Barking Dogs

Summary: This California law prohibits any owner or property manager from advertising a requirement, refusing occupancy of, or otherwise requiring a prospective tenant to declaw or devocalize any animal allowed on the premises. A city attorney, district attorney, or other law enforcement prosecutorial entity has standing to enforce this section and may sue for declaratory relief or injunctive relief for a violation of this section. Violation results in a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.

Summary: Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile, Alabama's public nuisance ordinances. The nuisance convictions stem from an anonymous complaint about multiple barking dogs at Wallen's property. After receiving the tip in March of 2016, an animal control officer drove to the residence, parked across the street, and, as he sat in his car, heard dogs bark continuously for approximately ten minutes. That same day, a local realtor went to house that was for sale behind Wallen's property and heard an "overwhelming" noise of dogs barking continuously for 30-45 minutes. For almost a year, officers received complaints about noise coming from Wallen's house. In May of 2017, Wallen entered a plea of not guilty for multiple charges of violating the public nuisance ordinance in Mobile Circuit Court. She also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague. Her motion was later denied, and a jury trial was held where Wallen was found guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. On appeal, Wallen first argues that the public nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. However, the court found that Wallen did not establish how the overbreadth doctrine applied to her case and how the ordinance was unconstitutional. As to her next vagueness challenge, Wallen contended that the ordinance had no objective standards to determine whether a dog's barking is disturbing or unreasonable. This court disagreed, finding the statute defines what are "disturbing noises" (which specifically states barking), and other courts previously established that the term "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not vague. Finally, the found that Wallen's last general argument, that the code is unconstitutional as applied to her, did not satisfy court rules with respect to issues presented and support with authority on appeal. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

Summary: In this case, the plaintiffs appealed a Zoning Board that granted their neighbor a special permit allowing four dogs to be kept at Ms. Sullivan's home. The dogs—pedigreed Eurasiers—are Ms. Sullivan's personal pets and live with Ms. Sullivan inside her house, have someone with them at all times, and spend most of their time indoors. When they are outside, they are confined to a chain-link fenced-in area behind the house. The permit has some conditions that must be met for the dogs to remain on the property, one of which is the dogs not become a nuisance. The court affirmed the grant of the special permit based on the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial after assessing the credibility, weight, and appropriate inferences to be drawn from that evidence. The Board's decision granting the special permit was AFFIRMED.

Summary: This Pennsylvania statute provides that the owners or operators of licensed dog training areas shall not be subject to any action for nuisance, and no court in this Commonwealth shall enjoin the use or operation of training areas on the basis of noise or noise pollution, provided that the owners were and remain in compliance with any applicable noise control laws or ordinances at the time the permit for establishment of the training areas was authorized.

Summary: This Pennsylvania statute provides that all owners and operators of dog training and special retriever training areas licensed by the Pennsylvania Game Commission shall be exempt and immune from any civil action or criminal prosecution in any manner relating to noise provided they were and remain in compliance with any applicable noise control laws or ordinances at the time the permit for establishment of the training area was authorized.

Summary: These statutes represent Pennsylvania's Dog Law, and contain provisions related to licensing, rabies quarantines, kennels, and the dangerous dog chapter. The significant features of the law include a statewide control requirement for dogs (Section 305) and provisions for "dangerous dogs" (Section 501 et. seq.). Under the latter, any person may kill any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing or wounding or killing any domestic animal, including household pets, or pursuing, wounding or attacking human beings, whether or not such a dog bears a required license tag. There is no liability on such persons in damages or otherwise for such killing.

Summary: These Montana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include strict liability for all dog bites, authority for counties to enact ordinances regarding dangerous dogs, barking dogs, and destruction of unlicensed dogs, as well as general laws related to registration and licensing.

Summary:

The following comprises Aurora, Colorado's animal-related ordinances. In addition to the standard ordinances dealing with number restrictions, at-large animals, barking dogs, and licensing, the city has two important provisions. First, the city makes it unlawful to own, possess or keep any dog, rabbit, or cat over the age of 6 months that has not been spayed or neutered (subject to some exceptions). Second, it is unlawful for any person to have, own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport, or sell within the city any pit bull or restricted breed of dog. "Restricted breeds" include any American Bulldog (Old Country Bulldog), Dogo Argentino, Canary Dog (Canary Island Dog, Presa Canario, Perro De Presa Canario), Presa Mallorquin (Pero De Presa Mallorquin, Ca De Bou), Tosa Inu (Tosa Fighting Dog, Japanese Fighting Dog, Japanese Mastiff), Cane Corso (Cane Di Macellaio, Sicilian Branchiero), Fila Brasileiro or any dog displaying the majority of physical traits of any one or more of the above breeds.

Summary:

In this Oregon case, the defendant appealed a conviction for violating Hood River County Ordinances (HRCO) under which the owner of a dog may not allow it "to become a public nuisance * * * " by "[d]isturb[ing] any person by frequent or prolonged noises[.]" (Her dog was reported to have barked for six straight hours.)  The defendant argued that the ordinances are invalid as applied to her because ORS 30.935 immunizes farm practices from the application of local government ordinances.  The defendant operated a farm with a herd of 60 cashmere and angora goats on land that bordered a national forest and used her dogs to keep predators at bay.  The Court of Appeals noted that once defendant raised the defense of the right to farm practice, the county had the burden of disproving it, which it failed to do.  Further, the trial court erred by disregarding uncontested facts that established defendant's immunity.

Summary:

An Ohio dog owner was convicted in the Municipal Court, Franklin County, of harboring an unreasonably loud or disturbing animal as prohibited by city ordinance. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the owner contended that the term “unreasonable” in the ordinance “does not provide enough explanation to allow the average person to know what behavior is permissible.” The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and was not unconstitutionally vague as applied.