Anti-Cruelty

Summary: Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty).

Summary: This Colorado statute relates to mandatory reporting for child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, the statute requires veterinarians, officers and agents of the state bureau of animal protection, and animal control officers to report suspected abuse or neglect as described in the law.

Summary: This Maine statute relates to mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect and permissive reporting of suspected animal abuse or neglect. With regard to animal-related issues, subsection (1)(A)(29) requires a humane agent employed by the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute. Subsection (1-A) makes an animal control officer (as defined in Title 7, section 3907, subsection 4) a "permitted reporter" who may report to the department when that person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is likely to be abused or neglected. Finally, subsection (6) allows all the described reporters in subsection (1) to be permissive reporters of suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect. These individuals may report a reasonable suspicion of animal cruelty, abuse or neglect to the local animal control officer or to the animal welfare program of the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry.

Summary: This California law states that any employee of a county child or adult protective services agency, while acting in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, who has knowledge of or observes an animal whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of cruelty, abuse, or neglect, may report the known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect to the entity or entities that investigate reports of animal cruelty, abuse, and neglect in that county. The statute details requirements for the reports.

Summary: This Virginia statute relates to mandated reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, subsection (A)(8) requires any law-enforcement officer or animal control officer to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute.

Summary: This Louisiana law states that any state or local law enforcement officer, or any employee of government or of a government contractor who in his professional capacity routinely investigates alleged abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child, or abuse or neglect of an adult, who becomes aware of evidence of neglect or abuse of an animal shall report such incident to the law enforcement authority of the governing authority in which the incident has occurred or the local animal welfare authority.

Summary: This Illinois law states that Investigation Specialists, Intact Family Specialists, and Placement Specialists employed by the Department of Children and Family Services who reasonably believe that an animal observed by them when in their professional or official capacity is being abused or neglected in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act must immediately make a written or oral report to the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Animal Health and Welfare.

Summary: Defendant appeals his conviction of animal abuse in the second degree (ORS 167.315). Neighbors witnessed him throwing his dog to the ground and called police. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he previously threw a cat to the ground 13-years prior to the current incident and submission of this evidence created unfair prejudice. The prosecution contended that this evidence was admitted for a noncharacter/nonpropsensity purpose under OEC 404(3) to establish defendant's subjective awareness of the risk of throwing pets the ground. On appeal, this court noted that animal abuse in the second degree requires the state to prove that defendant was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” At trial, the state introduced evidence that, in 2003, defendant threw a cat of his apartment window causing injury to the cat because it had defecated on the apartment floor. Defendant argued that there was an insufficient connection between the cat throwing incident and the current charge, and that the probative value of the evidence was at "best minimalistic." However, this court found that the cat throwing evidence was offered for a nonpropensity purpose of knowledge where it was reasonable to infer that defendant had a subjective awareness of the risks in throwing a pet to the ground. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that the evidence was relevant for the noncharacter purpose of establishing knowledge under OEC 404(3). The appellate court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence after hearing both sides and weighing the appropriate factors. Affirmed.

Summary: The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed.