Anti-Cruelty

Summary: Addressing a taboo rarely discussed in scholarly works, this Article analyzes frequently advanced arguments supporting prohibitions on bestiality. Though on a superficial level the arguments seem appealing, upon closer inspection the standard justifications break down under internal inconsistencies. A differently constructed theory may not only provide a rationalized, consistent basis for regulating bestiality, but also lend greater coherence to laws regulating sexuality in general. Part II of this Article explores arguments related to consent; Part III discusses bestiality impermissibly using animals as a means; Part IV examines public health arguments, largely relating to those diseases that can spread easily from humans to animals and vice versa; Part V explores arguments analogizing zoophilia to either pedophilia or homosexuality; and Part VI offers a new rationale for justifying prohibitions on bestiality.

Summary: This Act amends the Animal Welfare Act of 2006 (England and Wales). It makes it an offence to be cause unnecessary suffering to a service animal whilst in service, removing the defence to human safety from the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Also known as 'Finn's Law.'

Summary: The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge.

Summary: This Indiana chapter on pets in motor vehicles was enacted in 2017. Under the chapter, "domestic animal" means a dog, cat or other vertebrate animal kept as a household pet (not including livestock). Section 34-30-30-3 provides that a person who forcibly enters a motor vehicle to remove a domestic animal from a motor vehicle is liable for one-half the cost of repairing the damage to the motor vehicle caused by the forcible entry. To meet this immunity, the person must reasonably believe that the domestic animal is in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily harm. The person must do all the following first: (1) determine the motor vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary to remove the domestic animal; (2) call 911 or attempt to contact law enforcement/animal control; (3) use no more force than is necessary to remove the domestic animal from the vehicle; and (4) remain with the animal until first responders or law enforcement arrive. The statute gives complete immunity from the costs of damage to any first responder, law enforcement/animal control officer, public safety government employee, or veterinary professional. Finally, the chapter immunizes the owner of the domestic animal from liability for bites or physical injury to the rescuer.

Summary: This Arizona law insulates a person from liability for civil damages when he or she uses reasonable force to enter a locked and unattended motor vehicle to remove a minor or confined domestic animal if certain factors apply. The person first must determine that the motor vehicle is locked or there is no reasonable manner in which the person can remove the minor or domestic animal from the vehicle. Before entering the vehicle, the person must notify law enforcement or first responders. No more force than is necessary to remove the animal or minor may be used and the person must remain with the minor or domestic animal until first responders arrive. For the purposes of this section, “domestic animal” means a dog, a cat or another animal that is domesticated and kept as a household pet.

Summary: This Nevada law, enacted in 2017, prohibits bestiality. Convicted violators face the relinquishing and permanently forfeiting ownership or possession of all animals which are in the same household as the person to an animal shelter, an organization that takes into custody animals which have been abused or neglected, or a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. The court may also impose a possession ban on owning or keeping any animal for a period determined by the court. Those convicted must undergo a psychological evaluation and any recommended counseling and must pay all reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance of the animal involved in the crime and any other animal relinquished by the person. If the person convicted of the crime of bestiality is not the owner of the animal involved in the crime, reimbursing the owner of the animal for all medical expenses incurred for treating the animal.

Summary: Appellant is appealing an animal cruelty conviction. A deputy dog warden received a report from a deputy sheriff who observed a pit bull on appellant's property who was unable to walk and in poor condition while responding to a noise complaint. Appellant released the dog to the deputy and the dog was later euthanized. While the deputy was on appellant's property she observed two other dogs that were extremely thin which prompted the deputy to return to the appellant's house the next day, but the appellant was in the hospital. The deputy later returned to the appellant's home a few days later and the appellant's ex-wife allowed the deputy to perform an animal welfare check on the property. Two Australian cattle dogs were very muddy and in an outdoor kennel with no food or water. Numerous chickens, rabbits, mice, snakes, and raccoons were also observed inside and outside the house all living in cramped, filthy conditions. The deputy went to the hospital and the appellant signed a waiver releasing the raccoons and snakes to the wildlife officer, but the appellant refused to release the other animals to the deputy. As a consequence a search warrant was obtained. "Two raccoons, 3 black rat snakes, 8 dogs, 7 chickens, 3 roosters, 17 rabbits, 5 rats, 200 mice, and 2 guinea pigs were removed from the property." Appellant was charged by complaints with five counts of cruelty to animals and two counts of cruelty to companion animals. An additional complaint was filed charging appellant with one count of cruelty to a companion animal (the euthanized pit bull). The appellant raised 3 errors on appeal. The first error is that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him of animal cruelty. The Court found that the complaint charging the appellant with animal cruelty in counts B, C, and D were not valid because it did not set forth the underlying facts of the offense, did not provide any of the statutory language, and failed to specify which of the 5 subsections the appellant allegedly violated. Therefore, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict the appellant and the animal cruelty conviction regarding the three counts for the rabbits was vacated. The second error appellant raised was that his conviction for cruelty to companion animals for the two Australian cattle dogs was not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court overruled appellant's second error because it found that the state had presented sufficient evidence to show that the appellant negligently failed to provide adequate food and water for the Australian cattle dogs. The third error the appellant raised was that the Court erred by ordering him to pay $831 in restitution. The Court also overruled appellant's third error since the appellant stipulated to paying the restitution. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in all other respects.

Summary: This 2018 Louisiana law states that there shall be no liability on the part of a person for property damage or trespass to a motor vehicle, if the damage was caused while the person was rescuing an animal in distress. The person must first do the following: (1) make a good-faith attempt to locate the owner before forcibly entering the vehicle (based on the circumstances); (2) contact local law enforcement/911 before forcibly entering; (3) determine the vehicle is locked and has a good-faith belief there is no other reasonable means for the animal to be removed; (3) believe that removal of the animal is necessary because the animal is in imminent danger of death; (4) use no more force than necessary to rescue the animal; (5) place a notice on the windshield providing details including contact information and the location of the animal; and (6) remain with the animal in a safe location reasonably close to the vehicle until first responders arrive. For purposes of the law, "animal” means any cat or dog kept for pleasure, companionship, or other purposes that are not purely commercial.

Summary: Warren, the defendant in this case, videotaped on his cell phone sexual encounters he had with K.H. and her dog. The videos showed the dog's tongue penetrating K.H.'s vagina while K.H. performed oral sex on Warren. In March of 2017, Deputy Sheriff Adam Reynolds spoke to Warren about an unrelated matter. Warren asked if "bestiality type stuff" was "legal or illegal," described the cellphone videos, and offered to show them to Reynolds. Reynolds contacted Investigator Janet Sergeant and they obtained a search warrant and removed the videos from Warren's cellphone. Warren was indicted and moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that Code § 18.2-361(A), which criminalizes soliciting another person to "carnally know a brute animal or to submit to carnal knowledge with a brute animal," is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. "He argued that the conduct depicted in the videos could not be subject to criminal sanction because it amounted to nothing more than consensual conduct involving adults." The trial court denied Warren's motion to dismiss. The trial court convicted Warren of the charged offense. Warren appealed again challenging the constitutionality of the offense and that it violated his due process rights. Warren relied on a Supreme Court case, Lawrence v. Texas, which held that two adults engaging in consensual homosexual sexual practices was protected by the due process clause. He argued that the reasoning of Lawrence applies with equal force to his case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that although Code § 18.2-361(A) cannot criminalize sodomy between consenting adults, it can continue to regulate other forms of sodomy, like bestiality. "If Lawrence, which involved a prohibition on same-sex sodomy, did not facially invalidate the anti-sodomy provision of then Code § 18.2-361(A), it defies logic that it facially invalidates the bestiality portion of the statute that existed before the 2014 amendment and is all that remains after that amendment." Even though Warren claims his right as "the right of adults to engage in consensual private conduct without intervention of the government," the court concluded that the right he is actually asserting is the right to engage in bestiality. Code § 18.2-361(A) "does not place any limitation on the rights of consenting adults to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial, sexual acts with each other." The only act it prohibits is sexual conduct with a brute animal. Therefore, the only right the statute could possibly infringe on wold be the right to engage in bestiality. The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in banning sex with animals. The Court of Appeals held that the General Assembly's prohibition of bestiality does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The Court rejected Warren's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Summary: In 2015, Kristen Lindsey, who is a licensed veterinarian, killed a cat on her property by shooting it through the head with a bow and arrow. Lindsey had seen the cat fighting with her cat and defecating in her horse feeders and believed the cat to be a feral cat. However, there was evidence that the cat actually belonged to the neighbor and was a pet. Lindsey posted a photo of herself holding up the dead cat by the arrow. The photo was shared repeatedly and the story ended up reported on several news outlets. The Board received more than 700 formal complaints and more than 2,700 emails about the incident. In 2016 the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) initiated disciplinary proceedings against Lindsey seeking to revoke her license and alleging violations of the Veterinary Licensing Act and Administrative Rules. While the proceeding was pending, Lindsey filed a petition for declaratory judgment and equitable relief in the trial court. The grand jury declined to indict her for animal cruelty. Due to this, Lindsey asserted that the Board lacked the authority to discipline her because she had not been convicted of animal cruelty and her act did not involve the practice of veterinary medicine. The administrative law judges in the administrative-licensing proceeding issued a proposal for decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law which the Board adopted and issued a final order suspending Lindsey's license for five years (with four years probated). Lindsey then filed a petition for judicial review in trial court after the Board denied her motion for a rehearing. The trial court affirmed the Board's final order. This case involves two appeals that arise from the disciplinary proceeding filed against Lindsey by the Board. Lindsey appeals the first case (03-16-00549-CV) from the trial court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the Board's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her suit challenging the Board's authority to bring its disciplinary action. In the second case (17-005130-CV), Lindsey appeals from the trial court affirming the Board's final decision in the disciplinary proceeding. Even though Lindsey was not convicted of animal cruelty, the Court of Appeals held that the Board possessed the authority to determine that the offense of animal cruelty was sufficiently connected to the practice of veterinary medicine. Lindsey also did not have effective consent from the neighbor to kill the cat. The Board had sufficient evidence that Lindsey tied her profession to the shooting of the cat through the caption that she put on the photo that was posted on social media. The Court of Appeals ultimately overruled Lindsey's challenges to the Board's authority to seek disciplinary action against her veterinary license in both appeals as well as her challenges regarding the findings of fact and conclusions by the administrative law judges. The Court affirmed the judgment in both causes of action.