states that a person may not offer for sale, sell, offer to transfer, transfer, barter, trade, or auction a dog or cat at any public place, including a street, parking lot, carnival, swap meet, or fair, among others. The act does not apply to an animal welfare organization or animal control unit displaying dogs or cats for adoption or a prearranged sale of a dog by a dog breeder if not a recurring event. Violation results in a $500 civil penalty for a first violation, a $1,000 civil penalty for a second violation, and a civil penalty for a $1,500 for a third or subsequent violation.

Salazar v. Kubic

Summary: At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed.

At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed.

Rotunda v. Haynes

Summary: The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed.

The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed.

Nuijens v. Novy

Summary: Plaintiff brought this action in Small Claims Court for the recovery of $254.63 after purchasing a dog from the Defendant. At the time of purchase, the Defendant gave a five day guarantee to the Plaintiff that if a veterinarian found anything wrong with the dog, the dog could be returned and the Plaintiff would receive a refund. The Plaintiff took the dog to a vet within five days and although she was told that the dog had a urinary infection, the Plaintiff kept the dog. Within 14 days of the sale, the Plaintiff learned that the infection was serious, and she contacted the Defendant requesting a refund under article 35-B of the General Business Law. The Court stated that Plaintiff's cause of action under the General Business Law failed: because it did not give the Plaintiff the right to recover damages, since the statute only covered "pet dealers" or "breeders" who sold more than one litter of animals per year. There was no evidence to indicate that the Defendant sold more than one litter of puppies. Also, because the Plaintiff chose not to return the dog for a refund within five days after learning about the infection, she could not seek recovery for breach of an express warranty (UCC 2-313). Lastly, because the Defendant was not a “merchant" the Plaintiff could not recover for the breach of an implied warranty (UCC 2-314).

Plaintiff brought this action in Small Claims Court for the recovery of $254.63 after purchasing a dog from the Defendant. At the time of purchase, the Defendant gave a five day guarantee to the Plaintiff that if a veterinarian found anything wrong with the dog, the dog could be returned and the Plaintiff would receive a refund. The Plaintiff took the dog to a vet within five days and although she was told that the dog had a urinary infection, the Plaintiff kept the dog. Within 14 days of the sale, the Plaintiff learned that the infection was serious, and she contacted the Defendant requesting a refund under article 35-B of the General Business Law. The Court stated that Plaintiff's cause of action under the General Business Law failed: because it did not give the Plaintiff the right to recover damages, since the statute only covered "pet dealers" or "breeders" who sold more than one litter of animals per year. There was no evidence to indicate that the Defendant sold more than one litter of puppies. Also, because the Plaintiff chose not to return the dog for a refund within five days after learning about the infection, she could not seek recovery for breach of an express warranty (UCC 2-313). Lastly, because the Defendant was not a “merchant" the Plaintiff could not recover for the breach of an implied warranty (UCC 2-314).