Anti-Cruelty

Summary:

This Comment reviews the history of the horse-drawn carriage industry in New York City and details legislative efforts to regulate the business. Many cities in the United States feature horse-drawn carriages as a tourist attraction, but they are most associated with New York. The long-standing controversy over the working and living conditions of the horses that pull the cabs has garnered less national attention than other animal welfare issues, despite the fatalities and injuries suffered by the equines on traffic-choked Manhattan streets. Supporters of the industry defend it as an important contributor to the local economy, an iconic symbol of the city, and a source of livelihood for the operators. They maintain that municipal regulations are sufficient to protect the horses from mistreatment and the public from the perils of accidents involving carriages. However, city regulation has historically proven to be inadequate and ineffective in ensuring that the horses are not exposed to inhumane conditions. Moreover, the inherent hazards and stressors of New York City streets take a toll on the horses’ health and well-being that regulation cannot address. For these reasons, the protection of the horses and the public cannot be assured until the carriage business in the city is abolished. This Comment discusses the movement to ban the industry, including proposals that would replace the carriages with replicas of antique cars. With inadequate regulation and political obstacles to a ban, it may ultimately take a tide of public sentiment to end the suffering of carriage horses.

Summary:

In 2002, an animal protection clause was added to Article 20a of the German Constitution. Designed as a state objective, the nature of the animal protection clause decidedly influences its application. As a state objective, it is directed at all three branches of government, and each branch must ensure within its sphere of competence the realization of the stated goal. The Federal Constitutional Court has yet to address the precise scope of the provision.

This Article examines the likely future effects of the animal protection clause. With respect to the legislative branch, this Article addresses the question of whether the state objective demands that a standing provision be created for animal protection groups. With respect to the judicial and executive branches, this Article focuses on three fundamental rights that are most likely to come into conflict with animal protection: freedom of religion; freedom of teaching, science, and research; and freedom of artistic expression.

Seismic shifts in constitutional adjudication are not likely to be expected. The provision does not give rights to animals. However, at a minimum, it prohibits circumventing the Animal Protection Act by construing that statute in light of the Constitution. The animal protection clause removed the disproportionality between certain fundamental rights and the interest in animal protection. It mandates a balancing of constitutional interests and eliminates doubts regarding the constitutionality of the Animal Protection Act, especially with respect to the fundamental rights discussed.

Summary: This District of Columbia statute requires that any law enforcement or child protective services employee who knows or has reason to suspect than an animal is experiencing cruelty, abandonment, or neglect shall provide a report of the abuse within the specified time. The statute also states that any employee who observes an animal at the home of a person reasonably suspected of child, adult, or animal abuse should report it. The statute also specifies what information the report must include for completion.

Summary: These Connecticut statutes require state employees who work with children and families to also report suspected animal harm, neglect, or cruelty. The statutes explain how the reporting should be completed and describes the implementation of training programs for employees to recognize animal abuse. The statutes also discuss the development of an annual report on actual or suspected instances of animal neglect or cruelty within the state.

Summary: This Maine statute lists the mandated reporters in the state who must immediately report known or suspected abuse, neglect, or exploitation, of an incapacitated or dependent adult. The statute also allows permissive reporting of animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect and allows animal control officers to make reports when necessary.

Summary: This Tennessee statute requires employees of child or adult protective service agencies to report animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect that they know or reasonably suspect to have occurred in their county. The statute also describes the amount of time that an employee may have to make a report and ensures the confidentiality of the employee. The statute also makes clear that it does not impose a duty on the employee to investigate known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect.

Summary: This Massachusetts statute provides that a state employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, who has knowledge of or observes an animal whom he knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of animal cruelty, abuse or neglect may report it to the entities that investigate these reports or any local animal control. The statute describes how to make the report, timing to submit, and who can make the report if 2 or more employees witness the abuse. The statute also makes clear that no person who makes a report shall be liable in any civil or criminal action if the report was made in good faith.

Summary:

Plaintiff Milburn was acquitted of misdemeanor animal abuse on appeal, but a Lebanon police officer removed Milburns’ dog from her possession. While the appeal was pending, the Defendant, City of Lebanon, gave the dog to an animal shelter. The dog was later adopted by a new owner. The Linn County Circuit Court ordered the City to return the dog to Milburn after the acquittal but the Defendant City failed to comply. Milburn then brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of Lebanon. The City moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, and the United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, granted that motion while giving leave for Milburn to amend her complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Milburn contended that the City’s refusal to return her dog pursuant to the state court order deprived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milburn also asserted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, reasoned that while Milburn alleged a state-law property interest in her dog, she failed to allege that the Defendant City deprived her of that interest without adequate process. Milburn also did not allege state remedies to be inadequate. Those two omissions in combination were fatal to Miburn's procedural due process claim. Also, Milburn's assertion that the court issued an order and that the City did not comply with, is an attack on the result of the procedure. The court reasoned that attacking the result instead of the process of a procedure does not state a procedural due process claim. Milburn’s procedural due process claim was then dismissed. The Court also held that it did not have jurisdiction over Milburn’s injunctive relief claim. Therefore, Milburn's request for injunctive relief was dismissed with prejudice. However, the court held that Milburn could seek monetary damages. While Defendant City’s second motion to dismiss was granted, Milburn was granted leave to amend her complaint within 90 days with regard to her claim for actual and compensatory damages.

Summary:

Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied.

Summary: Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision.